U.S. Navy via Getty Images
Summary
A U.S. Navy warship rescues an Iranian fishing boat crew held by pirates Jan. 5
Monsoon
season in the Indian Ocean is set to end sometime in late February.
Somali pirates will take advantage of the calmer waters to enlarge their
presence in the area. But several factors -- including armed
contractors on commercial vessels, land-based security clampdowns and a
more sophisticated international military response -- may limit the
pirates' success.
Analysis
An
article from Somalia Report, a news agency specializing in Somali
affairs, has suggested that Somali pirates are readying their boats for
the end of monsoon season around Feb. 20, nearly coinciding with an
international conference to be held Feb. 23 in the United Kingdom on
Somalia and counterpiracy efforts. Indeed, calmer seas present greater
opportunity for hijackings and other piratic activities. Of course, Feb.
20 is merely an approximation, and meteorological phenomena like
monsoons may continue for weeks after this date. But soon the weather
will clear, and Somali pirates will embark on a new season of activity.
Every year from 2008 to 2011 Somali pirates expanded the areas in which they operated. But in 2011, their areas of operation contracted,
due in part to the increased use of armed guards on commercial vessels
and monitoring by anti-piracy naval forces. It is unclear whether this
trend will continue. So far in 2012, only one vessel and three fishing
boats have been hijacked by pirates, whereas eight commercial vessels
had been hijacked by this point last year. In any case, the end of
monsoon season invariably will give rise to an increased pirate presence
in the greater Indian Ocean basin. Whether this presence leads to
additional hijackings depends on a variety of factors.
In 2012, Somali pirates so far have favored the same ports as in the
past, particularly those between Harardhere in southern Somalia and
Bandar Bayla in northern Somalia. However, a new port known as Harfan,
located on a northern Somali peninsula that juts out into the Indian
Ocean toward Socotra Island, is gaining recognition as a port from which
pirates conduct their operations. According to reports, heightened
security in Haradhere, El-Dhanane and Garacad has led more than 100
pirates to relocate to Harfan in the past five months alone. Further
security clampdowns could lead to other alternative ports.
Already there is evidence that pirates are venturing outside their
traditional areas of operations. On Jan. 20, there was an attempted
hijacking of a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Oman. While Somali
pirates have occasionally operated in the area before, they have never
successfully hijacked a commercial vessel. Doing so would indicate their
expansion into a new area.
In our 2012 Piracy Annual,
we noted the relatively new trend that Somali pirates could begin
hijacking vessels within or just outside commercial ports, evidenced by
the August 2011 hijacking of the MV Fairchem Bogey within the Salalah,
Oman port limits. Already in 2012 we have seen another instance of this
trend. On Jan. 23, pirates attempted to hijack a commercial vessel just
outside the port of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
There is also evidence in 2012 of a tactical development in Somali
piracy not seen in recent years. In January, pirates who had boarded the
FV Shiuh Fu No. 1 cut off the captain's arm to convince the ship's
owners to pay a ransom. Typically, pirates eschew physical violence
against hostages; pirates are happy as long as they get paid. If such
violence becomes habitual, anti-piracy operations increasingly may be
carried out by various special operations forces -- though such
operations would be conducted only by the country of the abducted
individuals and if it has the intelligence to do so.
Such was the case in January, when U.S. Special Forces rescued
American Jessica Buchanan and her Danish co-captive. This demonstrated
how the U.S. military will respond to such incidents. (Notably, the
military had the requisite intelligence to act, and Buchanan's health
condition provided an added impetus for action.) Accordingly, pirates
may begin to house hostages on commercial vessels, given that vessels
are more difficult to raid than smaller skiffs or land-based facilities.
While the end of monsoon season will result in a larger presence of
pirate vessels, several factors may limit their successes. Armed
contractors continue to be used on commercial ships in 2012, and this
year no vessel carrying these contractors has been successfully
hijacked. Thus, we expect they will continue to be deployed in 2012. In
addition, the U.S. Navy reportedly is retrofitting the USS Ponce to be
used by special operations forces in the Central Command area of
operations, and anti-piracy operations fall into their purview.
Moreover, domestic Somali forces, including those of Galmudug and
Puntland, as well as the pro-Somali government Sufi militia Ahlu Sunnah
Waljamaah, have been arresting pirates in the regions they control. This
is an indication that land-based forces are also pressuring pirate
activity. Such measures may be more effective at reducing piracy over
the long term than arming merchant ships, but it remains to be seen if
this pressure on land can be sustained.
In the past Somali pirates have been adept at developing
countermeasures, so armed anti-piracy tactics alone may not bring about
an end to piracy off Somalia's waters. The end of the monsoon season may
embolden pirates to increase their presence, but it does not ensure
their success rate.
* Article publicat al web de Stratfor. L'evolució de les accions contra la pirateria és quelcom que cal seguir especialment, donada la dependència de l'economia catalana respecte a les víes marítimes de comunicació.
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