Vietnam faces limited options in South China Sea dispute

Vietnam has curbed the violent anti-China protests that swept the country after a Chinese oil rig began drilling in contested waters. But authorities have not dropped their opposition to the Chinese operation, sending boats to harass the drilling, considering waging a legal case in international courts to resolve the dispute, and courting regional allies like the Philippines.

China tightened the screws on Vietnam this week by sending a “position paper” to the United Nations on the operations of its $1 billion-oil rig in a part of the South China Sea that Vietnam also claims.

It accused Vietnam of ramming its vessels, sending frogmen and “other underwater agents” in waters which it says are indisputably Chinese.

China has always resisted third party intervention in disputes between rival claimants over territory in the South China Sea, but this shift could put Vietnam in a difficult position, says Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defense Force Academy.
“Is China trying to provoke a debate in the general assembly, making countries make a decision to put up or shut up? Trying to isolate Vietnam by having those countries which are most concerned about China to shut up because they wouldn’t want to be seen as forced out into the open like Brunei, they just abstain and duck for cover," Thayer suggested.

Vietnam cannot compete with China’s military muscle and remains heavily reliant on Beijing for trade. Vietnam is believed to be considering waging a legal case for the disputed territory, but taking its claims to an international court could take years.

According to Thayer, one option could be to take advantage of the Philippines’ challenge of the legality of China's maritime claims at an international tribunal in The Hague.

“The best approach politically, if relations between China are irreparable, would be to join the Philippines and try to bolster its claim as a friend of the Philippines," Thayer said.

Vietnam’s coalition with the Philippines took a lighter tone on Monday when the country played football, volleyball and tug of war with sailors on an island in the Spratly archipelago.

In the past the two governments would have been wary about organizing such an event, lest they appear to be “ganging up” on China, says Alexander Vuving, a security analyst at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

However, things have now come to a point where both countries can step up and show their solidarity.

Vietnam can look also look outside the region for support, he said.

“India is far away but has also indicated its support for Vietnam so looking at the core interest for both nations I think that the casual allies, if you want to use the term, would be the Philippines, Japan and the U.S. and India," Vuving said.

He added that Vietnam has been moving closer to the U.S. even before the oil rig crisis in a “continuing rapprochement to the rise of China”.

But Vietnam’s politburo are divided on how close they get to Washington. Some do not want political reform and others have vested interests in economic ties with China.

“I think fundamentally modernizers want to get closer to the U.S., not just for defense of the territory but also for economic reform," Vuving explained. " But they are not very well represented in the politburo right now.”

Meanwhile, at home Vietnam is preparing for the long haul. On Monday the National Assembly passed a plan to spend $760 million to support fishermen and coast guards.

The money will be used to buy equipment for patrols and build offshore fishing vessels for the Vietnam Coast Guard, the Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance Force and fishermen.

This includes construction of 3,000 steel-clad fishing boats, Tran Cao Muu, General Secretary of the Vietnam Fisheries Association said. The current fleet of around 100,000 boats are made of wood.

He said policies to exploit resources in Vietnamese waters are not new, but the issue has become “hotter” following China’s aggressive actions in the sea.

Vietnam has accused China of ramming its ships over 1,400 times, once causing a fishing boat to sink.

Despite the increased dangers, Muu said Vietnam's fishing ships were operating as normal in the sea.

* Notícia publicada a The Voice of America. Compartim aquest article, clarificador de com el contenciós al Mar del Sud de la Xina no té, ara per ara, aturador.

Work begins on Vietnam’s sixth Kilo-class submarine *

Russia has laid down the sixth Kilo-class submarine being built for the Vietnam Navy at Admiralty shipyards in St Petersburg.
Developed as part of a $2bn contract to deliver six submarines, the new subs are aimed at strengthening Vietnam's defences.
RIA Novosti quoted an anonymous defence industry source as saying: "This is the latest submarine in this series."
Vietnam has already taken delivery of two submarines, with the third currently undergoing sea trials and a fourth being floated out in late March. The final two are currently under construction.
"The improved Kilo-class submarines are capable of carrying out anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in shallow waters."
"Two submarines have already been transferred to the Vietnamese Navy, [and] the third is to be transferred this year and the remaining three in 2015-2016," the source added.
Featuring stealth technology with an extended combat range to strike targets on land, sea surface and underwater, the improved Kilo-class submarines are capable of carrying out anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in shallow waters.
Equipped with 18 torpedoes and eight surface-to-air missiles, they also feature low noise, advanced-hull architecture and an optimal level of control-process automation, while offering high reliability with minimal maintenance.
They can cruise at a speed of 20k with a range of 400 miles. In addition, they can accommodate a crew of 52 and patrol for 45 days.

Image: The Russian-built Kilo-class submarine is claimed to be one of the quietest diesel-electric vessels. Photo: courtesy of DoD.

*Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Ja hem parlat de la millora de les capacitats militars vietnamites. Vet aquí un graó més.

China Abandons Small-Stick Diplomacy?

So seagoing forces from Vietnam and China scrapped this week in the Paracel Islands. China’s state-run oil and gas firm CNOOC positioned an oil rig in waters claimed by both Beijing and Hanoi, prompting Vietnam’s leadership to send ships. No shots have been fired, thankfully. Ramming and dousing one another with water cannon have been the tactics of choice. How the contest will unfold remains to be seen.

China has controlled the Paracels for forty years now, since a mixed force of naval units and fishing vessels pummeled a South Vietnamese flotilla in the waning days of the Vietnam War. And, of course, it claims “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands and adjoining seas. It has rebuffed pleas to mediate or adjudicate maritime territorial disputes in the China seas. Hence the visceral reaction the rig elicited in Vietnam.

One curious twist to this week’s turbulence: PLA Navy units were among the mix of vessels tangling in the Paracels. Is Beijing abandoning the small-stick diplomacy that has served it so well in recent years? Maybe. It wouldn’t be the first time China’s leadership has chucked out a promising diplomatic venture (see Offensive, Charm) for mysterious reasons, or missed an opportunity to smooth out relations with Asian neighbors (see Haiyan, Typhoon). Dumb and self-defeating things are part of Beijing’s strategic repertoire.

In this case, however, they may be paying Vietnam a backhanded compliment rather than blundering. China likes to behave like Sun Tzu’s Hegemonic King. It likes to overawe its neighbors, keeping them from making common cause against China, and to generally bask in its own awesomeness. But officialdom doubtless remembers past Sino-Vietnamese clashes on land and on the waves. And it remembers that China has occasionally come off the worst against this tough, determined opponent.

The leadership may reckon that it can’t overpower Vietnamese forces with white China Coast Guard hulls alone. Navies fight for disputed objects, whereas coast guards enforce domestic law against non-state lawbreakers. By sending warships, Beijing may be tacitly admitting that Vietnam — unlike the Philippines, whose navy and coast guard are utterly outclassed — is a serious antagonist. Take a bow, Hanoi.

What should the United States do about such encounters? As the Naval Diplomat suggested recently, the time may have come to accept the idea that offshore waters — territorial seas and exclusive economic zones — are “blue” territory, to borrow the ubiquitous Chinese term. Sending official vessels to grab an atoll within a coastal state’s offshore waters is equivalent to setting up an outpost on another nation’s borderlands. Encouraging fishing fleets to ply their trade in another nation’s EEZ is equivalent to encouraging poachers to cross land frontiers to purloin natural resources.

See? Accepting China’s claim that water is territory clarifies matters, doesn’t it? It shows that Beijing is guilty of cross-border aggression at Scarborough Shoal or Mischief Reef, or when it tries to auction off parts of the Vietnamese EEZ (as it did in 2012). And thwarting cross-border aggression is central to any mutual defense pact, as well as to overarching documents such as the UN Charter.

But. U.S. help should apply only to waters off landmasses that are unambiguously coastal-state territory. Helping defend, say, a 200-nautical-mile belt off Luzon, or off central Vietnam, is one thing. Such cases are crystal-clear. The situation is murkier by far out in the central South China Sea. It’s hard to see Washington’s ever fighting for the Paracels or Spratlys unless some international tribunal finally untangles the mass of claims to these islets. If America’s partners in the region are banking on the U.S. Navy’s steaming to their rescue, their hopes will probably be dashed.

It’s also hard to envision doing battle over any island unless it’s naturally formed, remains above water at high tide, can support human habitation, and can support economic life. That’s how the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defines an island. It’s far from clear that any of the Spratlys or Paracels qualifies by all of these standards except for Woody Island, which is occupied by China. Unlike the other islets, Woody Island has its own fresh water and thus meets the UNCLOS tests.

It’s also worth pointing out that UNCLOS specifically states that “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” International law, then, would apportion a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea to such features while forbidding governments exercising jurisdiction there to assert exclusive economic zones centered on such rocks.

That puts a different spin on China’s nine-dashed line, doesn’t it? It’s hard to claim blue territory adjoining islands that aren’t islands at all. Some of the Spratlys and Paracels may qualify for territorial seas. Partially submerged features may not qualify for anything at all. This suggests the bones of a dual strategy for Southeast Asia states and external allies such as the United States: extend mutual-defense arrangements to cover EEZs washing against coastal-state homelands while seeking legal rulings on the status of the Spratlys and the Paracels.

And indeed, Manila recently opened a legal offensive, taking its case to the Law of the Sea Tribunal. In all likelihood, the jurists will agree that there is no basis for Beijing’s nine-dashed line — especially where it claims waterspace within EEZs adjacent to the metropolitan Philippines. As for the flyspecks in the central South China Sea, all claimants are apt to be disappointed at the tribunal’s findings. Few are islands in any legal sense. Sovereignty over them confers exclusive economic rights to minor sea areas at most. A decision to that effect would return most of that expanse to what it should be: an international commons, open to free use by any seafaring society.

China’s response to such a ruling will probably evoke the Incredible Hulk: China smash!!! After all, it’s a big country and other countries are small countries. Small countries should get used to it, dontcha know? But if it does defy the tribunal, Beijing will have revealed just how lawless it is. And it will have given fellow Asia-Pacific sea powers reason to join forces against it. Let’s wage some lawfare of our own.

* Article publicat a The Diplomat. Clarificadora reflexió del professor James R. Holmes sobre el que està passant entre la Xina i Vietnam.

Truong Sa submarine denied test site*

The setback came as discouraging news to Nguyen Quoc Hoa, developer of the sub, and other interested scientists.

Hoa and his colleagues had been convinced that the testing license was forthcoming from the local authorities, right up until the final decision was made. Vu Manh Hien, Director of the Thai Binh Department of Science and Technology, had told the local press on April 23 that he was certain that the Truong Sa would receive permission to go to sea.

“I cannot see any problems with the experiment. All new products need to be tested,” he told the Dat Viet newspaper.

Hoa had expressed his hope that his sub’s first outing at sea could take place on April 29, to coincide with the 39th anniversary of the Saigon Liberation Day and the nation’s reunion.

Just two days later, however, Hoa received a dispatch from Thai Binh’s People’s Committee. The missive applauded Hoa’s determination and expressed its support for the sub testing plan. But it went on to state that Hoa would not be allowed to test his sub in Thai Binh waters.

“The plan to test the sub in territorial waters, in the Diem Dien port area, about 12 kilometers offshore, at 11 am to 3 pm, is unreasonable and cannot be implemented,” the dispatch reads.

“The Quoc Hoa Mechanical Engineering Company (Hoa’s private business) still has not conducted the necessary surveys on the geographical and hydrographical conditions, and it has not demonstrated the measures to be taken to ensure safety for humans,” it continued.

As if to soften the rough edges of its rejection, Thai Binh added a word of advice: seek the support of the Ministry of National Defense, and consider testing the sub at the Navy High Command Region 1.

Commenting about officials’ decision, Hoa said: “Given this new reality, I will have to take the proposal to a higher level, as it is clear that the sub’s testing cannot be conducted in the territorial waters where it was born”.

Hoa said he regrets that he was not invited to the officials’ meeting to discuss the sub’s testing. “Those who made decision on my case do not have deep knowledge of submarine technology. Therefore, they feared the testing could be unsafe,” Hoa said.

“They said the water level would be low on April 29, thus unsuitable for the testing. However, I have learnt from the Hydrology Department that this was a time of high tide, and would have been a good day for testing,” he maintained.

Phan Boi Tran, known as the developer of the first mini-submarine in Southeast Asia, said if Hoa can get support from the Navy High Command Region 1, the testing would be easier and safer. There would be four ships following Truong Sa during testing, and one more ship with a large crane to be ready for an emergency.

Dat Viet

* Notícia publicada a Vietnamnet. Com veiem, més enllà dels contratemps concrets, Vietnam es pren seriosament la seva indústria de defensa, i més concretament la naval.

Lessons from the Battle of the Paracel Islands*

Forty years on, the battle has enduring lessons for Vietnam’s naval modernization.

 

By Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin

January 23, 2014

 

 

On January 16, 1974, the Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVN) discovered the presence of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Crescent Group in the western Paracel Islands, which was held by South Vietnam. This was an unexpected development, because notwithstanding the reduced U.S. military assistance to Saigon after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, and subsequent reduction of South Vietnamese garrisons on the islands, the Chinese had not taken unilateral actions to subvert the status quo – by which the Amphitrite Group in the eastern Paracels and the Crescent Group were respectively under Chinese and South Vietnamese control.

Over the next two days, the opposing naval forces jostled with one another in close-proximity maneuvers off the islands, before a firefight erupted as the South Vietnamese troops attempted to recapture Duncan Island. The skirmish subsequently escalated with overwhelming Chinese reinforcements deployed to the clash zone, including close air support staged from nearby Hainan Island and missile-armed Hainan-class patrol vessels. Shorn of American naval support, given that the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet was then scaling down its presence in the South China Sea following the peace accords of 1973, the RVN was utterly defeated. Beijing swiftly exploited the naval victory with an amphibious landing in force to complete its control of all the Paracel Islands.

The Battle of the Paracel Islands has since gone down history as the first Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the quest for control over the South China Sea isles. The Sino-Vietnamese naval skirmish in the nearby Spratly Islands in 1988 was the second and final such instance. Since then, tensions have eased. There have been continued exchanges at the ruling party level and between the countries’ militaries (including the hosting of a PLA Navy South Sea Fleet delegation to a Vietnamese naval base). Beijing and Hanoi have also recently inaugurated mutual consultations on joint marine resource development in the South China Sea.

However, the Battle of Paracel Islands in 1974 yields some useful and enduring lessons for Hanoi and its ongoing naval modernization in the South China Sea, particularly in the face of geopolitical developments.

Enduring Lesson #1: Diplomacy is the First Recourse… But Not the Sole Recourse

No international and regional treaties constitute perfect safeguards against unilateral action, including threat or use of force. The landmark Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea inked in 2002 between China and the Southeast Asian claimants has not been entirely successful. In fact, unilateral actions aimed at subverting the status quo in the South China Sea by threat or use of force has continued to dominate. Recent video footage revealed by China’s CCTV in January 2014 showed a standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement ships off the Paracel Islands back in 2007. More recent, recurring incidents included the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships by Chinese vessels, the Sino-Philippine maritime standoff in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 and, later, the show of force by Chinese surveillance ships and naval frigates off the Philippine-held Second Thomas Shoal. These episodes bear an eerie resemblance to the sort of naval jostling that led to the skirmish back in 1974.

Even as the South China Sea claimants engaged in consultations on a Code of Conduct, upon unilaterally declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in December 2013, Beijing declared indisputable rights to create ADIZs in other areas if it so desired. An ADIZ over the South China Sea, if ever established, would undoubtedly strengthen Beijing’s hand over the disputed waters, augmenting regular unilateral fishing bans, an earlier expanded maritime law enforcement authority for the Hainan authorities as well as the latest Chinese fisheries law requiring foreign fishing vessels to seek permission from Beijing to operate in much of the South China Sea. These developments, if they continue unabated, will only heighten the risk of accidental or premeditated clashes in the disputed waters.

Enduring Lesson #2: Extra-regional Powers Neither Always Stay… Nor Always Help

There has been growing interest among extra-regional powers in the South China Sea. Besides the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalancing, Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has intensified its Southeast Asian diplomatic offensive, one of the objectives being to promote Tokyo’s territorial stance in the East China Sea. Vietnam has become one of the major beneficiaries of this development. During the 4th U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue held in Washington in late October 2013, an agreement was reached to enhance maritime security cooperation. In the same month, Tokyo was reportedly keen to supply patrol vessels as part of a plan to bolster Vietnam’s maritime security capacity-building efforts. Also notable, Hanoi is enjoying budding defense ties with New Delhi, having hosted regular Indian Navy port visits in the past decade.

Still, none of the extra-regional powers has taken any side on the South China Sea disputes, preferring to focus only on freedom of navigation. This means that even though Washington or Tokyo have legitimate reasons to intervene if vital sea lines of communications through the South China Sea are threatened by the specter of armed conflict, any extra-regional help is far from certain. For instance, even if the U.S. Pacific Command is able to detect tell-tale signs of unusual Chinese military movements in the South China Sea, it may not be able to react in time. The U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, as part of the rebalancing strategy, has intensified maritime surveillance in the area: the new Littoral Combat Ship U.S.S. Freedom is said to be conducting more than mere training missions in the area while the U.S. Navy was reported to have stepped up maritime aerial surveillance since July 2012.

However, during the skirmish in 1974 Saigon sought assistance from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, but it was under orders not to intervene in the disputes and no help arrived for the RVN off the Paracels. Washington is likely to adopt the same stance today, even if a renewed Sino-Vietnamese naval clash were to erupt, especially in localized contexts that do not necessarily impinge upon freedom of navigation by other users. Moreover, the present and future PLA Navy South Sea Fleet is no longer the same run-down, coastal-oriented force operating Soviet-era small patrol and attack forces it used to be. With its steady accumulation of force projection capabilities, including amphibious assault, the PLA Navy is in a better position than back in 1974 to deploy sizeable forces over sustained durations at greater distances to assert sovereignty, and its overall combat power will be far more potent if ever unleashed in the South China Sea.

Enduring Lesson #3: The Need for At Least Limited Sea Control Capabilities

There is no way for Vietnam to quantitatively match the PLA naval capabilities in the South China Sea. Consistent with Hanoi’s policy pronunciations, an arms race with China is not only impossible in the first place, but is considered potentially detrimental to Vietnam’s ongoing Renovation process. Vietnam’s post-Cold War naval modernization has been predicated on filling capacity shortfalls after previous decades of neglect. In recent years, the Vietnam People’s Navy had made notable strides in acquiring new hardware to replace the ageing Soviet-era equipment. However, the new, mostly Russian-supplied capabilities, such as Gepard-3.9 light frigates, Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2V Flanker multi-role fighters equipped for maritime strike and Yakhont/Bastion coastal defense missile batteries, Dutch-built SIGMA-class corvettes as well as locally-built coastal patrol and attack craft all point to a force modernization pathway based primarily on denying an adversary access to the disputed zone. They do not suggest an ability to secure Vietnam’s own access.

Yet, the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 highlighted the need to not just deny an adversary from blockading the South China Sea features but also to secure Vietnam’s own access to those exposed and vulnerable garrisons. Only a shift from sea denial to sea control can hope to attain that. Given the durable peace along the land borders with her neighbors, Vietnam should logically emphasize air-sea warfighting capabilities. For status quo-oriented Vietnam, much akin to what Saigon was back in 1974, the foreseeable combat scenario in a renewed South China Sea clash will encompass the need for Vietnamese forces to recapture seized features, or at least reinforce existing garrisons in the face of hostile attack. Under this scenario, Vietnam’s defense predicament is perhaps no different from Japan’s with respect to the East China Sea dispute. Tokyo has outlined in its recent new defense strategy the need for robust, integrated mobile defense, which envisaged the need for the Self-Defense Force to recapture the East China Sea isles in times of hostilities. Certainly Vietnam cannot hope to muster the same range of capabilities as Japan could, given economic constraints. To build at least limited sea control capabilities, Hanoi ought to focus on improving early warning and expanding amphibious sealift capacity.

Existing Vietnamese early warning capabilities are vested in a static electronic surveillance network arrayed along the Vietnamese mainland coast and in occupied South China Sea features, augmented only in recent years by maritime patrol aircraft of the Vietnamese navy and coastguard. These planes are mainly designed for surface surveillance, yet are handicapped in endurance and lack adequate anti-submarine warfare capabilities especially in view of the increasing PLA submarine challenge. A high-endurance maritime patrol aircraft fitted with longer-range sensors will be appropriate, and arguably more survivable than static installations. The Vietnam Naval Infantry, which specializes in amphibious assault and has been streamlined over the decades, has become a leaner yet meaner force with the acquisition of better equipment. Still, it remains short on amphibious sealift capacity, given that the Soviet and ex-U.S. vintage landing ships were too old and mostly no longer operational. Hanoi’s fledgling naval shipbuilders have so far produced a small handful of new assault transports ostensibly to fill this gap. However, more such vessels are required to enable the Vietnam Naval Infantry to project more substantial forces with greater rapidity in order to reinforce the South China Sea garrisons or to recapture them from an adversary.

Final Thoughts

The Battle of the Paracel Islands might have happened a long forty years ago. Still, even though the South China Sea has seen relative peace, it pays for Hanoi to remain vigilant by sustaining the pace of its naval modernization attempts. While diplomacy is the preferred recourse and extra-regional powers have become more heavily involved in the region, adequate military power in the form of defense self-help remains necessary, especially when the area continues to be fraught with uncertainty. Compared to the RVN, for now and in the foreseeable future the Vietnam People’s Navy and Air Force faces a challenge far greater than before in preserving the status quo in the South China Sea.

Ngo Minh Tri is Managing Editor of the Thanh Nien newspaper, based in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University based in Singapore. This article reflects the personal viewpoints of the authors and not representative of their respective organizations

 

*Article publicat a The Diplomat. El compartim per l'importància que té sempre la perspectiva històrica en els conflictes del present.

Three Japanese warships in Da Nang *

 

Three Japanese warships arrived at Tien Sa port based in the central Da Nang city on Saturday for a two-day visit to help forge closer links with Vietnam’s naval force.
The squadron comprises training vessel Japanese Defense Ship (JDS) Kashima, two destroyers JDS Shirayuki and JDS Isoyuki, and 750 officers and crew members.
The ships belong to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Training Squadron. Rear Admiral Fumiyuki Kitagawa, who leads the squadron, said that this visit is part of activities marking the 40^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Japan.
During their stay in Da Nang, the squadron’s members will meet the city’s leaders, jointly participate in sea rescue training with local naval forces, and visit some tourist attractions.

* Notícia publicada a tuoitree news. Compartim aquesta notícia per com a seguiment de la ruta de l'Esquadra d'Instucció Japonesa, ara al Vietnam.

Vietnam’s third Varshavyanka-class submarine to be floated out this month*

Russia's Admiralty Shipyards will float out the Vietnamese Navy's third of six Varshavyanka-class submarines, Stary Oskol, later this month, Admiralty Shipyards announced.
In December 2009, Vietnam's Defence Ministry awarded a $2bn contract to Russia to deliver a total of six submarines to strengthen its naval capabilities and better defend the country, according to RIA Novosti.

Under the contract, Russia will also provide training for the Vietnamese submarine crews, while deliveries of the submarines are scheduled to be complete by 2016.
The Varshavyanka-class boats are integrated with advanced stealth technology to provide strike land, surface and underwater targets at extended combat ranges.

Equipped with 533mm torpedo tubes, the boats are also armed with torpedoes, mines and Kalibr 3M54 cruise missiles to support anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in shallow waters.

The 3,100t submarines are capable of accommodating a crew of 52 and are currently under construction at the Admiralteiskie Verfi shipyard in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Capable of cruising at a speed of 20k, the submarines can also conduct missions such as coastal defence, mine laying, general reconnaissance and patrol operations, according to USNI News.
In August 2010, the first Varshavyanka-class submarine Novorossiisk was laid down and also successfully completed 100-day sea trials last month.
Earlier, Admiralty Shipyards in a statement, said: "The vessel showed excellent maneuverability and reliable work of all mechanisms during the trials."

Novorossiisk is scheduled to be delivered to the Vietnamese Navy in November 2013 while the construction on the second vessel Rostov-on-Don began in November 2011.
Admiralty Shipyards said the Russian Black Sea Fleet's first of another six Varshavyanka-class diesel-electric submarines will also be floated out in November 2013.

*Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. La Marina del Vietnam continua endavant amb el seu programa d'adquisició de submarins. Caldrà veure si seran prou dissuasoris per la Xina.

Vietnam to receive advanced Russian submarine in 2013*

As tensions remain high in the South China Sea between Vietnam and China
, Hanoi is reportedly set to receive its first of six advanced submarines from Russia.
Ria Novsti reported
 that “The first of six Varshavyanka class (Project 636M) diesel-electric submarines will be delivered to Vietnam in 2013 as scheduled.” Commonly referred to as the Kilo-class, the subsreportedly
 boast “advanced stealth technology, extended combat range and ability to strike land, surface and underwater targets.”
Hanoi placed an order for six of the Russian-made subs back in 2009. According to the report by Ria Novsti, the contract, which also has provisions for the training of Vietnamese submarine crews in Russia, is reportedly worth US$2 billion.
According to a recent article from USNI News
, Vietnam has ordered the most advanced variant of the Kilo, the improved 636MV. TheUSNI article explained
:
“The Project 636 Kilo-class submarine has been dubbed the “black hole” by the U.S. Navy for its level of quietness. The Project 636MV-class sub has improved stealth features through the removal of flooding ports and treating the hull with multilayer anechoic rubber tiles. The tiles are fitted on casings and fins to absorb active sonar waves that reduce and distort the return signal. The anechoic tiles also shield sounds from within the submarine thus reducing the range of detection by passive sonar.”
The new subs could also be part of Vietnam’s attempt to develop its own anti-access capabilities. As our own Naval Diplomat, James Holmes, pointed out in a recent article
:
“Submarines offer enormous bang for the buck, and they are survivable. Still, this also means that advances in Chinese antisubmarine warfare could nullify Vietnam’s effort to fend off the PLA Navy. Next, Vietnamese access denial could take on an offensive as well as a defensive character. Vietnamese Kilos could, say, loiter unseen off the Chinese naval station at Sanya, on Hainan Island, holding PLA Navy submarines at risk at the delicate moment when they are entering or leaving port—exposing them to enemy action.”
While such a purchase by Vietnam will surely increase its undersea capabilities, it will take years for such subs to come online. All of the vessels crews will need to undergone extensive training and the subs will also need to be thoroughly tested. Also, all six submarines will not all be available for duty at all times, as such vessels are cycled in and out of service for repair and training.

* Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. El programa de rearmament naval vietnamita segueix endavant. Més enllà de les bones qualitats dels submarins "Kilo", hem de pensar en les qualitats dels homes que els portin. La valentia dels vietnamites queda fora de qualsevol dubte, però sense entrenament i maniobres constants de poc serveix.

Russia launches Vietnam Navy’s first Kilo-class submarine *

Russia has launched the first of six Kilo-class Project 636 diesel-electric submarines built for the Vietnam Navy at Admiralty shipyards in St Petersburg.

Launch of the new submarine follows a $2bn contract signed between Vietnam and Russia to deliver six submarines in December 2009 to strengthen its ability to defend the country, reports RIA Novosti.

A shipyard source said that the first boat was scheduled to be launched on this week, following which it will set sail for sea trials before its delivery by the end of this year.

Capable of conducting anti-shipping and anti-submarine missions in shallow waters, the improved Kilo-class submarines feature stealth technology with extended combat range to strike targets on land, sea surface and underwater.

Featuring low noise, advanced hull architecture and optimal level of control process automation, the submarines provide high reliability and require minimal maintenance.Equipped with 18 torpedoes and eight surface-to-air missiles, the submarines have a cruising speed of 20k, a range of 400 miles using electronic propulsion, can patrol for 45 days and are capable of accommodating a crew of 52.

Designed by Russian-based Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau and originally built at the Komsomolsk shipyard, the Russian Kilo-class submarines first entered into service in the early 1980s.

The Vietnamese Navy does not currently have a submarine fleet and is expected to build a basing site for them with help from the Russian Navy, as reported by RusNavy.

Deliveries of the submarines are scheduled to be complete by 2016.

* Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. El llançament (que no entrada en servei encara) de la primera de les sis unitats de classe Kilo millorada destinada al Vietnam, ajuda a pensar que la balança de forces al Mar de la Xina Meridional començarà a equilibrar-se. Fins i tot sense comptar amb els Estats Units i l'Índia, Vietnam podrà disposar d'un "game changer" contra l'Armada xinesa.

Vietnamese Back Philippines*

By Huy Duong

 In a new twist this week to the stand-off between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, 66 Vietnamese, many of them well-known public figures in Vietnam and within the Vietnamese Diaspora, signed a letter to the Philippine Ambassador in Vietnam to express support for the Philippines’ “sovereign rights” in the continuing stand-off. The main points of the letter are:

1) Support for the “sovereign rights” of the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal.

2) Opposition to China’s use of the “nine-dashed line”  to make overlapping claims with the Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves of the Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN countries, as well as opposition to “China’s actions and threats of force,” the latter presumably referring to articles in China’s state controlled press.

3) Support for the Philippines’ proposal to submit the dispute at Scarborough Shoal to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

The first interesting thing about the letter, to which I am a signatory, is that while supporting the Philippines, the letter stops short of taking sides on the question of sovereignty over the rocks at Scarborough Shoal. What it supports the Philippines on is the question of “sovereign rights,” which isn’t sovereignty over islands and rocks, but rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.

Does it make legal sense to support the Philippines on the question of rights over the EEZ and continental shelf without taking sides on the question of sovereignty over the rocks? Don’t the rights over the EEZ and continental shelf depend on sovereignty over territories, including islands and rocks? The answer lies in the fact that the rocks at Scarborough Shoal aren’t the only territories in this area; there’s also Luzon Island. It’s possible to argue that these rocks aren’t entitled to an EEZ beyond 12 nautical miles, therefore the EEZ in this area belongs to Luzon Island, regardless of whether the rocks belong to China or the Philippines, and regardless of the fact that they are disputed territory.

It’s evident that while both Vietnam and the Philippines feel most threatened by China’s “nine-dashed line,” those countries also feel that this line has a legal Achilles’ heel, which they seek to target with the concepts of UNCLOS such as EEZ, and of maritime delimitations, arguing that regardless of which country owns an island or rock, and of the fact that it might be disputed territory, the EEZ in certain areas belongs to larger landmasses.

The second interesting thing is that whoever drafted the letter chose not to use the conventional international name of “South China Sea.” Instead, they chose to use a combination of the Filipino and Vietnamese names, “West Philippine Sea/East Sea.” Are we about to see something similar to South Korea’s challenge to the conventional name “Sea of Japan”?

However, most interesting of all is the fact that this is the first time ever that members of the public in a country involved in the South China Sea disputes have expressed support for another in this way.

Still, perhaps this move shouldn’t come as a complete surprise given that in recent years most of the incidents in the South China Sea involve either China and Vietnam or China and the Philippines. With a common legal argument and facing a common, but much larger, opponent, there will likely be a tendency for the Vietnamese and the Filipinos to move towards a strategy of mutual support in the future.

Huy Duong contributes articles on the South China Sea to several news outlets including the BBC and Vietnam's online publication VietNamNet.

* Article publicat a The Diplomat. La fermesa del Vietnam en recolzar les Filipines el el contenciós amb la Xina, a banda de l'intel·ligència de plantejar un front comú, posa de relleu altre cop l'enorme determinació d'aquest país asiàtic. Sense dubte, sense una política exterior valenta, no es poden contenir les ànsies de conquesta. Recordem Münich el 1938...

Vietnam Negotiate Buying four Sigma Corvettes from the Netherlands*

Vietnam’s growing economy, and China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea, are pushing the country to begin a long-delayed military modernization program. Most of the equipment comes from Vietnam’s traditional Russian sources, but a purchase of Next-Gen DHC-6 Twin Otter maritime patrol aircraft from Canada showed the country’s willingness to consider other suppliers. Now comes word that Vietnam’s new Russian Gepard Class corvettes may be joined by another Western entry: 4 SIGMA ships from the Dutch Schelde shipyard.

SIGMA actually stands for Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach. Block construction has become almost routine for ships, but block design at this level is unique…

The SIGMA design uses standard, 7.2m sections, separated by bulkheads with watertight doors. That block size allows the ship to meet international requirements for surviving 6m wide damage to the ship. To add capabilities, people, or space, just add blocks to the design, and a base 50m OPV design can morph all the way to a 90m corvette (Indonesia) or even a full-featured 105m – 150m frigate (Morocco). Necessary standardization within compartment interfaces, beams, doors, portals, stairs and other key construction components adds more efficiencies. 

Early reports in October 2011 indicated that an agreement was in progress, whereby the first 2 SIGMA ships would be built in Vlissingen, the Netherlands, and the last 2 would be built in Vietnam, under Dutch supervision. That would represent a big step forward for Vietnam’s shipbuilding industry.

SIGMA ships usually use Thales for combat systems and radars, and MBDA for missiles, but customers like Vietnam can change that if they want. Vietnam certainly has a long history with France, who would undoubtedly be interested in resuming some level of defense ties. On the other hand, compatibility with the Russian weapons on its other naval ships would offer advantages of its own. If they choose to change the SIGMA’s standard armament, the most likely substitutions involve incorporating a Russian 76.2mm AK-176M naval gun instead of Oto Melara’s 76mm, SA-18 very short range anti-aircraft missiles instead of MBDA’s Mistral, and/or Kh-53E anti-ship missiles, instead of the French Exocet

* Notícia publicada a Defense Industry Daily. El rearmament vietnamita en matèria naval, és tot un símptoma de la por que genera el creixement xinés. Sens dubte, les darreres declaracions dels mitjans estatals xinesos, no contribueixen a la calma.