Kongsberg Maritime sonar chosen for Swedish Navy fast patrol boats*

Swede Ship Marine will install new Kongsberg Maritime sonar systems as part of a major rebuild and lifetime extension of five patrol boats for the Swedish Navy. The new sonars will replace the previous model SIMRAD SS576 sonars first installed in 1996 on board the Tapper-class (or Bevakningsbåt 80), with the purpose to protect and patrol Swedish coastal waters.

With 22 meters in length and a displacement of 62 tons, the Tapper-class Fast Patrol Boats operate in extremely shallow water, and require sonars capable of high performance in such environments. The Kongsberg Maritime sonar selected for this upgrade will be used for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine and Obstacle detection and Navigation, and is designed for use in shallow water.

"The Swedish Navy is one of the most experienced Navies with regards to operation of sonars in shallow and challenging waters so we are proud to have the preferred sonar solution for protection of the Swedish coastline," said Thomas Hostvedt Dahle, Naval Sonar Product Sales Manager, Kongsberg Maritime.

"Our sonars have acoustic properties specially developed for shallow water and our design is compact in order to enable installation also on very small ships. This supports the ASW tactics of fighting submarines in shallow water with the use of several smaller ships that are equipped with sonars. We look forward to the ship being delivered with upgraded sonars to the Swedish Navy, in less than a year."

The rebuild and lifetime extension project has already started, with the first vessel being prepared for the work in the shipyard.

* Notícia publicada al web de Kongsberg. Un altre exemple de la cooperació nòrdica, en aquest cas, en el camp dels sònars per entorns litorals.

Sweden is fighting intruders, naked*

The thought of submarine chases off the Swedish coast may sound a tad dramatic, the stuff of cold warrior fantasies. But after two rumored sightings of Russian submarines in the country’s Scandinavian waters this fall, those fantasies have become all too real.

Swedish Armed Forces were tipped off to the presence of the first submarine on October 17, but called off their search a week later after failing to find enough evidence — it had already snuck away. On October 31, they began searching for a second foreign submarine, but only this month has conclusive evidence surfaced: On May 15, five independent witnesses came forward to say that they spotted a submarine very close to Stockholm on October 31 last year. That dramatically raises the stakes in Sweden’s hunt for aquatic intruders.

The witnesses — local residents with marine experience — described their sightings to the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter. Their reports of a submarine sighting on October 31, near the suburb of Lidingö and thus much closer to Stockholm than the October 17 submarine, contradict the armed forces, who maintain that the object was a white plastic boat.

Sverker Göranson, supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces, now finds himself in a predicament. He can maintain the armed forces line that the witnesses are mistaken, or he can choose to believe the witnesses, which would raise the question of why the submarine was able to get so close to Stockholm. The Russian media, meanwhile, is already poking fun at what it labels Swedish military incompetence.

“It’s almost impossible to keep mini-submarines out,” notes Tomas Ries, a lecturer in strategy and security policy at the Swedish Defense College. “That would require rebuilding the whole coastal defense system that the armed forces decimated after the 1990s, especially sensor lines and helicopters.” Russian nuclear submarines are usually tailed by the US Navy, and vice versa, while smaller subs are not.

At the end of the Cold War, Swedish submarine hunters commanded an arsenal featuring depth charges, torpedoes, and anti-submarine-warfare grenades, and surface submarine hunters were aided by a large number of helicopters, which easily spot movements in the water. Now, however, “we’ve got rid of our more modern weapons,” says Göran Frisk, a naval commander and top submarine hunter until his retirement 12 years ago. “The Russians can do whatever they like in Swedish waters as long as they’re not careless, because in that case a Swedish warship can shoot and disable them.”

Following a series of budget cuts starting the late 1990s, the naval commandos defending Sweden’s 2,700-kilometer coastline find themselves rather modestly equipped in the fight against underwater intruders, with just seven torpedo-armed corvettes (small warships), four submarines and one marine battalion. In March, the government announced an ambitious naval investment program that includes the purchase of two new submarines and the upgrade of existing corvettes. But that process will take years.

“Today we’re naked,” says retired Admiral Nils-Ove Jansson, a top submarine hunter in Swedish antisubmarine operations during the 1980s and 1990s. “The little equipment we have is good, but otherwise the situation is dreadful. The risks involved with intruding into Swedish waters are so negligible that the biggest risk facing a sub is that it has an accident.”

That is what happened to the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine U-137, which ran aground close to a Swedish naval base in 1981, an incident known as Whiskey on the Rocks. On October 27 that year, local fishermen discovered the submarine, stuck on a rock, and raised the alarm. The sailors, on an espionage mission off the Swedish coast, had misjudged its tricky waters. Though they all survived the accident, it led to a high-stakes diplomatic drama that ended when the Swedish navy escorted the submarine out of Swedish water 10 days later. After that scare Sweden hastily beefed up its submarine-hunting abilities, increasing both equipment and crew training.

And while Sweden’s navy boasts several modern ships and submarines, its sailors haven’t had much submarine-hunting practice since the 1990s. Finding an intruding submarine is harder than it sounds off the Swedish coast, whose archipelagos offer intruders countless hiding places. Philip Simon, a spokesman for the armed forces, is certain, however, that unwelcome guests will be caught. “We can discover an intruding submarine and get it to stop its activity,” he says. “The armed forces have no intention of disabling an intruder but want him to give up his unlawful activity.”

Not unexpectedly, the armed forces maintain that their navy is well-equipped for submarine hunts. “Regarding systems and their abilities, we’re well-equipped, probably the best in the world when it comes to advanced submarine-hunting in shallow waters,” says Simon. “We have weapons and systems to detect and fight intruding submarines both inside and outside our archipelagos.” But, adds Simon, reductions in the number of systems and vessels have had an effect on the navy’s ability to hunt for submarines in a larger area or over a longer period of time.

“The vast majority of security researchers believe that the intrusions are Russian under-water activities,” notes Ries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of submarine intrusions in Swedish waters dropped, but started growing again in 2000. Independent naval experts report that the Russian navy uses mini-submarines in the Baltic to spy on Swedish, Finnish and NATO activities. It’s no secret that the Russian signals-intelligence ship Fyodor Golovin also gathers information in the Baltic Sea, and doing so in international waters is not illegal. Russia’s military attaché in Stockholm, Colonel Vladimir Ermachkov, did not respond to a request for comment. Following massive military cuts in the 1990s, Russia is now half-way through a $700 billionmodernization plan.

Jansson, who’s also a former deputy director of the Swedish military intelligence agency, MUST, and a leading authority on Russian military espionage, argues that the Soviet Union’s snooping on its largest Scandinavian neighbor has returned in Russian guise, with an undeniable logic to it. “The Russians suspect that Sweden and Finland are not really independent of NATO,” he explains. “With their submarine activities, they’re preparing to put nuclear mines in Swedish locations likely to host NATO naval units. And their TU-22M supersonic bomber airplanes that fly towards Swedish airspace are testing the course of their missiles, which they’d direct against locations that may host NATO air force units.”

As Captain Marko Ramius says in the Cold War-era thriller “The Hunt for Red October”: “Once more, we play our dangerous game, a game of chess against our old adversary.”

The Russian assumption is, of course, right on target: Though officially non-aligned, Sweden cooperates closely with NATO. A Russian air incursion on May 21 is reported to have targeted a state-of-the-art southern Swedish airbase recently used by the Nordic Battle Group, which includes several NATO members. Until reinforcements arrive, the Swedish navy will have no choice but to keep vigilantly patrolling its waters, hoping that unwelcome guests will do themselves in.

Elisabeth Braw is a correspondent for Newsweek, which she joined following a fellowship at the University of Oxford.

* Article publicat a Politico.eu . No és el primer cop que surten notícies assenyalant la debilitat de la defensa de Suècia. Com veiem altra vegada, el buit estratègic acostuma a omplir-se.

Nato partners start anti-submarine warfare exercise off Norwegian coast*

Naval forces from approximately ten Nato allies and Sweden have commenced a large-scale anti-submarine warfare exercise off the coast of Norway.
Code-named Dynamic Mongoose, the annual exercise involves four submarines from Germany, Norway, Sweden and the US, alongside 13 surface ships from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey, as well as the UK and the US.
In addition, two research vessels, one Norwegian and one Nato-owned, are participating in the exercise, which focuses on detecting and defending against submarines.
The drill aims to provide all participants with complex and challenging warfare training to enhance their interoperability and proficiency in anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare skills.
During the two-week exercise, the participating vessels will conduct a variety of anti-submarine warfare operations, ranging from warships against submarine scenarios, submarine against submarine scenarios and aircraft against submarines scenarios.
The submarines will take turns trying to approach and target the ships undetected, simulating an attack.
"It will allow us to exercise our anti-submarine warfare capabilities in a complex and challenging environment."
Standing Nato Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) commander rear admiral Brad Williamson said: "Exercise Dynamic Mongoose is a great training opportunity for SNMG2 ships that will allow us to further integrate with other Nato forces to enhance our interoperability and ability to effectively respond to potential submarine threats to our Nato allies.
"It will allow us to exercise our anti-submarine warfare capabilities in a complex and challenging environment."
Norwegian fleet commander commodore Ole Morten Sandquist said: "The presence of Nato in Norwegian waters will enhance interoperability and will allow Nato to familiarise with Norwegian waters."
As the host nation, Norway is providing support from the Haakonsvern Naval Base and the Sola Air Base, located near Bergen, while France and Germany have also deployed maritime patrol aircraft for the exercise.
Exercise Dynamic Mongoose 2015 is scheduled to conclude on 14 May.

*Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Sembla que les sorpreses de la darrera tardor han fet que Suècia s'incorpori als exercicis ASW de l'OTAN. Sigui com sigui, a uns i altres els hi interessa no oblidar aquesta tasca cabdal de la guerra naval.

Confirmed submarine in the Stockholm archipelago*

The Swedish Armed Forces now confirms that a submarine has violated Swedish territorial integrity. Results from the analysis following the intelligence operation conducted in October are unambiguous.

-There is no doubt, we have excluded all other explanations. Swedish territory has been seriously and unacceptably violated by a foreign power, says Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson.

On Friday the 17th October the Swedish Armed Forces received credible information on foreign underwater activity in the Stockholm archipelago. An intelligence operation including naval-, ground- and air units was initiated immediately. Apart from the military resources, observations from the public provided important data.

- The decisive observation is made by the Swedish Armed Forces’ sensors. It is a result of a highly skilled operational conduct. The observation meets the requirements for the highest level of assessment grading, confirmed submarine, says Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson.

The Swedish Armed Forces will not account for details on this observation since it could disclose information on Swedish abilities and capacities. The analysis cannot determine the nationality of the intruder.

In addition to the decisive observation, a number of other observations have been analyzed and reach the second highest level of assessment grading. A picture taken by a member of the public shows an object moving at a speed of approximately 1 knot. The picture also shows the kind of spray that arises when water is pushed out of scuttles at the top of a submarine.

A second observation was made by a naval corvette. Following strong indications on its sensors, a closer examination of the area was conducted and recently made traces were found on the bottom. Another observation was made by a resident in the archipelago, observing an underwater body with distinctive features. Sensors from the Swedish Armed Forces also confirmed echoes in the area. Similar observations were made by multiple credible sources.

- Each of these observations has a high credibility. Together with other observations, and a confirmed submarine, they generate a pattern. Thus, the intelligence operation confirms that a foreign power has violated Swedish territorial integrity. The gravity of this is obvious, says

FOTOGRAFIES DE LA CONFERÈNCIA EN PDF

* Notícia publicada al web de les Forces de Defensa de Suècia. Malgrat que l'informe no ho diu tot (comprensiblement) la capacitat de la Försvarsmakten ens mereix molta credibilitat.

Visby Class, Sweden*

The Visby Class of stealth corvettes were built for the Swedish Navy by the Swedish company Kockums (a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems of Germany).

Construction began in 1996 at Kockums' Kalrskrona yard. The lead ship of the class, Visby (K31), was launched in June 2000 and was delivered to the FMV (the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration) in June 2002 for fitting with weapons and combat systems. The second, HMS Helsingborg (K32), was launched in June 2003 and delivered in April 2006. Harnosand (K33) was launched in December 2004. HMS Visby and Harnosand were officially delivered to the FMV in June 2006.

The other hulls are: Nykoping (K34), launched in August 2005 and delivered in September 2006, and Karlstad (K35), launched in August 2006.

Two corvettes, HMS Helsingborg and Harnosand, were delivered to the Swedish Navy in December 2009. The Swedish Navy has cancelled an option on a sixth vessel (Uddevalla K36).

The first four Visby corvettes for the Swedish Navy are for mine countermeasures (MCM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The last vessel will be primarily for the attack and anti-surface warfare role.

A helicopter, such as the AgustaWestland A109M selected by Sweden, can land, take off, and refuel on the upper deck.

Design

The design of the Visby aims to minimise the optical and infrared signature, above water acoustic and hydroacoustic signature, underwater electrical potential and magnetic signature, pressure signature, radar cross section and actively emitted signals.

A stealth corvette of the YS 2000 design has a detection range of 13km in rough seas and 22km in calm sea without jamming. In a jammed environment, the Visby would be detected at a range of 8km in rough sea and 11km in calm sea.

The hull material is a sandwich construction comprising a PVC core with a carbon fibre and vinyl laminate. The material provides high strength and rigidity, low weight, good shock resistance, low radar and magnetic signature.

Command and control
The vessel's CETRIS C3 (command, control and communications) system consists of the Saab Systems 9LV mk3E combat management system, the MAST decision support aid and the integrated communications system.

The 9LV mk3 is based on open system architecture and uses the Windows NT operating system.

The SaabTech CEROS 200 radar and optronic fire control system has been ordered for the Visby and will be fully integrated into the combat management system.

The communications system has a high-capacity digital communications switch, developed by Danish company Maersk Data Defence (formerly Infocom) together with Karlskrona, which interconnects the voice and data communications channels. The system provides internal communications or open conference lines and access to external communications with various radio links and land-based networks.

Missiles

Visby vessels were not initially fitted with an air defence missile system, but could later be equipped with one. It has been reported that the Swedish government has selected the Umkhonto surface-to-air missile system, produced by Denel of South Africa. Umkhonto has infrared guidance, range of 12km and ceiling of 10,000m. The system is capable of engaging up to eight targets.

The corvettes are equipped with eight Saab Bofors Dynamics RBS 15 mk2 anti-ship missiles. The RBS 15 mk2 uses active Ku-band radar homing and has a range of more than 200km. The missile has a high subsonic speed, Mach 0.9, and is armed with a 200kg warhead. The missiles will be installed below deck and be fired through special hatches to maintain the vessel's stealth. The missiles' exhaust plumes will be managed in separate canals.
Anti-submarine warfare

The Visby is equipped with a suite of ASW 127mm rocket-powered grenade launchers, depth charges and torpedoes. There are three fixed 400mm torpedo tubes for Saab Underwater Systems Tp 45 anti-submarine homing torpedoes.

Gun

The Visby is equipped with a Bofors 57mm 70 SAK mkIII general purpose gun. The gun has a fully automatic loading system containing 120 rounds of ready-to-fire ammunition. The gun fires up to 220 rounds a minute to a maximum range of 17,000m.
Mine countermeasures (MCM)

The Visby carries Saab Bofors Underwater system ROVs (remotely operated vehicles) for mine hunting and the Atlas Elektronik Seafox ROV for mine disposal. The minehunting ROVs are a development of the Double Eagle mkIII.

The Visby corvettes are fitted with the Hydra multisonar suite from General Dynamics Canada (formerly Computing Devices Canada), which integrates data from a Hydroscience Technologies passive towed array sonar, C-Tech CVDS-26 dual-frequency active Variable Depth Sonar (VDS), C-Tech CHMS-90 hull-mounted sonar and data from the ROVs.

Sensors

Saab Microwave Systems (formerly Ericsson) Sea Giraffe AMB 3D C-band multi-role radar provides air and surface surveillance and tracking and target indication to weapon systems. It features 3D agile multi-beam technology and can handle multiple threats up to 20,000m (65,000ft) at elevations up to 70°.

ECCM (electronic counter countermeasures) capabilities include ultra-low antenna sidelobes and both frequency and code agility. The antenna has a rotation rate of 30rpm for surveillance and 60rpm for air defence.

There is also an I-band surface search and I/J-band fire control radar.

Countermeasures

The CS-3701 tactical radar surveillance system (TRSS) from EDO Reconnaissance & Surveillance Systems provides electronic support measures (ESM) and radar warning receiver (RWR) functions.

Visby Class vessels are equipped with the MASS (multi-ammuntion softkill) decoy system from Rheinmetall Waffe Munition (formerly Buck Neue Technologien) of Germany.

MASS can launch up to 32 omni-spectral projectiles in a time-staggered configuration against anti-ship missiles and guided projectiles. The MASS decoy covers radar, infrared, electro-optic, laser and ultraviolet wavebands.

Propulsion

The Visby is equipped with a combined diesel and gas (CODAG) turbine arrangement. Four TF 50 A gas turbines from Honeywell and two MTU 16V 2000 N90 diesel motors are connected to two gearboxes which run two Kamewa waterjet propulsors.

The motors provide a maximum speed of 15kt for long duration and 35kt for short duration. The ship has rudders and bowthrusters for harbour manoeuvring.

* Article publicat a Naval Technology. Compartim aquest article per ampliar la informació, sobre les corbetes Visby, molt vistes els darrers dies als nostres mitjans, i de les quals se'n comença a parlar a casa nostra per la futura Força Naval Catalana.

Why would a Russian submarine enter Swedish waters?*

If the Swedish navy’s hunt for a missing “Russian submarine”sounds like a throw-back to the Cold War, it is no coincidence.

Diplomats in Moscow and western capitals may deny that we are seeing the beginning of “Cold War Two,” but the truth is relations are at their lowest point since the end of the Soviet Union.

And the “missing submarine” is most likely guilty of typical Cold War behaviour: spying, or deliberately testing Western reaction.


Espionage

Sweden may not be a member of Nato, the dark alliance that Moscow’s defence chiefs have identified as Russia’s number one enemy. But it has always taken defence of its “neutrality” extremely seriously.

Its shoreline is still dotted with Cold-War era artillery batteries, and to this day it has one of the most advanced navies in the world - its new Visby class corvettes are widely billed as “the world’s first stealth ships.”

In the relatively small Baltic Sea, that makes Sweden something of a naval super-power, and a neighbour that Russia - which has Baltic ports at St Petersburg and Kaliningrad - would naturally keep a very close eye on.

It might be embarrassing to get caught, but it would be far from surprising to find a Russian submarine servicing underwater spy equipment, perhaps installed during the Cold War, or possibly shadowing Swedish navy exercises.


Testing the Waters

Another explanation is that the Russians actually wanted the submarine to be caught.

With the West and Russia at loggerheads over the annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s proxy war in eastern Ukraine, tensions in the Baltic Sea are higher than at any time in recent history.

Nato has held a series of exercises in the region to let Russia know any attempt to repeat the adventure in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania will be met with force.

And Russia has sent its own signals via the crude diplomatic telegraph of “training exercises.”

Last month, the Swedish airforce scrambled jets to see off an incursion by two Russian fighters flying out of Kaliningrad.

Their mission appeared simply to see how far they could get into Swedish airspace before being turned back - part of a Cold War era practice designed to probe a neighbour’s defences and signal that the Russian military is back in business.

Western militaries say such flights have become worryingly frequent, with Britain, the United States, and Japan all scrambling fighters to see off Russian aircraft from their airspace in the past few months.

Sending a submarine to skulk off the Swedish coast may be the Russian navy’s way of keeping up with the airforce - and letting the West know that Russia will not be intimidated in this strategically vital sea.


Spy extraction

Then again, as everyone one knows, the best role of a submarine in any Cold War drama is to deliver or extract spies from hostile shores in the dead of night.

Following that logic, the vessel in question almost certainly ran into trouble while delivering a Russian agent to a remote Baltic island to do something swashbuckling and nefarious.

Exactly what such a spy might be up to is anyone’s guess.

After all, Russia and Sweden are not at war, and Aeroflot flies Moscow to Stockholm twice daily (from a very reasonable £73, according to the airline’s website).

So unless Moscow’s spy agencies have lost the ability to travel incognito, there would have to be a good reason to take such a risky and laborious travel option.

Probably the kind of reason that would make a decent airport paperback.

If a Russian submarine really has been stranded off the coast of Sweden, it raises the question - what could it have been getting up to? Roland Oliphant explains

Menacing the West with nuclear weapons

On Sunday, a rumour appeared on Ukrainian Twitter accounts naming the missing submarine as the Dmitry Donskoi - a ballistic missile submarine of Russia’s northern fleet equipped with Russia’s brand-new nuclear-tipped Bulava missiles.

One of the largest submarines ever built, it was implied, had suffered some catastrophic failure and was now stranded somewhere on the Baltic Sea bed, unable to contact Moscow and threatening Scandinavia with a kind of maritime Chernobyl.

The rumour played on memories of the Kursk disaster, when a submarine was lost with all hands in the Barents Sea in 2000.

But it is almost certainly fantasy.

At 175 meters, the Donskoi is almost the size of an aircraft carrier and, in the shallow waters of the Baltic, about as easy to hide.

Whatever is lurking amongst the islands of the Stockholm archipelago, it is not a missile submarine.

Hopefully.

* Noticia publicada a The Telegraph. Més enllà dels esdeveniments diaris, cal plantejar hipotesis plausibles, i la del Telegraph ho és bastant.

Catalunya i el model nòrdic: implicacions del concepte‏*

Com és ben sabut, al nostre país es parla molt del "Model Nòrdic", per part de persones i organitzacions de diferents ideologies, i amb referències creixents a mida que ens acostem a la recuperació de la sobirania.

Res a objectar. Ara sí, és necessari que entenguem tot el que implica, no solament els aspectes més simpàtics.

Aquests dies les Forces Armades de Suècia estan duent a terme una cacera d'un submarí rus, sembla ser que avariat, a aigües properes a la capital. Això és possible perquè, com s'esdevé amb països com Noruega, Dinamarca, i Finlàndia, compta amb unes forces armades modernes i ben equipades i entrenades.

Per tant, quan parlem d'una Catalunya "nòrdica", parlem també d'una Catalunya capaç de dur a terme operacions similars en situacions similars. Per tant d'una Catalunya que disposi també, com ho fa Suècia, d'unes forces armades modernes, ben equipades, i ben entrenades. 

I si hi ha algú que encara cregui que no ens trobarem en casos similars, que pregunti a Gibraltar.

ARTICLES I DOCUMENTS RECOMANATS

Svenska Dagbladet

Could be a damaged russian submarine


The Telegraph

Swedish navy sends 200 people to hunt for 'foreign underwater activity'


Defence News

Sweden Hunts Suspected Foreign Submarine Off Stockholm Coast


Reuters

Sweden steps up hunt for "foreign underwater activity"


Societat d'Estudis Militars

Anàlisi de la política de defensa dels països nòrdics

* Article publicat al bloc de la Societat d'Estudis Militars. Compartim aquest article perquè enllaça perfectament amb els nostres plantejaments: si volem ser una nació adulta cal assumir-ne tots els aspectes. Recomanem especialment consultar el darrer dels enllaços.