China Unveiled its First VLFS Project Similar to the US Military Mobile Offshore Base Concept*

China unveiled its first "Very Large Floating Platform" project which appears to be a 21st century iteration of the US Military "Mobile Offshore Base" concept. The project was unveiled to the public during the "National Defense Science and Technology Achievements" exhibition held recently in Beijing.

It is reported that the very large floating structures (VLFS) is thousands of meters long and made up of floating modules connected together. It can be assembled as required and used as a floating pier, logistics base and airport.

A large floating island or airport or sea base can be achieved by linking a several floating platforms, which is very valuable for military and civilian use, said an expert when interviewed by Shenzhen TV. 

US Mobile offshore base

The mobile offshore base (MOB) idea was first seriously considered when the United States entered Operation Desert Shield (1990–91). MOB is a concept for supporting military operations where conventional land bases are not available. With the MOB concept the U.S. could have a base anywhere in the world in as little as a month. A MOB could accomodate and deploy conventional fighters and even large carge aircraft like the C-17 Globemaster III as well as landing craft. Such a floating offshore base has been researched and proposed, but never developed.

Future will tell if unlike the U.S., the Chinese military decides to go ahead, develop and actually produce a VLFS/mobile offshore base.

* Notícia publicada a Navy Recognition. No sabem fins a quin punt Beijing disposa d'un projecte sòlid o és propaganda institucional i/o una "maskirovka". Ara bé, que el projecte, com diu l'article, va existir als Estats Units. Es fa difícil determinar les seves aplicacions en un teatre d'operacions, doncs un cop desplegat disposa d'una mobilitat quasi nul·la. Ara bé, les seves pròpies dimensions (i una estructura modular), fan d'aquesta plataforma quelcom capaç d'encaixar molts danys. Restarem a l'expectativa.

The Rapid Expansion of China’s Navy in Five Charts*

With tensions mounting over China’s island-building in the South China Sea, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence has published its first report on the Chinese navy since 2009. The report, released late Thursday (pdf) predicts: “In the next decade, China will complete its transition from a coastal navy to a navy capable of multiple missions around the world.”

The report says that in 2014, China reclaimed hundreds of acres of land at the seven features it occupies in the disputed Spratly Islands and “appears to be building much larger facilities that could eventually support both maritime law enforcement and naval operations.” It also confirms that China’s newest destroyers have been fitted with a new kind of vertically launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, called the YJ-18, which could significantly enhance their capacity to threaten U.S. ships.

Here are five graphics that illustrate some its other key findings:

1) China’s coast guard and maritime law enforcement fleet is now bigger than those of Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines combined. The coast guard will add 50 ships to its fleet between 2012 and 2015, increasing its overall force by 25 percent.

2) China launched more naval ships than any other country in 2013 and 2014, and is expected to continue this trend through 2015-16.

3) The range of Chinese naval surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles is increasing. China’s newest class of destroyer, the LUYANG III, is fitted with the new YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile which Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College says in a blog post “could pose unprecedented challenges to the air defenses of U.S. and allied ships.”

4) China’s submarine force currently consists of five nuclear attack submarines, four nuclear ballistic missile submarines and 57 diesel attack submarines. By 2020, that force will likely grow to more than 70 submarines.

5) According to the report, China’s navy will soon assume a central role in the country’s nuclear deterrence, launching ballistic missile submarine patrols with intercontinental-range missiles. “As we look ahead to the coming decade, the introduction of aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and potentially a large-deck amphibious ship will fundamentally alter how the PLA(N) operates and is viewed by the world,”it says.

– Jeremy Page. Follow him on Twitter @JNBPage

* Notícia publicada al Wall Street Journal. Clar i concís resum de punts clau en l'expansió navla xinesa, que publiva l'ONI cada any. Per aquells qui vulguin accedir al document complet, cliqueu aquí.

Japan’s Biggest Warship Since World War II Enters Service*

(Bloomberg) -- Japan’s armed forces took control of their biggest warship since World War II, underscoring Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s drive to strengthen the nation’s military.

The Izumo, a 19,500-ton helicopter carrier, will improve the Self-Defense Forces’ capacity to deal with submarines, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters after inspecting the ship at the Japan Marine United Corp. shipyard in the port city of Yokohama, near Tokyo. The 248-meter (814-foot) vessel can carry 470 personnel and as many as nine helicopters.

Since taking office in 2012, Abe has reversed a decade-long decline in defense spending, lifted a ban on arms exports and reinterpreted the pacifist constitution to allow Japan to defend other countries. The defense push is adding to tensions with China over a territorial dispute that threatens the trade relationship between Asia’s two largest economies.

“As well as having the capacity to search for submarines itself, it will be able to deal with submarines over a larger area as it’s equipped with a lot of helicopters,” Nakatani said, adding that he wasn’t referring to any specific country.

In May 2013, Japan said it detected submarines navigating under water close to territorial waters near Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures. The government is seeking to toughen the measures Japan can legally take under its pacifist constitution in the event of a “gray zone” situation that doesn’t amount to an armed attack on the nation.

A second ship of the same size and specifications is set to be introduced in early 2018.

The vessels are also capable of carrying Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. Ospreys can take off and land like a helicopter and fly long distances like a fixed-wing plane, giving the ships some of the capabilities of a small aircraft carrier.

Nakatani stressed the Izumo’s capacity to help out in disaster relief and peace-keeping operations.

“China has aircraft carriers,” Nakatani said. “The Izumo isn’t designed to carry fixed-wing aircraft,” he said, adding that Japan wasn’t thinking of operating it like an aircraft carrier.

* Notícia publicada a Bloomberg. Ja havíem fet esment de l'Izumo anteriorment i, si bé els comentaris sobre les seves capacitats ASW són certes, també ho és que no només serveixen per això. Són un portaavions VTOL en potència o, com ja apunta l'article, una plataforma per assalts verticals.

The US Navy’s New Surface Warfare Strategy: ‘Distributed Lethality’*

By Franz-Stefan Gady
January 16, 2015

The United States Navy plans to re-organize and re-equip its surface fleet by grouping ships into small surface action groups and increasing the number of anti-ship weapons on more platforms. The U.S. Navy calls this tactical shift “distributed lethality.”

Breaking Defense quotes, Rear Admiral Peter Fanta and his rough summary of the concept of “distributed lethality”: “If it floats, it fights, that’s ‘distributed lethality’ (…) Make every cruiser, destroyer, amphib, LCS, a thorn in somebody else’s side.” Fanta, the director for Surface Warfare on the Navy staff, spoke at the annual Surface Navy Association National Symposium, which took place in Arlington, Virginia this week.

Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, commander of Naval Surface Forces, further elaborated on the tactical shift at the symposium, as military.com reports: “We’re going to up-gun as many existing platforms as we can to achieve more total lethality.” Speakers at the symposium noted that the Navy will overhaul ships in service with low-cost weapon and sensor upgrades including Aegis destroyers, cruisers, supply ships, and littoral combat ships. However, more details on the specifics of this reshuffle will only emerge when the president’s 2016 budget request comes out next month.

In 2014, the U.S. Navy had to endure politically motivated budget cuts and a hiring freeze delaying retrofits and maintenance of Navy vessels. This trend will likely continue in 2015. “Budget is coming down,” Fanta emphasized. This should be placed in perspective: In 2014, the U.S. Navy deployed tonnage equal to that of the sixteen next-largest navies combined.

The tactical “distributed lethality” shift is largely due to the increasing anti-access/area denial capabilities of the armed forces of China and Iran but also Russia. In an article in Proceedings Magazine, published by the U.S. Naval Institute, Vice Admiral Rowden, Rear Admiral Fanta, and Rear Admiral Peter Gumataotao, outlined the reasons behind the re-organization of the surface fleet by arguing that, “the shift to the offensive responds to the development of increasingly capable A2/AD weapons and sensors designed specifically to deny U.S. naval forces the freedom of maneuver necessary to project power.(…) Adversaries who counter this advantage diminish the deterrent value of forward-deployed forces and negatively impact the assurances we provide to friends and allies. A shift to the offensive is necessary to ‘spread the playing field,’ providing a more complex targeting problem while creating more favorable conditions to project power where required.”

As of now, the U.S. Navy still lacks an adequate long-range, anti-surface weapon to implement a re-organization of the surface fleet based on the “distributed lethality” idea. One possible future acquisition could be the Norwegian Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile, yet no decisions on the procurement of new weapon systems has been made as of now. The authors of the Proceeding Magazine article also outline additional requirements for their vision, such as improved intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance and data relay, low-cost medium range strike weapons, and new railguns.

This new tactical reorganization is a clear indication that the days when the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet just served as air defense elements for carrier strike groups, floating bastions for ballistic missile defense, and strike platforms for land attacks are over. It remains to be seen how the Chinese and Russian navies will respond to the shift.

* Article publicat a The Diplomat. Recomanem la lectura d'aquest article, i dels seus enllaços, doncs la US Navy fa temps que necessita redistrubuïr la seva potència de foc. Per descomptat, cal alliberar destructors i creurers de les tasques de "pantalla" als CSG, però es l'exessiva concentració de la potència de foc en un determinat tipus de naus, genera vulnerabilitats.

SEIZING THE ASUW INITIATIVE WITH LAND BASED PATROL AIRCRAFT*

By Michael Glynn

Recent months have found uniformed officers and naval strategists writing and speaking about regaining the ability of U.S. Navy (USN) ships to conduct offensive anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The discussion has been lively and featured many authors and many different approaches. Some solutions are incremental, such as fielding more capable long-range weapons in existing launch systems.[i] Others are more radical, such as trading large long-range missile defense interceptors for small point defense missiles and building a new generation of multi-role cruise missiles.[ii]

Missing from the discussion of future acquisitions and new weapons is how the USN can leverage existing land-based airpower to seize the offensive in ASuW. The P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft is deployed today, with the range, persistence, sensors, and network architecture to serve as a self-contained “kill chain.” It is able to disperse and operate in an expeditionary environment during peacetime or contingency operations. If equipped with more suitable long-range anti-ship weapons, this aircraft will provide greatly increased capability for the combatant commander. This will allow more flexibility for USN forces to operate in an A2/AD environment when a carrier is not nearby or in the interim until more capable surface-based ASuW weapons are fielded.

Framing the Challenge

During the last three decades, the USN has divested its surface forces of offensive anti-ship firepower as operations shifted to littoral environments with permissive threat profiles. With the retirement of the Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile, the service has been left without a weapon that can engage targets at a range beyond that of threat anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM’s).[iii] Our ships now go to sea armed only with the sub-sonic, medium range Harpoon missile. The removal of Harpoon from Flight IIA DDG-51’s after DDG-79 and proposed cuts to funding for cruisers have exacerbated this glaring deficiency.[iv] The onus for conducting maritime strike has shifted from our surface ships to the aircraft of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

As the reach and number of U.S. ASCM’s have decreased, threat systems have proliferated and improved in range, speed and sophistication. China, Russia, and India all possess advanced supersonic long-range ASCM’s. Foreign militaries are equipping themselves not only with the weapons needed to strike, but also the C4ISR capabilities needed to detect and accurately target adversary forces.[v]

Commanders, legislators, and the defense industry have responded with a variety of initiatives, including the development of an Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW.) This program is aimed at fielding an advanced cruise missile with sufficient range to allow USN ships to employ outside the reach of threat weapons systems. OASuW Increment 1 will begin fielding the Lockheed Martin Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) in FY17 for carriage on the F/A-18 Super Hornet and USAF B-1 bombers. OASuW Increment 2 will provide for integration of a long-range anti-surface capability onboard surface ships.[vi] By equipping the F/A-18 and B-1 with the ability to carry LRASM, the Department of Defense has signaled that regardless of eventual integration of OASuW onboard surface ships, carrier and land-based airpower will remain a key component of the U.S. anti-surface strategy.

Missing from this conversation on OASuW capabilities is the USN’s Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPR) force. The MPR community is recapitalizing with the P-8 Poseidon aircraft. The sensors, datalink capabilities, and expeditionary nature of this aircraft make it a natural choice to augment the lack of anti-surface punch. The P-8 and RQ-4C UAS are envisioned to play targeting roles in long-range ASuW engagements, so arming P-8 with upgraded weapons is a logical next step. The Poseidon can allow the fleet to seize the initiative in anti-surface employment, especially in situations where the threat makes the reality of deploying the CSG forward politically unpalatable or disadvantageous.

The Solution

The P-8 Poseidon is derived from the Boeing 737 aircraft. It features long-range, high transit speed, solid persistence, and will soon incorporate the ability to perform air-to-air refueling. The open architecture mission systems are easily reconfigurable and allow for rapid improvement of sensor and weapon capabilities. The P-8 features a Mobile Tactical Operations Center (MTOC), which aids in processing data collected during and after mission flights. The MTOC is fully expeditionary, allowing an MPR detachment to quickly relocate in peacetime or disperse away from main operating airfields and continue to fight in wartime.

The ability to disperse is especially critical in an A2/AD environment. The proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBM’s) and cruise missiles has allowed previously weak nations to hold an opponent’s forward bases at risk. By deploying aircraft to auxiliary fields away from large military installations, adversary commanders are faced with a much more challenging targeting problem. The increased cost of building more TBM’s may be daunting to a particular military, and the uncertainty of being able to destroy forward forces is a stabilizing influence. P-8’s ability to deploy to medium sized airfields and sustain itself during combat operations is a force multiplier.

P-8 will also carry the Raytheon Advanced Aerial Sensor (AAS) to provide standoff detection and targeting of maritime and land targets. Descended from the highly-classified APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System, AAS will provide Poseidon crews with the ability to detect, classify, and provide targeting solutions of threats even in highly congested littoral areas.[vii] In A2/AD environments with highly advanced surface to air missile systems, this ability to accurately detect threats from long-range and provide targeting updates to net-enabled weapons isn’t just beneficial, it’s critical.[viii]A MPR squadron equipped with AAS and appropriate weapons becomes its own self-contained targeting and strike force.

In short, P-8 offers a weapons platform that is uniquely suited to maritime strikes. Its crews are far more familiar with operating in the ASuW role than USAF bomber crews and culturally more pre-disposed to emphasize this mission set. The ability to act as an armed sensor platform allows the Poseidon to close the kill-chain itself. P-8 armed with suitable standoff weapons has the ability to detect and attrite adversary surface ships, preserving the ability for our surface forces to deploy forward in wartime, and decreasing the need for our carriers to surge forward into extremely high-risk areas to eliminate surface threats with the air wing. This provides increased flexibility to the combatant commander.

Needed Changes

The MPR force has the potential to act as a powerful ASuW strike force, however this capability can grow stronger with upgrades and training. P-8 should be equipped with an OASuW capability, ideally allowing it to carry the LRASM rounds that will enter production in FY17. The largest roadblock will not be carriage capability or weapons system engineering, rather finding the funding to provide integration and testing for this weapon onboard P-8.

The P-8 currently carries the Harpoon Block IC, which is insufficient for high-end ASuW. The Block IC is not net-enabled, meaning it cannot receive in-flight updates from targeting platforms via a datalink. This makes the weapon less flexible and precise in congested environments. The aircraft is slated to receive the Harpoon Block II, which is net-enabled, but is still constrained by its short range.[ix] This lack of reach prevents it from engaging high-end air defense warships without putting the P-8 and its crew at serious risk.

It is best to utilize the synergy that exists in MPR squadrons and equip these aircraft with both the sensors and the weapons required for standoff targeting and strike. Since AAS equipped P-8’s may be required to provide targeting support to OASuW in a complex surface environment, equipping the targeting aircraft with weapons is the logical next step to close the kill chain. Once P-8 is equipped with LRASM, crews must be required to train frequently with AAS equipped targeting aircraft and LRASM equipped shooter aircraft against representative threat pictures. Maritime targeting is a very dynamic and challenging game, and requires practice to execute properly.[x]

Summary

Equipping the MPR force with a long-range strike capability will capitalize on existing sensors, platforms, and aircrew skills. The ability to call on an existing force structure with incremental upgrades provides a solution to a glaring deficiency in the Navy’s ASuW capabilities. The ability to task highly mobile aircraft rather than SSN’s or carriers to provide ASuW firepower provides a commander with increased options and flexibility. This can reduce risk while raising the enemy’s uncertainty about U.S. operational intentions.

American patrol crews gained fame during World War II for their nighttime raids on Japanese shipping. Operating alone and independent of the carrier they provided a critical force to weaken enemy logistics capability and to disrupt sea lines of control. It is fitting that almost three quarters of a century later we consider the role of our current MPR force. The P-8 can add to our ASuW capability if we make the decision now to properly equip it and provide training to aircrews.

Lieutenant Michael Glynn is an active-duty naval aviator and graduate of the University of Pennsylvania. He most recently served as a P-8 instructor pilot and mission commander with Patrol Squadron (VP) 16. He currently serves as an instructor flying the T-45 with the ‘Fighting Redhawks’ of Training Squadron (VT) 21. The views expressed in this article are entirely his own.

[i] Robert Crumplar and Peter Morrison, “Beware the Anti-Ship Cruise Missile,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 140, no. 1 (January 2014), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014-01/beware-antiship-cruise-missile.

[ii] Bryan Clark, Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/A-Plan-To-Reinvigorate-US-Navy-Surface-Warfare.pdf.

[iii] Charlie Williams, “Increasing Lethality in Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW),” Center for International Maritime Security, May 31, 2014,http://cimsec.org/increasing-lethality-anti-surface-warfare-asuw-minor-less-minor-course-corrections/11478.

[iv] “LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch,” Defense Industry Daily, October 15, 2014, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lrasm-missiles-reaching-for-a-long-reach-punch-06752/.

[v] Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, (Washington, D.C., 2014), 34.

[vi] LRASM Missiles, Defense Industry Daily.

[vii] Bill Sweetman, “Navy Moves Forward On Advanced Airborne Radar,” Aviation Week, June 18, 2012, http://aviationweek.com/awin/navy-moves-forward-advanced-airborne-radar.

[viii] Bill Sweetman, Christina Mackenzie, and Andy Nativi, “Net Enabled Weapons Drive Sea Warfare Change,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 3, 2012, http://aviationweek.com/awin/net-enabled-weapons-drive-sea-warfare-change.

[ix] Richard R. Burgess, “A ‘Year of Transition’ for the P-8A Poseidon,”Seapower, April 9, 2013, http://seapowermagazine.org/sas/stories/20130409-p-8a.html.

[x] Maksim Y. Tokarev, “Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy,” Naval War College Review, vol. 67, no. 1, (Winter 2014), 61-84. It should be noted that Soviet Tu-95RT “Bear-D” reconnaissance and targeting aircraft were equipped with Uspekh-1 “Big Bulge” maritime search and targeting radar. This system did not feature Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) capabilities for standoff imaging and identification. The P-8 AAS system and APY-10 search radar both feature ISAR capabilities, simplifying long-range identification challenges. Modern employment scenarios would find ISR aircraft much better able to identify a contact once it had been located and would not be as chaotic as the Soviet experience that Tokarev describes. Maritime targeting still remains an arena that is inherently dynamic and therefore requires proper training to execute reliably and efficiently.

* Article publicat al CIMSEC. Recomanem una lectura reflexiva d'aquest article per la importància que poden tenir els P-8 en la funció ASuW. En un moment en que la major part dels destructors i creuers de la Navy estan lligats a tasques de protecció d'unitats d'alt valor estratègic, els P-8 podrien complementar el buit que queda en operacions contra unitats de superfície. No obstant, mentre se'n analitzin les possibilitats i s'incorporin a l'entrenament i a la doctrina de la US Navy, no podem esperar que aquesta tecnologia per si sola sigui una veritable solució.

PLA's new Type 1130 CIWS can intercept Mach 4 missiles*

Russian media has reported that China's latest indigenous Type 1130 close-in weapon system can fire 10,000 rounds per minute and destroy 90% of hypersonic missiles traveling at a speed four times the speed of sound, reports our Chinese-language sister paper Want Daily.

The system, which is the third-generation of the close-in weapon system developed by China, was recently spotted being installed on a PLA Type 054A frigate.

Compared to its seven-barreled Type 730 predecessor, the Type 1130's Gatling-type gun has the same 30 mm caliber but the number of barrels increased to 11. While the Type 730 has only one magazine which contains 250 rounds, the latest gun carries two magazines each containing 640 rounds. The design allows the gun to fire over 10,000 rounds per minute and raise its hit rate against missiles traveling at Mach 4 to 90%, according to the Russian media outlet cited.

Though the mammoth rotary cannon has been placed on a Type 054A frigate that only has around a 4,000-ton displacement, the Russian media claimed the system should be deployed on ships with a displacement over 12,000 tons due to its size and weight as well as the amount of electricity it consumes.

The system has been installed on both sides of China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. The Russian media predicted that the system will be deployed on the country's latest guided missile destroyer, the Type 055, in the future.

The Type 1103 will not completely replace the Type 730. Destroyers such as the Types 052, 052B, 052C, 052D and 051C will continue using the latter.

* Notícia publicada a Want China Times. La millora dels sistemes de defensa de punt és quelcom imprescindible. Amb la proliferació de míssils súper o hipersònics, el temps és clau, i no convé refiar-se dels SAM per la destrucció dels ASCM a llarga distància. De fet, no cal que siguin molt ràpids per provocar sorpreses desagradables si passen inadvertits al radar. D'aquí la importància de solucions d'últim recurs.

Coast Guard Admiral: LCS ‘an Incredible Ship’ for Drug Interdiction*

By RICHARD R. BURGESS, Managing Editor

WASHINGTON — The Coast Guard’s deputy commandant for operations has high praise for the littoral combat ship (LCS) as a platform for intercepting drug-running boats.

“What an incredible ship … tailor-made for that mission set,” said VADM Charles D. Michel, speaking of the LCS Dec. 4 to an audience at the Defense Forum, an event sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute.

The LCS has performed drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean Sea area in support of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South (JIATF-South), the drug-interdiction headquarters in Key West, Fla. The LCSs supported the task force during transits to their new homeport, San Diego, by way of the Panama Canal.

The high speed of the LCS plus its helicopter capability and now Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle capability make it suitable for running down the go-fast boats favored by drug runners.

Michel, a previous director of JIATF-South, said that a shortage of surface vessels was the main challenge in the drug interdiction effort in the Caribbean area. The over-tasked Coast Guard cutters have been augmented for decades by the Navy’s Perry-class frigates, but they are being retired at a rapid rate, with the last ones scheduled for decommissioning in fiscal 2015.

Navy RADM Kevin M. Donegan, acting deputy chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy, also speaking at the forum, said the Navy is looking realistically at other platforms for drug interdiction as the frigates are decommissioned, including joint high-speed vessels, coastal patrol ships and other platforms.

“The high-end assets are not going to get placed down there, given the other things that are going on in the world,” Donegan said, speaking of the cruisers and destroyers in high demand for other missions. “There is not an easy answer and there is not going to be an instantaneous fix for that issue.”

The Navy plans to base 10 Freedom-class LCSs at Naval Station Mayport, Fla., some of which could succeed the frigates in the drug interdiction role.

“When times get tough on ships down there, we just get more innovative,” Michel said, naming combatting smuggling networks as the main line of effort.

“It’s all about network identification and attack strategy,” he said. “It’s all about using whole-of-government intelligence to make the assets that we have down there as smart as possible. My goal when I was JIATF-South director was that every turn of a propeller on a ship or a plane down there should be done with specific intent.

“We still do some patrolling in the areas but [we’ve] got to really get inside those networks,” he said, “and there some very sophisticated ways that we do it, working with the intelligence community partners as well as our law enforcement partners. Probably 95 percent of the products removed down there are based on intelligence and different intelligence techniques.

“Last year, JIATF-South facilitated upwards of 100 metric tons of cocaine that was removed off the water before it could get into Central America or into cities in the United States,” he said.

Michel said that 60 percent of the cocaine “removed from planet Earth” was intercepted by the Coast Guard and Navy ships.

* Notícia publicada a Sea Power. Més enllà de la part de propaganda institucional, és bó veure que els LCS encaixin en algun tipus de missió. Si el Departament de Marina dels Estats Units aconsegueix allunyar les grapes dels contractistes de defensa, amb la seva afició a incrementar preus injustificadament, els LCS poden tenir un bon futur.

PLA looks to add more Type 052D destroyers

The People's Liberation Army will soon be adding more of the highly-touted Type 052D destroyer to its naval fleet, reports the Canada-based Kanwa Defense Review.

After completing six Type 052C destroyers, the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai is said to have shifted its focus to the Type 052D destroyer, which comes with several key improvements including its radar and engine systems.

The Type 052D has reportedly ditched the old Ukraine-made DA80 gas turbines used in the first two of the Type 052C vessels and has domestically upgraded the QC-280 gas turbine engines used in latter four Type 052C vessels to reduce weight and increase power. The DA80s were not ideal for the Type 052C given their considerable weight and fuel consumption, which is why they have not been considered for use in the Russian and Indian navies, the report said.

The Type 052D also features the PLA Navy's first ever vertical launching system for anti-ship missiles, which can travel at both subsonic and supersonic speeds and with a range of about 220 kilometers.

Altogether six vessels of this class are now fitting out or under construction, with a further four on order or planned. The Kunming is currently the only active Type 052D destroyer in the PLA Navy, while the Changsha is still undergoing sea trials.

Each of the Type 052D vessels has a displacement nearing 10,000 tonnes. As of now, China only has one type of vessel at that level, namely the Type 071 amphibious transport dock, which has a displacement of 20,000 tonnes. China currently has three of the Yuzhao-class amphibious warfare ships and reportedly has plans to acquire three more for the PLA's East Sea Fleet.

* Notícia publicada per Want China Times. Ja hem dit diverses vegades que la transformació de la Marina de l'Exèrcit Popular d'Alliberament (PLAN) en una flota oceànica ha de ser mesurada en el seu conjunt i no només en si té portaavions. Vet aquí un pas més. A la inversa, la US Navy hauria de començar a "alliberar" Arleigh Burkes de tasques d'escorta de portaavions i començar a ampliar ens seus DESRONs (Destroyer Squadrons), si realment vol mantenir l'hegemonia al Pacífic.

Australia receives first Canberra-class LHD

The Australian government has accepted the first of its two Canberra-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) from BAE Systems, the vessel's prime contractor said in a statement on 8 October.

The ship will remain at BAE Systems' Williamstown shipyard in Melbourne before its commissioning at Sydney later in 2014, the statement added. It is due for delivery to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) on 28 November.

Canberra , which is based on Navantia's Juan Carlos I aircraft carrier design, completed its final contractor sea trials in late August.

Work is progressing on second ship Adelaide , which arrived in Australia for outfitting in Bé bé ja tu after being transported from Navantia's Ferrol yard in Spain. Adelaide is scheduled to begin sea trials in the second quarter of 2015, with delivery expected in 2016.

Meanwhile, Australia has begun the process of exercising an option on two more Boeing C-17A Globemaster III strategic airlifters in addition to the six operated by 36 Squadron out of RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland.

Defence Minister David Johnston said in a statement that, if exercised, the two extra Globemasters would "significantly enhance the Royal Australian Air Force's [RAAF's] capacity for operational tasks, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance in our region and around the world".

"The ability to rapidly react and move large elements of Australia's support systems over long distances during these times has highlighted the need for us to have a good sized fleet," he added.

Australia initially purchased four C-17s under Project AIR 8000 Phase 3 using the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, with the first aircraft delivered in December 2006. The last of the six in service was delivered to the RAAF in 2012.

* Notícia publicada per Jane's Information Group. Austràlia continua ampliant la seva capacitat de projecció de força, consolidant-se com a element estabilitzador al Pacífic i l'Índic

U.S. Submarines: Run Silent, Run Deep... On Diesel Engines?*

"Underway on nuclear power", radioed the skipper of USS Nautilus in 1955, after taking history's first nuclear-powered attack submarine to sea for the first time. Nautilus's maiden cruise left an indelible imprint on the navy. Her success, cheered on by the likes of Admiral Hyman Rickover, the godfather of naval nuclear propulsion, helped encode the supremacy of atomic power in the submarine force's cultural DNA.

Things were never the same after that. America built its last diesel-electric sub, once the state of the art, not long after Nautilus took to the sea. Not since 1990 has the U.S. Navy operated conventionally powered boats. It's been longer than that since they were frontline fighting ships. For a quarter-century, then, it's been all nukes, all the time. No U.S. shipbuilder even constructs diesel boats nowadays.

That was then. Now may be the time to break up the nuclear monopoly. To wit, imagine permanently forward-deploying a squadron of diesel attack boats, or SSKs, to likely hotspots. Such a force would expand America's silent service, reversing the ongoing slide in numbers of hulls. It would do so at reasonable cost in this age of budgetary stress. A standing East Asia squadron would be close to the action. Likely based in Japan and Guam, it would amplify the U.S.-Japanese fleet's prowess vis-á-vis China's navy and merchant marine. It would empower Washington and Tokyo to deny China access to offshore waters without committing the whole fleet of U.S. nuclear-powered boats to the endeavor. And in the process it would open up new vistas for building and reinforcing alliances.

Greater numbers, middling cost, a heavier punch in battle. That's a major contribution from such humble craft. U.S. submariners' diesel-propelled past could be, and should be, part of their future.

There's nothing new or especially radical about conventional U.S. subs' prowling the Western Pacific deep. They did so to devastating effect during World War II. For instance, the Philippine Islands was home to the largest concentration of U.S. submarines in the Pacific on the eve of hostilities. U.S. commanders squandered a golden opportunity to run wild against transports carrying Japanese troops to invade the Philippines. But their missed opportunity doesn't detract from subs' potential to confound opponents amid Asia's intricate nautical terrain. It's an exception that proves the rule.

And indeed, American submarines vindicated their potential in ensuing years. U.S. Pacific Fleet boats were among the first vessels to return to Asia following the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. Ordered to sea while the battle line was still ablaze at Ford Island, they helped dismember an island empire. Empires like Japan's depend on ships to ferry all manner of warmaking materiel—raw materials, foodstuffs, finished goods—hither and yon. Take away seaborne movement and you cut the lineaments binding the imperial enterprise together.

The submarine campaign grew more and more effective as the U.S. offensives undulated across the Central and South Pacific. U.S. Navy, Marine and Army amphibious forces wrested outer islands from Japan, letting the navy position, maintenance and logistics outposts closer to the foe. Submarine tenders—floating repair and supply depots for all intents and purposes—staged support operations westward of Hawaii. As the transpacific campaigns progressed, boats wasted less time transiting to and from assigned hunting grounds. They spent more time strewing the seafloor with enemy merchantmen and men-of-war.

Forward bases, then, offset the tyranny of distance—allowing the submarine force to mount a stifling presence in Asian waters. Wartime prime minister General Hideki Tōjō catalogued submarine warfare among three critical determinants of Japan's defeat—high praise from someone in a position to know.

And afterward? Ravaged by undersea combat during World War II, Japan built an impressive submarine force of its own to help prosecute the Cold War. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) diesel boats turned geography to advantage, lurking in and around the straits that pierce Asia's offshore island chains. Crews monitored and encumbered east-west movement between the China seas and the Western Pacific. Soviet skippers often balked at attempting the passage. The JMSDF, in short, forged itself into a lethal weapon for a cold war beneath the waves.

*Article complet fent click aquí. Tot i que el debat de recuperar els submarins dièsel/elèctrics no és nou, el professor James R. Holmes, torna a abordar el tema. Aquest tema, que ha estat gairebé tabú per l'obsessió quasi religiosa per la "all nuclear fleet", es suma a una altra " heretgia" com és l'aquisició d'un tipus de submarí dissenyat a l'estranger: AL JAPÓ! Esperem que facin cas a aquestes tesis, doncs l'equilibri de forces al Pacífic en depèn directament.

The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession*

Scotland will free-ride in the Atlantic without sustained investment, but Catalonian maritime specialization would be welcome in the Mediterranean.
On 18 September, Scotland votes on the question of independence from the United Kingdom, and the polling strongly suggests a vote of no. On 9 November, Catalonia could be voting on the same issue vis-à-vis Spain, but the polling slightly suggests a yes—if the Spanish Constitutional Court allows the vote to take place. NATO members should treat neither case lightly, but the independence of Catalonia would pose fewer military problems for the alliance than that of Scotland.

The secessionist movements in both countries have endorsed joining both the EU and NATO. But both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, and depends on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. The Spanish probably could not manage to block a determined move for Catalonian self-determination. That said, two of my Atlantic Council colleagues have questioned whether the European Union would admit Catalonia, as some member states (e.g. Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity. Would the British accede to Scottish independence, but then plausibly attempt to exclude the country from NATO? A currency union may be off the table, but such dickering over the serious business of defense would be unacceptable.

As Griffe Witte of the Washington Post argued just this week, in the long run, Scottish secession could be challenging for maintaining Britain’s Trident submarine force. The Scottish National Party (SNP) aims to declare independence in 2016, and see the nukes off by 2020. Today, the submarines and their warheads are conveniently somewhat isolated at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, 40 kilometers from Glasgow. The Royal Navy’s other two major facilities, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth, are both in populated areas on the south coast of England. This has caused some to question whether the south coasters would appreciate the sudden arrival of a few hundred nuclear weapons. But Devonport is where the RN overhauls and refuels those nuclear submarines, so the locals are already accustomed to the presence of things nuclear. In the breach, it is likely that they would prefer the several thousand high-paying industrial jobs that would transfer down from Scotland.

That could be all well and good, but assuming that Scotland and Catalonia were admitted to NATO, what would they contribute? At the Strategic Foresight Forum this past spring at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter—late of Princeton and the US State Department, and now running the New America Foundation—opined that an independent Scotland and an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending themselves. At the reception afterwards, a former defense official and defense industrialist argued to me that the consequences for NATO would be adverse, “because the Scots think that defense is a free good”. But even beyond the hyperbole, it’s important to note how significantly plans for forces flying the Saltire cross and the four bars of the Senyera differ.

Scotland is a country of 5.3 million people, with over $200 billion in GDP. The SNP has in mind a tiny version of Britain’s armed forces as a whole: a navy of a few frigates, a fighter squadron, and an armored infantry brigade. With enough investment, a short-ranged maritime patrol squadron might follow as a welcome addition to the recent loss of RAF Coastal Command. The problem, however, is that Scottish resources aren’t likely to match these goals. Spending the NATO average of 1.6% of that GDP on defense would provides just over $3 billion annually. That level of spending is equivalent to the budget of Austria, a neutral country which needn’t maintain a navy. Unless Scotland steps up to a higher rate of spending, its exit from the United Kingdom would produce another free-riding Celtic state on the periphery of the open North Atlantic.

 Catalonia has 7.3 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that on defense provides over $4.5 billion annually, or roughly the budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces. Catalonian military plans are more vague, but so far, they emphasize the navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, ‘with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework’, as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argues. The rough plans call for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as "a main actor in the Mediterranean," with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security.

 Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of each country’s political process, but even the announced policies differ importantly. Scotland’s tiny replication of British capabilities wouldn’t be so clearly efficient. On the other hand, Catalonia’s ambition would be more restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.

 
James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

* Article publicat a The Atlantic Council. Una gran notícia! Que la tasca dels especialistes catalans en Defensa sigui reconeguda als Estats Units posa de relleu dues coses:
- LA SERIOSITAT DEL SEU TREBALL
- LA NEGLIGÈNCIA DE LA CLASSE POLÍTICA (ANC INCLOSA) D'HAVER DEFUGIT AQUEST TEMA

Russia Develops Robots for Maritime Defense*

MOSCOW, August 4 (RIA Novosti) - Russian scientists have developed and presented to the Defense Ministry a maritime defense system comprising surface, underwater and flying robots, a defense industry official told RIA Novosti on Monday.

“The global [maritime defense] command-and-control system, which we are developing, is ready for a large-scale testing phase,” General Director and Chief Designer of the Morinformsystem-Agat corporation, Georgy Antsev, said during the Innovation Day exhibition organized by the Defense Ministry.

"A patrol ship or a submarine are not always capable of monitoring large regions, while an integrated information control robotic system may solve tasks related to the defense of whole regions, as well as providing navigation in difficult conditions," Antsev said.

According to the official, the system includes remotely-controlled patrol boats, unmanned aerial vehicles, various types of floating beacons and sensors, as well as other means of monitoring, communications and data-management.

Antsev said his company could create robotic systems providing maritime defenses of any scope - from protection of ports to the defense of entire stretches of border. The robots could be equipped with traditional internal combustion engines or with engines powered by solar or water energy, he added.

Morinformsystem-Agat Concern is an umbrella organization in the Russian shipbuilding industry specializing in the domains of informational systems and technologies, system engineering in the sphere of marine data computing equipment, electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic facilities, degaussing systems, fire control systems of sea-based cruise and ballistic missiles, combat information and control systems and integrated management systems for surface ships and submarines, according to the company’s official website.

* Notícia publicada a RIA Novosti. Que Rússia ha deixat definitivament endarrera la caòtica dècada post-soviètica és un fet. Caldria que Europa fos més conscient de les possibilitats d'aquest país, ja en situació d'imposar la seva voluntat, sigui pel gas o sigui amb pressió militar convencional. Aquest article és una bona mostra del salt qualitatiu de les forces russes.

Kolkata handed over to Navy*

The INS Kolkata, lead ship in the Kolkata-class stealth destroyers, was handed over to the Indian Navy on Thursday after extensive sea trials and tests, 11 years after the construction began in 2003 at the Mazgaon Docks Limited (MDL). The ships are the second group of three indigenously built stealth warships after the Shivalik-class boats, while the official commissioning ceremony is expected to take place in a month’s time.
The same ship had seen naval engineer Commander Kuntal Wadhwa lose his life after a prolonged exposure to CO2 gas on March 6, suspected to be caused by a malfunctioning fire fighting system. “The ship has finished construction with all user acceptance trials, sea trials and testing of the weapons systems completed. The ship will still be called Yard 701 but designated the INS Kolkata after the commissioning ceremony,” said Rear Admiral (retired) R.K. Shrawat, MDL’s chief managing director.
Most importantly, the naval version of the Brahmos cruise missile was also fired from the ship off the coast of Karwar about a month ago, to prove the boat’s and weapon handling system. “The purpose was to test the ship’s capability to withstand the missile, but not the missile itself,” said an MDL source. The main feature of the ship, however, according to naval officers, is the ‘multi-function radar’, the first of its kind in the country. “It is more in tune with modern naval warfare technologies than the stealth feature,” said an officer.
The Indian Navy can come back with technical complaints or suggesting modifications by availing the one-year guarantee period in the next 12 months, in the event of which Form D448 would be invoked. Sources, however, said that all technical issues were raised by the IN team, liaisoning with the MDL, during the construction phase itself.
Meanwhile, two other sister ships of the class, INS Kochi and INS Chennai are undergoing construction with the handing over to the IN slated to be in late 2014 and mid-2015 respectively.

* Notícia publicada a The Asian Age. Finalment la primera unitat de la classe Kolkata entrarà en servei. Serà interessant veure con encaixen en la nova doctrina naval de l'Índia: seran la peça central o un conplement dels nous portaavions? No és una qüestió menor.

Israeli Breakthrough: Submarines Without Periscopes*

A submarine without its periscope? Researchers from Israel’s Technion are developing an underwater photography and surveillance system that might make periscopes obsolete.

Close to a hundred years and always the same process: Submarine commanders who wanted to see what was happening on the surface raised their periscope with the “up scope” command, or lowered it with “down scope.”

That’s about to change. In the future submarine commanders will be able to monitor the surface from the depths without relying on periscopes. A team of Israeli researchers from the Technion’s Faculty of Electrical Engineering will present their new system at a scientific conference taking place in Santa Clara, Calfornia: A system that allows an underwater vehicle to see above the surface without a physical periscope – using a virtual periscope instead. The system is still under development, but the idea is sound and has already been successfully tested. The new virtual periscope system is called “Stella Maris,” the star of the sea.

“Divers have been using periscopes for a hundred years now,” said Prof. Yoav Schechner, along with the two doctorate students Marina Alterman and Yochai Savirski. “The periscope’s downside is the fact that it gets exposed once it rises above the water surface.” The alternative system developed by the scientists includes a fully submerged camera and a special sensor, used to create a virtual periscope and avoid exposure.
The main technical challenge was image distortion due to wave activity. In order to solve this problem the researchers founed a solution used by astronomers, a mechanism that reduces image distortion, and applied it to naval systems. This mechanism, a refracted imaging sensor, includes a thin metal sheet with precise, laser-cut holes that measure sunlight refraction, used to correct distortions in images taken by the new underwater system.

Technion researchers have already tested the system along the Haifa shores, taking pictures of team members from below the surface without using a physical periscope. Lab test results were also satisfactory. Prof. Schechner explained that “there’s still a lot to do before periscopes vanish entirely, but our work continues.”

The periscope will also have some civilian uses, such as tracking and taking pictures of birds at sea. The system, from its position on the bottom of the sea, will be able to track birds in flight, while plummeting towards the water and during their stay under the surface.

* Notícia publicada a Jewish Business News. D'arribar a fer-se realitat aquesta tecnologia, seria una canvi notable en les operacions submarines. És cert que els periscopis pràcticament són innecessaris per atacar objectius de superfície, ara bé, per operacions de reconeixement clandestí la situació canvia...

Truong Sa submarine denied test site*

The setback came as discouraging news to Nguyen Quoc Hoa, developer of the sub, and other interested scientists.

Hoa and his colleagues had been convinced that the testing license was forthcoming from the local authorities, right up until the final decision was made. Vu Manh Hien, Director of the Thai Binh Department of Science and Technology, had told the local press on April 23 that he was certain that the Truong Sa would receive permission to go to sea.

“I cannot see any problems with the experiment. All new products need to be tested,” he told the Dat Viet newspaper.

Hoa had expressed his hope that his sub’s first outing at sea could take place on April 29, to coincide with the 39th anniversary of the Saigon Liberation Day and the nation’s reunion.

Just two days later, however, Hoa received a dispatch from Thai Binh’s People’s Committee. The missive applauded Hoa’s determination and expressed its support for the sub testing plan. But it went on to state that Hoa would not be allowed to test his sub in Thai Binh waters.

“The plan to test the sub in territorial waters, in the Diem Dien port area, about 12 kilometers offshore, at 11 am to 3 pm, is unreasonable and cannot be implemented,” the dispatch reads.

“The Quoc Hoa Mechanical Engineering Company (Hoa’s private business) still has not conducted the necessary surveys on the geographical and hydrographical conditions, and it has not demonstrated the measures to be taken to ensure safety for humans,” it continued.

As if to soften the rough edges of its rejection, Thai Binh added a word of advice: seek the support of the Ministry of National Defense, and consider testing the sub at the Navy High Command Region 1.

Commenting about officials’ decision, Hoa said: “Given this new reality, I will have to take the proposal to a higher level, as it is clear that the sub’s testing cannot be conducted in the territorial waters where it was born”.

Hoa said he regrets that he was not invited to the officials’ meeting to discuss the sub’s testing. “Those who made decision on my case do not have deep knowledge of submarine technology. Therefore, they feared the testing could be unsafe,” Hoa said.

“They said the water level would be low on April 29, thus unsuitable for the testing. However, I have learnt from the Hydrology Department that this was a time of high tide, and would have been a good day for testing,” he maintained.

Phan Boi Tran, known as the developer of the first mini-submarine in Southeast Asia, said if Hoa can get support from the Navy High Command Region 1, the testing would be easier and safer. There would be four ships following Truong Sa during testing, and one more ship with a large crane to be ready for an emergency.

Dat Viet

* Notícia publicada a Vietnamnet. Com veiem, més enllà dels contratemps concrets, Vietnam es pren seriosament la seva indústria de defensa, i més concretament la naval.

US Navy plans at-sea demonstration of EM Railgun in 2016*

The US Navy has outlined plans to deploy and test a prototype electromagnetic railgun (EM railgun) on-board a joint high-speed vessel (JHSV) in the fiscal year 2016.
The test, which is the first at-sea demonstration of an EM railgun, marks a significant advance in naval combat for the US Navy, as well as the latest in a series of technical maturation efforts intended to provide an operational railgun to the fleet.
Using an electromagnetic force known as the Lorenz Force, the EM railgun technology can rapidly accelerate and launch a projectile between two conductive rails.
Launched at high velocities to achieve greater ranges than conventional guns, the guided projectile maintains enough kinetic energy, while eliminating the need of a high explosive payload when it reaches its target.
The high-energy railguns are designed to be lethal and effective against multiple threats, including enemy warships, small boats, aircraft, missiles and land-based targets.
The navy chief engineer rear admiral Bryant Fuller said that the announcement marks the US Navy's new offensive capability.
"This capability will allow us to effectively counter a wide-range of threats at a relatively low cost, while keeping our ships and sailors safer by removing the need to carry as many high-explosive weapons," Fuller said.
"This capability will allow us to effectively counter a wide-range of threats at a relatively low cost."
In addition to complementing the existing kinetic weapons, the EM railgun will be capable of launching guided, multi-mission projectiles to a range of 110nm.
The cost for each engagement against specific threats is less expensive than comparable missile engagements. Furthermore, the projectile itself is being designed to be compatible with some current powder guns.
Naval research chief rear admiral Matt Klunder said: "The US Navy is at the forefront of this game-changing technology."
The navy is considering JHSV non-combatants for testing the new technology because of its available cargo, topside space and schedule flexibility.

Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Un graó més en la implantació dels railguns. Caldrà estar atents.

Indian Navy ready to commission third Saryu-class warship*

The Indian Navy's third Saryu-class naval offshore patrol vessel (NOPV), INS Sumedha, will be commissioned on 7 March 2014 at Goa shipyard (GSL).
Built by Goa Shipyard, the 105m-long offshore patrol vessel was delivered to the Indian Navy in January 2014 during a ceremony held in Goa.
GSL chairman and managing director Rear Admiral Shekhar Mital said that the ship is the result of many years of in-house design development and ship build techniques.
"The commissioning of this ship, marks a significant milestone in GSL's & nation's march towards indigenisation and self reliance," Mital said.
"It becomes more important as Sumedha is 200th ship indigenously built by GSL."
Designed for monitoring sea lines of communication, defence of offshore oil installations and other critical offshore national assets, the vessel can be deployed for escorting high value ships and fleet support operations.
"The vessel can be deployed for escorting high value ships and fleet support operations."
Capable of conducting ocean surveillance and surface warfare operations to prevent infiltration and transgression of maritime sovereignty, the 2,300t Saryu-class vessel can cruise at speeds in excess of 25km using two KOEL/Pielstick Diesel engines and have a range of 6,000nm.

The warship can also conduct ocean surveillance and surface warfare operations to prevent infiltration and transgression of maritime sovereignty while helping to meet the increasing requirement of the Indian Navy.

The Indian Navy has taken delivery of the first two Saryu-class vessels INS Saryu and Sunayna from GSL on 21 December 2012 and 02 September 2013 respectively.

Meanwhile, the GSL-built Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF), designed for landing trials of the MIG 29K & LCA at INS Hansa is also ready for commissioning.

* Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Compartim aquesta notícia ja que, tot i que les OPV no tinguin el "glamour" d'un portaavions, donen bastanta polivalència i, per tant, són una inversió amb més retorn.

Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race*

ASEAN countries are looking to bolster their submarine fleets, but this is not an arms race.

By Koh Swee Lean Collin

January 30, 2014

In early January this year, Vietnam formally joined the Southeast Asian “submarine club” with its first Russian-built Kilo-class submarine christened the Hanoi. Not too long ago, Jakarta expressed interest in acquiring the same model of submarines from Russia or more boats from South Korea, ostensibly to augment the incoming new fleet of three SS-209 boats purchased from South Korea back in August 2012. Just recently in November 2013, Singapore contracted German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp to develop the Type-218SG, the first of two boats slated to enter service in 2020.

Other Southeast Asian countries have evinced interest in acquiring an undersea warfighting capability, but were prevented from doing so largely because of budgetary constraints. In the case of Thailand, even though no submarines were bought after the German offer of second-hand Type-206A boats lapsed in March 2012, the Royal Thai Navy has reportedly constructed submarine basing support and training facilities in anticipation of future acquisitions. The Philippine Navy has been eyeing submarines but for now, decided to prioritize the use of limited funds to beef up surface and naval aviation forces, with anti-submarine warfare capabilities tipped as the next major focus to substitute for a submarine capability.

A “Submarine Race” in Southeast Asia?

This recent spate of submarine acquisitions being implemented or planned has characterized Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts to date, which could lead to observers highlighting the revival of a “submarine race” in the region after the bout of submarine purchases made in the 1990s to early-2000s. A superficial survey of open remarks by the region’s defense and naval planners seemed to allude to this. For example, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro reportedly remarked that the submarine purchase, among other defense equipment, is designed to signal Jakarta’s commitment towards Indonesian defense modernization so that “we can keep up with ASEAN members.” Bangkok referred to the submarine programs of neighboring Southeast Asian navies when it emphasized the need for submarines as part of the country’s naval capabilities.

However, technical and geopolitical indications point to neither the existence of a “submarine race” nor the prospective emergence of such a phenomenon in the foreseeable future. Any negative effects of submarine proliferation in Southeast Asia appear to be at least counterbalanced by rising trends of regional cooperation in the submarine field.

Key Patterns in Submarine Capabilities

While there are evident efforts among regional submarine operators to look beyond a mere “fleet-in-being” force to create a more effective and sustainable force to guard their national waters, there are no indications of a rapid expansion of submarine forces. The Vietnamese submarine force will number six boats by 2016 while the Indonesians will muster three new submarines around the same time, whereas the existing pair of West German-built Type-209s will most likely be decommissioned. With the progressive phasing out of the ageing Challenger-class boats by then, Singapore will most likely have just two Archer-class submarines in service before the first Type-218SG is inducted. In short, the number of submarines in service throughout Southeast Asia will remain more or less stable within the next decade, with new boats supplanting old ones for existing submarine users while any expansion will take place over a significant span of time, primarily dependent on the countries’ economic health.

There is also no indication of a qualitative submarine race. When Singapore became the first Southeast Asian navy to introduce submarines with the air-independent propulsion (AIP), designed to prolong the underwater endurance of conventional submarines with reduced need for snorkeling, the consequent submarine buys of the other regional navies did not include that capability in response. The only area where there is some “catching up with the Joneses” has been submerged-launch anti-ship missiles. The Royal Malaysian Navy’s Scorpene-class submarines touted the region’s first such capability in the form of SM-39 Exocet, followed by Vietnam with the Klub-S, while Indonesia’s intent to purchase Kilo boats from Russia is intricately linked to a similar capability. In fact, new conventional submarines on the global market are typically offered with submerged-launch anti-ship missiles as an optional part of the entire sales package. This is an international trend in contemporary proliferation of submarine technologies, by no means unique to Southeast Asia. Navies in the Northeast and South Asian sub-regions have in fact long possessed such a capability.

Submarine-launched cruisemissiles (SLCM) for land attack purposes, however, represent a wholly different ballgame. Such weapons are potentially destabilizing, especially when launched from a platform as stealthy as a submarine, since they can project offensive firepower at standoff ranges deep into another country’s territory. It is noteworthy that whereas other major navies in the region have either acquired or explored the SLCM option, at present no Southeast Asian navy is seriously considering this capability. Another point is that none of the ASEAN member states is partner to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which restricts proliferation of missiles (and associated technologies) with a 500-kilogram payload out to a minimum range of 300 kilometers.

It is not yet ascertained whether the Kilo boats, which Indonesia is reportedly keen to purchase, will be armed with SLCM, such as the Klub-S land-attack variant. Scant information has emerged thus far regarding the capabilities of the Type-218SG. Nevertheless, SLCM is unlikely to appear on the future wish-lists of Southeast Asian navies unless serious evolution of geopolitical circumstances compels the introduction of such a weapon into the region. For now and the foreseeable future, AIP and submerged-launch anti-ship missiles constitute key submarine capability patterns in Southeast Asia.

The Geopolitical Underpinnings

Perhaps more crucial is that a “submarine race” – embodying the classical, arms-tension spiral consequences – emerging within a political void looks unlikely. The geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia has never been as benign as it has over the past decade or so. The region was once fraught with maritime territorial and sovereignty disputes, but since the early 2000s, Southeast Asian countries have amicably resolved most of the pressing maritime disputes through international law proceedings. The Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the Pedra Branca islet disputes are examples. Maritime boundary issues are also addressed bilaterally, for instance the agreement reached in 2011 between Indonesia and Vietnam to jointly determine common fishing corridors in their overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Bilateral technical working groups continue to discuss outstanding maritime boundary issues, as seen in the case of Indonesia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait, and between Malaysia and Singapore concerning the post-2008 International Court of Justice verdict on the Pedra Branca. The various General Border Committees established back in the early years of ASEAN continue to be active in addressing common bilateral border issues, including areas of territorial contention and EEZ jurisdictional problems.

Since the last reported naval incident in the disputed Ambalat offshore oil block in the Sulawesi Sea between the Indonesian and Malaysian naval patrols in 2009, there had been no other reported instances of close encounters among Southeast Asian navies in disputed maritime zones. This tranquil situation looks set to persist, especially given that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has reiterated in recent years its commitment towards a community, a geopolitical construct that envisions refrain from the threat or use of force against fellow ASEAN member states. Moreover, in the context of regional uncertainties arising from ongoing geopolitical problems, for instance disputes in the East and South China Seas, ASEAN strives to retain its relevance as the driver of the regional security architecture. The threat or use of force among ASEAN member states would be regarded as antithetical to this objective.

Rising Trends of Concord Over Discord

While submarines feature prominently within the overall scheme of Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts, often overlooked is the recent intensification of cooperation among regional navies. Indonesia and Singapore established a submarine rescue and cooperation agreement back in 2012, followed by an equivalent pact between Singapore and Vietnam in 2013. These bilateral efforts augment existing multilateral arrangements in the region, such as Exercise Pacific Reach – a multinational submarine rescue exercise since 2000 – and the Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) which first began in 2001 as a platform designed to promote cooperation and mutual trust among submarine operators and aspiring ones in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Considering the operationally sensitive nature of submarine operations, these gradual, incremental steps are noteworthy. They can facilitate the creation of wider multilateral participation and institutionalized cooperative arrangements in the future, modelling on foreign examples such as the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERWG).

With more submarine operators entering the scene, which means more submarines roaming the waters of Southeast Asia, the risk of underwater accidents is also multiplied. This calls for a further conceptualization of regional submarine rescue cooperation.

Prospects for Further Submarine Cooperation

Because submarine operations are much more hazardous for naval servicemen, a rescue capability is necessary. The recent mishap revolving around the Indian Navy submarine INS Sindhurakshak highlighted the necessity of a submarine rescue capability which is, however, expensive to obtain, operate and maintain. Rudimentary submarine rescue capabilities, such as a basic diving bell lowered by the rescue vessel onto the submarine escape hatch, are limited by sea conditions and depth. Modern submarine rescue techniques encompass the use of more robust equipment such as a mobile diving bell, or more commonly deep-submergence rescue vehicles (DSRVs) – essentially mini-submarines designed to mate with the submarine in distress and transport submariners to the rescue ship. DSRVs and their operations are more complex to handle than diving bells. The entire package – the “mother ship” and its DSRV payload, trained personnel and supporting infrastructure altogether – may entail costs beyond the reach of many regional navies’ budgets.

To date, in Southeast Asia only Singapore operates a DSRV-type submarine rescue capability. Malaysia has in recent years expressed the intent to acquire a similar capability but is apparently prevented from proceeding with procurement due to a lack of funds. Nonetheless, the bilateral agreements reached with Indonesia and Vietnam indicated intra-regional attempts to share naval expertise and resources, at least until more submarine-operating regional navies acquire their own submarine rescue capabilities. The role of extra-regional navies cannot be discounted, given that the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, South Korean and U.S. naval forces all possess full-fledged submarine rescue capabilities. An Asia-Pacific submarine rescue framework, perhaps emulating NATO’s SMERWG, can be established on the basis of existing arrangements such as Pacific Reach and APSC. This is an interim arrangement after all, since activating and deploying a submarine rescue capability from overseas foreign bases requires time and colossal logistical efforts. The ideal would be multiple submarine-operating navies in the region mustering their own rescue capabilities and pooling them together under an institutionalized framework. However, taking into account the budgetary constraints faced by navies in Southeast Asia, sharing of submarine rescue capacity will remain the way to go.

Final Thoughts

Because of the persistent interest in submarines, in no small part influenced by the outstanding requirements to fill envisaged capacity shortfalls, submarines look set to remain on the wish-lists of various Southeast Asian navies. This proliferation pattern will continue in the foreseeable future. But to label this as a “submarine race,” in view of the technical and geopolitical trends observed so far in Southeast Asia as well as evident growth in inter-navy submarine rescue cooperation, may be a mischaracterization of what is more likely a concerted drive by Southeast Asian navies to achieve balanced naval force capabilities.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His primary research interests cover naval modernization in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.

* Article publicat a The Diplomat. Sens dubte un bon article de reflexió que invita a seguir estudiant els canvis el les diverses marines asiàtiques en matèria de submarins i, especialment, les seves implicacions futures.