THE ROLES OF NAVIES IN THE YEMENI CONFLICT*

By Claude Berube, Stephanie Chenault, Louis M-v, Chris Rawley

Although the Saudi-led Operation RESOLUTE STORM (alternately translated as DECISIVE STORM) began with air strikes into Yemen on March 26 and continue as of this writing, the heightened level of regional activity also includes maritime operations. These national and multi-national operations highlight the importance of naval platforms and presence. Yemen is strategically located with the heavily-trafficked Red Sea to its west and the Gulf of Aden along its southern coast. Some twenty thousand ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually. Yemen’s ports have been largely closed to commercial traffic.

Evacuation of Citizens

Earlier this year, the US and other nations began pulling out of embassies and recommending their citizens leave Yemen at the earliest opportunity. Once RESOLUTE STORM began, airspace was restricted with limited flights out of the country. Consequently, several countries have been evacuating its citizens via comparatively safer ports such as Aden in the Gulf of Aden and Hodeida situated along the Red Sea. One Pakistan Navy ship got underway from Pakistan on Sunday while a second planned to depart the following day, both for the port of Hodeida where some 600 Pakistani citizenswere converging.

India sent five ships to evacuate approximately four thousand nationals from Hodeida. The passenger ships include the M/V Kavaratti and M/V Corals. The Indian Navy ships include the Delhi-class destroyer Mumbai, the Talwar-class frigate Tarkash, and the Saryu-class patrol vessel Sumitra.

China also interrupted the duties of its 19th anti-piracy flotilla off the Horn of Africa to evacuate citizens from Yemen. The PLA/N frigate Weifang was sent to Yemen and evacuated 449 Chinese citizens and others. Evacuations had taken place at both Aden and Hodeida. Chinese citizens were then taken to Djibouti.

Saudi Arabia’s “Tornado Plan” was employed to transport diplomats in Yemen. The ships included the Al-Riyadh (Lafayette)-class Al-Damman, and a modified Durance-class replenishment ship Yunbou

Maritime Security

Several countries have some concern about the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, approximately 18-20 miles wide at its narrowest point“limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments.” According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 3.8 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Bab el-Mandeb every day in 2013. Although the Iranian-backed Houthis leading the insurgency in Yemen have announced that they would not seek to impact transitthrough the strait, the more likely threat would be from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2013, for example, the Yemeni government reportedly disrupted one AQAP plot to attack ships in the Bab el-Mandeb.

According to Reuters, four ships from the Egyptian Navy transited the Suez Canal to secure the region on the first day of the air strikes.

Search and Rescue

The Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Sterrett (DDG 104)rescued two Saudi Arabian airmen from the Gulf of Aden after their two-seater F-15 fighter jet crashed on the first day of the air strikes.

Naval Gunfire Support

According to one source, Egyptian warships began shelling Houthis outside Aden on March 30. The Egyptian flotilla includes the U.S. produced Perry-class frigate Alexandria (F911), whose 76 mm OTO-Melara gun can bombard surface targets out to 16 km away.

Analysts’ Assessment

While the majority of Operation RESOLUTE STORM activities have been air strikes with the possibility of a future ground conflict, the domestic instability in Yemen and on-going military operations underscore the importance of naval platforms, presence, and the varied operations that can be conducted by navies. Naval activity in the region by regional and international actors can be expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Possible future naval missions could include patrols designed to prevent Iran’s resupply of Houthi forces from the sea. Previous attempts by the Iranians to smuggle modern weapons to Houthi forces, such as the Jeehan 1 in January 2013, were foiled by Yemeni government forces. It is doubtful such naval capability still exists in non-Houthi Yemeni elements so multi-national forces will need to take on the maritime interdiction role.

The operations also highlight the PLA/N’s increasing capability. China began sending anti-piracy flotillas off the Horn of Africa in 2008 at the height of Somali pirate activity. To date, the PLA/N has sent nineteen flotillas, each comprised of two warships and one supply ship. These uninterrupted operations have enabled the Chinese to become familiar with long-term operations, logistics, and the importance of presence. Without the PLA/N’s experience in the region, it is unknown how or if it could have extracted its citizens from Yemen in a timely fashion.

A new op-ed in a Chinese newspaper on March 30 points out that“China has evacuated hundreds of its nationals from war-torn Yemen by Monday, in demonstrating responsibility and humanistic care toward its citizens. In the era of globalization, coupled with China’s increasing presence in the world, more Chinese nationals are living and working overseas.” Another online commenter on China’s Sina Weibo stated:“The strength of the motherland is not about the visa-free agreements with other countries, but that it could bring you home from danger.” Put simply: The Navy protects you.

One might ask, given budget priorities, have Americans and Europeans forgotten this?

Claude Berube is a history instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy and author.

Stephanie Chenault is the Chief Operating Officer of Venio Inc. and a Policy & Strategy Consultant for the Department of Defense.

Louis Martin-Vézian is the co-president of the French chapter at CIMSEC.org, and the founder of CIGeography, where he post his maps and infographics on various security and defense topics. He is currently studying Geography and Political Science in Lyon, France.

Chris Rawley is an entrepreneur and reserve naval officer.

* Notícia publicada al CIMSEC. Compartim aquest article doncs resulta aclaridor sobre els moviments al Iemen.

Egypt sent warships to Yemen's Gulf of Aden: Official*

Two gunboats and two destroyers have crossed the Suez Canal en route to the Red Sea to help secure the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait

Egypt has sent four naval vessels to Yemen's strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait amid a Saudi-led offensive against Yemen's Shiite Houthi group, an Egyptian official said Thursday.

"Two gunboats and two destroyers have crossed the Suez Canal en route to the Red Sea to help secure the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait," a source from Egypt's Suez Canal Authority told The Anadolu Agency.

Earlier Thursday, the Egyptian government announced its "political and military" support for airstrikes launched by Saudi Arabia and several Arab countries – including most of the Gulf States – on Houthi positions in Yemen.

Several Arab states, all of them allies of Washington, have joined the Saudi-led military offensive, which kicked off with a string of overnight airstrikes against Houthi positions and assets in Yemen, including some in capital Sanaa.

Predominantly-Sunni Saudi Arabia said the strikes were in response to calls by Gulf-backed Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi for military intervention in Yemen to "save the people from the Houthi militias."

Fractious Yemen has descended into violence since last September, when the Houthis overran capital Sanaa, from which they have sought to extend their influence to other parts of the country.

Some Gulf countries suspect that the Houthi insurgency is supported by Shiite Iran.

* Notícia publicada per Anadolu Agency. De moment és de les poques informacions que tenim sobre els moviments navals egipcis. Malgrat que Egipte no disposi de destructors, creiem que el terme es pot haver emprat per algun problema d'interpretació entre les classificacions de naus locals i internacionals.

SNMG2 Arrives in Barcelona for a Port Visit*

BARCELONA, Spain – Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) ships arrived in Barcelona today for a port visit and to prepare to join forces with France’s Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group for a short period of combined exercises.

SNMG2 leadership will meet with local Allied authorities to discuss items of mutual benefit. Additionally, the groups’ crew members will enjoy a friendly basketball game with a local police force, and explore the city and surrounding areas.

“This visit is an excellent opportunity to engage with our Allies here in Spain, both on a professional and personal level,” said Commander, SNMG2, Rear Admiral Brad Williamson. “We also look forward to our exercises with the French Navy following this visit.”

Upon departure from Barcelona, SNMG2 will operate in conjunction with Task Force (TF) 473, France’s Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group. TF 473 and SNMG2 will conduct a series of exercises formulated to improve cohesion among NATO maritime forces. SNMG2 will then accompany TF 473 as it sails in the Mediterranean en route to support national tasking.

“We will be doing normal underway operations together such as replenishment at sea, coordinated anti-submarine exercises, and air-defence exercises,” said Lt. Grahame Flint, SNMG2 Staff Anti-submarine Warfare officer. “Operating with Allied forces is always a great learning experience and can make a positive impact on how well we can work together in the future on large scale exercises and operations”

SNMG2 is currently comprised of flagship USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Turkish ship TCG Turgutreis (F 241), and Canadian ship HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337) and is deployed in the Mediterranean serving as NATO’s maritime force dedicated to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

For more information about SNMG2, visit "standing NATO Maritime Group 2" on Facebook.

*Notícia publicada al NATO Maritime Command. Considerem una bona notícia el retorn progressiu de vaixells de guerra als ports catalans, tot un símptoma de normalitat.

Coast Guards in the Arctic – Troubles Ahead?*

Coast guards are the maritime workhorses of coastal states, intent on protecting their sovereign rights to fisheries and petroleum resources, while also safeguarding lives and the environment. In an Arctic Klondike, this institution – which often operates in the shadow of national navies – does the heavy lifting. Yet, striking the right balance on fleet structure, investments, and Arctic presence in times of budget austerity is no easy task for Arctic coastal states.

Waking up to a New Reality

Maritime activity levels in the Arctic are increasing, compared to low levels throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. It is not the number of trans-arctic voyages, but the number of ships with a destination in the Arctic itself that has predominately increased. This comes as a result of an increase in the transport of goods to and from the Arctic, and from an increase in cruise ship tourism offering “Arctic Cruises” [1]. Similarly, exploratory drilling in Greenlandic, Alaskan or North Norwegian waters, and record yielding fish stocks in the Barents Sea and North Sea, contribute to this trend [2].

Coast Guard Prerogatives

As activity increases, the need for an active management of the maritime domain increases as well. When fisheries grow in volume, so does the need for fisheries inspections and research to determine the sustainable yield of the stocks. When more vessels operate further north, search and rescue incidents grow in numbers, and as the number of exploratory drillings rises, the potential for accidents related to oil exploration similarly increases. The pressure on coast guards to provide aid to navigation is also increasing, sometimes demanding an ice breaking capacity that requires relatively costly investments in icebreakers [3]. Consequently, this large relative growth in activity spurs demand for a number of coast guard tasks in the Arctic, as depicted below.

The coast guard institutional structure in one Arctic state is very different from the next, ranging from a civilian model without a law enforcing mandate (Canada), to military structures separated from (USA, Russia), or part of (Norway, Denmark), national navies [4]. Yet, as the amount of tasks in northern waters increases, all of the various Arctic coast guards find themselves in a similar position, weighing priorities and resources [5]. In particular, they encounter challenges concerning budget restraints, aging equipment and large areas of operation.

Solving problems together?

Investments in coast guards, on the other hand, in particular in the North American side of the Arctic, are pending. This is mainly a consequence of limited public investments in an area where the return rate of such investments – at least in according to strict economic calculations – can be questioned. In the context of low temperatures and remote operating areas, however, the consequences of a cruise ship accident or an oil spill is likely to become more fatal in the Arctic, than in more densely populated areas further south.

In 2011, Arctic states responded to this challenge by creating a legally binding search and rescue agreement under the auspices of the Arctic Council, dividing the Arctic into areas of responsibility (see map) [6]. In 2013, another agreement was signed on oil pollution, preparedness and response, implementing the same mechanisms for oil spill response [7]. Forming alliances and initiating collaboration across borders with partners in similar situations provides a practical solution to a fiscal challenge. It is also an easier and less expensive remedy than building up domestic assets in isolation.

However, agreeing on zones of responsibility does not inherently enhance maritime capabilities in the Arctic, which ultimately fall under the prerogatives of the various national coast guards. Operational collaboration across borders is also not necessarily an adequate response to new maritime challenges in the Arctic. The share distance between the Arctic maritime zones and the differences in coast guard structures provide barriers to effective collaboration. Additionally, coast guard tasks are often closely linked to the protection of sovereign rights and enforcing national law. Such tasks are not easily transferred or outsourced.

Planning for the future

Working across Arctic maritime borders with your neighbor is undoubtedly beneficial, if not crucial, to jointly manage natural resources and protect the environment. The establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum – building off the already well-functioning North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum – is one such measure.  

Such collaboration will not, however, disband the need for national and local investments in future Arctic capabilities. The processes of coast guard procurement and capacity building are additionally costly and lengthy. Showcasing this challenge, the US Coast Guard has been calling out for more investment in District 17 (Alaska) for almost a decade, while in Canada the acquisition of a much-needed new Coast Guard icebreaker is delayed [8].

Littoral states in the Arctic have to carefully contemplate future investments and needs to avoid finding themselves in a situation where the former and the latter do not match. Arriving in 2030 in a direr state than today will be detrimental to any Arctic development. Preventing disaster is of interest to all littoral states as they determine the future potential of their Arctic maritime areas.

Sources:

[1] Steinicke, S., & Albrecht, S. (2012). Search and Rescue in the Arctic Working Paper (Vol. 2012/05). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. & Brigham, L. W. (2013). The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic. In B. S. e. Zellen (Ed.), The fast-changing Arctic: rethinking Arctic security for a warmer world (pp. 1-17). Calgary: Calgary Unversity Press.

[2] Fred Olsen Cruise Lines. (2014). Greenland & Arctic Cruises. Retrieved June 5, 2014, from http://www.fredolsencruises.com/places-we-visit/region/arctic-greenland-cruises & Østhagen, A. (2013a). Arctic oil and gas. The role of regions. In IFS (Ed.), (Vol. September 2). Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS).

[3] Brigham, L. W. (2013). The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic. In B. S. e. Zellen (Ed.), The fast-changing Arctic: rethinking Arctic security for a warmer world (pp. 1-17). Calgary: Calgary Unversity Press. & Mitchell, J. R. (2013). The Canadian Coast Guard in Perspective: A paper prepared for Action Canada (Vol. August). Ottawa: Action Canada.

[4] Andreas Østhagen (2014). "Coast Guard Collaboration in the Arctic: Canada and Greenland (Denmark)", Toronto: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program.

[5] Terjesen, B., Kristiansen, T., & Gjelsten, R. (2010). Sjøforsvaret i krig og fred: Langs kysten og på havet gjennom 200 år. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

[6] Arctic Council. Search and Rescue: SAR-Agreement. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/oceans/search-and-rescue/157-sar-agreement

[7] Arctic Council. Agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution, preparedness and response in the Arctic Final - Formatted version. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting

[8] http://www.adn.com/article/20140916/us-icebreaker-fleet-will-need-makeover-about-2020-coast-guard-says & Byers, M. (2012, March 27). You can’t replace real icebreakers, The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2012/03/you-cant-replace-real-icebreakers.html

* Article publicat per The Artic Institute. No és el primer cop que parlem de guardacostes i l'Àrtic. Recomanem una lectura reflexiva d'aquest article així com les seves fonts documentals.

Russia to build military Arctic environmental center*

Russia’s Ministry of Defense wants to enhance ecological monitoring in the Arctic and plans to establish a regional environmental center operated by the Northern Fleet.

Russia’s military presence in the Arctic is not to harm the region’s ecology, Deputy Defence Minister General Dmitry Bulgakov told reporters on Saturday.

“To control the ecology of the Russian Arctic zone, a regional environmental center of the Northern Fleet is to be created in the near future, which will carry out ecological monitoring and control compliance with Russian and international environmental legislation,” Bulgakov said according to Portnews.

Russia’s Defense Ministry has worked out a road-map on ecology security in the Arctic, Bulgakov said. According to the road map, military specialists are analyzing the ecology situation in places the Armed Forces have been located in the Arctic, including territories that were used in the Soviet times. “We plan to remove within the next few years old and destroyed buildings and to re-cultivate the territory - this means we shall remove the debris, fundaments, metal parts and so forth.”

According to Bulgakov, Russian forces have removed ten tons of garbage from Wrangel Island this summer.

 

* Notícia publicada a The Barents Observer. Rússia segueix consolidant posicions, també a l'Àrtic; aquesta peça n'és una nova constatació.

Stavridis: Russian Mistrals Could Work Well As NATO Rapid Reaction Force Asset*

The suspended delivery of two French-built amphibious warships to the Russian Navy could give NATO an opportunity to buy a ready-made platform for its planned rapid reaction force, retired Adm. James G. Stavridis — former NATO Supreme Allied Commander — told USNI News on Thursday.

“France has made a good decision stopping the sale process — it would be absurd for NATO to be providing assistance to Ukraine on the one hand while selling arms to Russia on the other,” said retired James G. Stavridis — U.S. Naval Institute’s Chair of the Board of Directors — said in a statement to USNI News.
“If the [Russian] arms embargo continues, then the idea of NATO purchasing one or even two as part of a rapid reaction force might make sense… “[But] it is too soon to tell, given discussion today about ceasefires and political settlement.”

Stavridis comments follow a Wednesday announcement from the office French President François Hollande suspending the delivery of the ships as part of a $1.53 billion program.

Citing the continued Russian involvement in violence in Eastern Ukraine, the Hollande administration concluded, “the conditions under which France could authorize the delivery of the first helicopter carrier are not in place.”

It is yet unclear if the suspension of delivery will be permanent.

Rapid Reaction

This week — as part of the ongoing NATO conference in Wales — alliance leaders will likely approve the creation of a, “very high-readiness force able to deploy at very short notice,” NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Monday as reported by The Wall Street Journal.
“This force can travel light, but strike hard if needed.”

NATO currently has a response force, but the new unit could assemble in two days instead of five.

The force that could pair well with the Russian Mistrals, said Eric Wertheim — naval analyst and author of U.S. Naval Institute’s Combat Fleets of the World.

“I [think] that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should examine acquiring the two ships as NATO alliance assets operating in support of their newly proposed rapid reaction force,” he said.
“Additionally the two 20,000-ton vessels could support NATO mine-countermeasures (MCM) operations or be on standby for humanitarian assistance duties.”

NATO’s Military Assets

It wouldn’t be the first time NATO purchased and operated its own military assets.

“There would be a precedent for joint ownership of NATO maritime and even air assets. NATO has operated the research ship NRV Alliance as well as the oceanographic tender CRV Leonardo,” Wertheim said.
“NATO also operates a fleet of E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft as well as a force of C-17 cargo aircraft operated by multi-national NATO crewmembers.”

The U.S. Navy also experimented with mixed multi-national NATO crews to some success in the 1960s.

The inclusion of the Mistrals into the NATO arsenal opens up a range of possibilities for the reaction force.

The Russian Mistrals — Vladivostok and Sevastopol — have been modified to carry heavier Russian helicopters and are optimized for Arctic operations, allowing a rare cold weather operating capability for NATO. Most Western ships are optimized to work in tropical climates.

The ships could also serve as a logistics sea base for expeditionary forces from NATO without creating a large terrestrial footprint — much like U.S. Navy and Marine Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Unites. (ARG/MEU).

Economic Affect and Russian Capabilities

A cancellation of the Russian Mistral deal could have a significant affect on the French defense industry.

Russia has paid France most of the price tag for the two ships and a cancellation of the program could result in a total refund plus $325 million in contract penalties, reported the BBC on Thursday.

“Unless an alternative buyer or use is found for these two ships, cancelation could have a negative impact on their economy, employment and shipbuilding industry,” Wertheim said.

A NATO purchase could defray that cost, he said.

The cancellation would also degrade the long-term outlook for the Russian Navy’s amphibious capabilities.

“Without the two French Mistral class vessels, Russia’s navy has only a handful of small landing ships, none of which carry helicopters or have flight decks,” Wertheim said. “Their newest class of tank landing ships has been under construction since 2004 and have yet to enter service. Without these French ships, Russia remains a decade or more away from gaining a similar capability.”

Russia contracted France to build the two ships shortly after its 2008 with Georgia. Russian commanders had trouble deploying large numbers of troops on the coast — prompting the deal with France.

* Notícia publicada a l'US Naval Institute. La cancel.lació de l'entrega dels Mistral a Rússia per part de França és una bona notícia, no només per Ucraïna. Ara caldrà veure com actua l'OTAN, ja que seria desitjable que adquirís les naus.

http://news.usni.org/2014/09/04/stavridis-russian-mistrals-work-well-nato-rapid-reaction-force-asset

Vietnam faces limited options in South China Sea dispute

Vietnam has curbed the violent anti-China protests that swept the country after a Chinese oil rig began drilling in contested waters. But authorities have not dropped their opposition to the Chinese operation, sending boats to harass the drilling, considering waging a legal case in international courts to resolve the dispute, and courting regional allies like the Philippines.

China tightened the screws on Vietnam this week by sending a “position paper” to the United Nations on the operations of its $1 billion-oil rig in a part of the South China Sea that Vietnam also claims.

It accused Vietnam of ramming its vessels, sending frogmen and “other underwater agents” in waters which it says are indisputably Chinese.

China has always resisted third party intervention in disputes between rival claimants over territory in the South China Sea, but this shift could put Vietnam in a difficult position, says Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defense Force Academy.
“Is China trying to provoke a debate in the general assembly, making countries make a decision to put up or shut up? Trying to isolate Vietnam by having those countries which are most concerned about China to shut up because they wouldn’t want to be seen as forced out into the open like Brunei, they just abstain and duck for cover," Thayer suggested.

Vietnam cannot compete with China’s military muscle and remains heavily reliant on Beijing for trade. Vietnam is believed to be considering waging a legal case for the disputed territory, but taking its claims to an international court could take years.

According to Thayer, one option could be to take advantage of the Philippines’ challenge of the legality of China's maritime claims at an international tribunal in The Hague.

“The best approach politically, if relations between China are irreparable, would be to join the Philippines and try to bolster its claim as a friend of the Philippines," Thayer said.

Vietnam’s coalition with the Philippines took a lighter tone on Monday when the country played football, volleyball and tug of war with sailors on an island in the Spratly archipelago.

In the past the two governments would have been wary about organizing such an event, lest they appear to be “ganging up” on China, says Alexander Vuving, a security analyst at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

However, things have now come to a point where both countries can step up and show their solidarity.

Vietnam can look also look outside the region for support, he said.

“India is far away but has also indicated its support for Vietnam so looking at the core interest for both nations I think that the casual allies, if you want to use the term, would be the Philippines, Japan and the U.S. and India," Vuving said.

He added that Vietnam has been moving closer to the U.S. even before the oil rig crisis in a “continuing rapprochement to the rise of China”.

But Vietnam’s politburo are divided on how close they get to Washington. Some do not want political reform and others have vested interests in economic ties with China.

“I think fundamentally modernizers want to get closer to the U.S., not just for defense of the territory but also for economic reform," Vuving explained. " But they are not very well represented in the politburo right now.”

Meanwhile, at home Vietnam is preparing for the long haul. On Monday the National Assembly passed a plan to spend $760 million to support fishermen and coast guards.

The money will be used to buy equipment for patrols and build offshore fishing vessels for the Vietnam Coast Guard, the Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance Force and fishermen.

This includes construction of 3,000 steel-clad fishing boats, Tran Cao Muu, General Secretary of the Vietnam Fisheries Association said. The current fleet of around 100,000 boats are made of wood.

He said policies to exploit resources in Vietnamese waters are not new, but the issue has become “hotter” following China’s aggressive actions in the sea.

Vietnam has accused China of ramming its ships over 1,400 times, once causing a fishing boat to sink.

Despite the increased dangers, Muu said Vietnam's fishing ships were operating as normal in the sea.

* Notícia publicada a The Voice of America. Compartim aquest article, clarificador de com el contenciós al Mar del Sud de la Xina no té, ara per ara, aturador.

Normandia, 70è aniversari

En primer lloc, Blau Naval vol demanar disculpes per no haver fet aquest article en el dia corresponent, és a dir, el 6 de juny. Dit això, volem fer constar el nostre record als caiguts en combat per durant l'Operació Overlord. Per més que ho intentem, qualsevol cosa que diguem serà redundant i és per això que compartirem un seguit d'enllaços. Ara bé, com a catalans no ens podem estar de recordar que la Llibertat sempre té un preu.

HMS Belfast fent foc de preparació el Dia D

• Regne Unit
• França
• Estats Units
• Canadà

U.S. Should Condemn Spain and France’s Military Support to the Russian Federation*

As Russia continues to occupy Crimea and back political instability in eastern Ukraine, there are some NATO members that continue to provide Russia with military support. Spain allows the Russian navy use of its ports, and France is selling two amphibious assault ships to Russia.

This behavior is unbecoming of 21st-century NATO allies. The U.S. should work with likeminded NATO partners to apply pressure on France and Spain to end their military assistance to Russia.

Europe Is Divided
Although the secretary general of NATO described the crisis in Ukraine and Russian aggression as the biggest threat to Europe since the end of the Cold War, Europe has been divided on its response. Some countries, such as Germany and Italy, have strong economic ties to Russia. Other European nations are dependent for 100 percent of their natural gas and oil requirements on the Russian Federation.

These complex economic relationships do not justify Europe’s unwillingness to enact meaningful sanctions on Russia, but they certainly make it understandably more difficult. However, there is no excuse for the support given by Spain and France to the Russian navy.

Spain Welcomes the Russian Navy
Spain possesses two sovereign enclaves called Ceuta and Melilla that border Morocco. They are both sizable cities, with populations of 73,000 and 79,000, respectively. They are legally part of Spain, and they are the only two European Union (EU) cities located in mainland Africa. They are also part of the Schengen Agreement and the eurozone. The Russian navy has been using their port facilities for years.

On April 28, during the same week that the EU announced a new round of sanctions against Russia, Spain played host to the Russian destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov at Ceuta.[1] During its stay, the destroyer took on nearly 740 tons of fuel and 100 tons of water. In the same week, two Russian navy tankers, the Duban and the Sergey Osipov, visited the Spanish port. Earlier this year, the landing ship Alexander Shabalin and the tug ship Khorov also called into Ceuta. It has been reported that a total of six Russian ships have visited Ceuta in 2014.[2]

Spain’s policy of allowing the Russian navy to use Ceuta in North Africa is also hypocritical in relation to its reluctance to allow visits by NATO ships to or from the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar directly to or from Spanish ports. Therefore, under certain circumstances Spain would rather have a Russian ship visit a Spanish port than a NATO ship. In addition, Spanish authorities routinely deny any request by military aircraft from NATO members that arrives or departs the Gibraltar airfield and overflies or lands in Spain.

France: Arming the Russians
It is not only Spain providing support to the Russian navy. The French are literally equipping it as well. France is proceeding with a €1.2 billion ($1.6 billion) defense deal involving the sale of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to the Russian navy. The first ship, named Vladivostok, is due for delivery at the end of the year. The second ship, coincidently named the Sevastopol (the name of the naval base in Crimea, which Russia has just annexed from Ukraine), will follow soon after.

Although France will not be selling any weapons systems with the ships, the ships themselves provide a platform from which an array of offensive military capability and weapons can be deployed. Mistrals can carry 16 helicopters and have a flight deck with six helicopter landing spots. Russian Mistrals are expected to be armed with eight Ka-52K attack helicopters and eight Ka-29 assault transport helicopters. The ships can carry four mechanized landing craft or two hovercrafts, 70 armored vehicles, and up to 450 troops. Each ship comes equipped with advanced communications capabilities that make it capable of operating as a command-and-control vessel and has a 69-bed hospital. Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, the former head of the Russian navy, said that his country would have won the war against Georgia in 2008 in “40 minutes instead of 26 hours” if it had had these ships back then.[3]

France is also hosting Russian sailors to train them to operate the ships. Russia sent 354 sailors and 60 instructors to France in February to undergo training on manning the ship; this first phase of training will be completed at the end of May. The second phase of training, consisting of around 400 troops, will begin in June and last until October.[4]

Although Russia has publicly stated that the two ships will be based with its Pacific fleet, there is no guarantee this will be the case forever—especially considering that the service life of a Mistral-class ship is several decades. The Mistral variant that Russia will be purchasing will have a reinforced hull and special deck-warming devices in order for it to operate in the Arctic Ocean.

Even with Russia’s recent aggression in the Ukraine, France has no plans to cancel the deal. In fact, French politicians have taken a flippant attitude to the deal. The French defense minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, recently claimed that France was only selling “civilian hulls” to Russia.[5] Bruno Le Maire, a former government minister and current member of the French National Assembly, justified continuing with the sale by stating, “It’s the only way to show Vladimir Putin we’re serious.… Putin is playing on Europe’s divisions and hesitations.”[6] Paris is in denial about the potent maritime capability these two platforms will offer the Russian navy.

Pressure from All Sides
French and Spanish support to the Russian navy weakens NATO’s opposition to Russian aggression against Ukraine and projects an image of a divided alliance. The situation requires:

Leadership from the White House. President Obama should make his disappointment about Spain and France’s behavior public. He should also request that each country cease their support to the Russian navy while the crisis in Ukraine continues.
Pressure from Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel should use every opportunity, including the upcoming NATO ministerial meeting in June and the NATO summit in September, to raise this issue with their French and Spanish counterparts.
A coordinated effort with European allies. The Administration should be coordinating with like-minded allies in NATO to apply pressure to force a change in policy in Paris and Madrid.
Action from Congress. It is incumbent on the U.S. Congress to make it clear that French and Spanish support to the Russian navy is unbecoming of a NATO ally.
Completely Unacceptable
It is unacceptable that two major NATO member states would offer support to the Russian navy at a time when Moscow is actively attempting to dismember Ukraine and undermining the security of the Baltic states. The U.S. government should make it clear at the highest levels that it views any support to the Russian navy in terms of equipment sales and port access as completely unacceptable in light of Russian aggression.

—Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow and Daniel Kochis is a Research Assistant in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

* Notícia publicada a The Heritage Foundation. Si França i Espanya volen representar un paper creïble a nivell internacional (cadascuna al seu nivell), farien bé de no trencar files amb els seus aliats.

Boats: ‘Get Out’ of South China Sea*

Back in November, Hainan Province issued new maritime regulations, including an article stating that “foreigners or foreign fishing ships entering sea areas administered by Hainan and engaged in fishery production or fishery resource surveys should receive approval from relevant departments of the State Council.” As many, including “Naval Diplomat” James Holmes, pointed out, this provision would apply to over half of the South China Sea.  However, experts wondered if China would be willing or able to enforce the regulation. M Taylor Fravel, writing for The Diplomat, noted that the new regulations had no information on how the provision would be enforced. “The sheer size of the waters nominally under Hainan’s administration indicates that actual implementation of these new rules would be a daunting operational task,” Fravel wrote.

Now, the question of whether these rules are being enforced seems to have been answered. Reuters reports that Hainan Party Secretary Luo Baoming said that authorities based on Sansha city have been regularly confronting unauthorized foreign fishing vessels. It’s apparently quite a common occurrence: “There’s something like this happening if not every day then at least once a week,” Luo said.

Luo also stressed that “the majority [of such incidents] are dealt with by negotiating and persuasion.” “We negotiate and dissuade as much as possible,” Luo said, although from his comments it seems the “negotiation” is actually an order. Authorities “tell them [unauthorized vessels] to get out, this is our area,” according to Luo.

Sansha city, a prefecture of Hainan province, administers several groups of disputed islands, including the Paracels (where Sansha is located), the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys. Beijing established Sansha as a prefecture in July 2012, in what many saw as an attempt to increase de facto control over these disputed areas. Chinese officials agreed—Hainan’s Party Secretary said at the time that Sansha city would be “an important base to safeguard China’s sovereignty and serve marine resource development.” China has also established a military base on Sansha, and stationed a 5,000 ton patrol ship on the island.

Luo Baoming’s remarks confirm that Sansha is being used as a base to drive foreign fishing boats away from waters claimed by China. The fishing boats in question most likely originate from Vietnam and the Philippines, as the Paracels are claimed by both China and Vietnam and various islands in the Spratlys group are claimed by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Taiwan also claims these territories, and has rejected Hainan’s fishing regulations.

The Chief of Staff of the Philippines Arms Forces claimed recently that Chinese Coast Guard ships used water cannons to drive Philippine fishing vessels away from the Scarborough Shoal. The Scarborough Shoal is not under Sansha’s administration, and it’s unclear whether Sansha authorities have used similarly aggressive tactics to force foreign vessels to leave. But given the unease caused by the mere announcement of Hainan’s new fishing regulations, confirmation that the provisions are being enforced is likely to stir up more tensions.

* Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. Una mostra més de com està "evolucionant" la situació al Mar del Sud de la Xina

Ukrainian Navy enraged by Moscow's denial that is has troops in Crimea*

In Sevastopol harbour the Ukrainian Navy's command ship Slavutych is ready to repel boarders.

Armed marines in body armour patrol the deck, mattresses are piled over railings to frustrate grappling hooks, and firehoses dangle at the ready.

With gangplanks pulled up, the only way the crew can receive gifts of cigarettes and tea from family and friends is via a makeshift pulley system running from the stern to the quayside.

Like their army and airforce colleagues on shore, the sailors on board the Slavutych and the corvette Ternopyl, both moored at the Ukrainian base in Sevastopol harbour, have for nearly a week been locked in a strange battle of nerves with surrounding Russian troops.

But judging by the Ukrainian navy's latest public statement, the crews don't find being blockaded by Russian troops and ships half as irritating as Moscow's refusal to admit what is happening.

After Vladimir Putin insisted in a press conference on Tuesday that the "men in green" who have occupied Crimea are local self defence forces, the navy fired an answering volley, "Based on [yesterday's press conference], we feel qualified to accused the President of the Russian Federation of blatant lies," the Ukrainian Navy wrote in an official announcement released on Wednesday.

"The warships Ternopyl and Slavutych, in Sevastopol bay, are currently blockaded by vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in each of which are marine units amounting to one platoon armed with automatic weapons and the corresponding kit."

"Given Mr Putin's remark that such uniforms and equipment can be purchased at any shop, we would like to take this opportunity to ask exactly which shops, and also where in violation of Ukrainian law you can also buy automatic weapons, combat pistols, and grenade launchers," the statement read.

It is the very question most journalists in Crimea have given up any hope of hearing a logical answer to.

While there are civilian pro-Russian "self defence" units in Crimea, they are generally dressed in either mixed army-surplus camouflage or simply tracksuits or jeans. The nearest they come to an actual armed force are the rag-tag Cossack units guarding the entrance to the peninsula.

They are light years from the highly disciplined, professional soldiers dressed in recent issue Russian field uniforms, driving Russian Tigr armoured jeeps, and carrying Russian weapons who have fanned out across Crimea since last Thursday.

Crimean civilians, whether pro or anti the occupation, have no doubts about the provenance of the men in green.

Ukrainian commanders who have negotiated with their unexpected guests have described how occupation force commanders introduced themselves as officers of the Russian military.

And as the occupation drags on, even the troops on the ground are struggling to maintain the pretence that their political masters in Moscow insist on maintaining.

On Saturday the soldier commanding a squad of men outside a Ukrainian navy installation in Simferopol identified himself to the Telegraph as a member of the 810th marine infantry brigade, the unit that has guarded Russia's Black Sea Fleet base since the 1960s.

Since then, journalists from Ukrainian and foreign media, including the Guardian and the BBC, have had numerous similar conversations with Russian troops who identified themselves as such.

On Wednesday a Ukrainian journalist managed to provoke a Russian officer in Kerch into an interview in which he said "we're Russian. We're here so there aren't terrorist attacks."

But for some reason, the official line from Moscow remains that there are no Russian troops in Crimea - or that if there are, they are simply regular Black Sea Fleet forces as agreed by treaty with Ukraine.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, has gone so far as to claim Moscow has no authority over the "self defence" units.

"Its complete nonsense," Sergei Shoigu, Russia's respected defence minister, said when his turn to utter the strange denial came round on Wednesday.

Russia's RT television network even broadcast a segment denouncing "mainstream media" hysteria about the invasion.

"The western media has been flooded with reports going so far as to suggest that Russia has invaded Ukraine," the presenter intoned solemnly during the piece.

The Russian troops watching over the Slavutych from a nearby cliff top on Wednesday were more disciplined than some of their other colleagues, keeping themselves to a stoic "no comment," in Russian and English when asked about their job.

"We'll take your photo though," they said, producing their own camera phones, apparently fed up of being on the receiving end of photography.

When the Telegraph volunteered correspondent's name and publication to caption the image, they said they didn't need it. "We're in the loop," they said, knowingly.

* Notícia publicada a The Telegraph. La intervenció russa a Ucraïna, com s'està veient, es condueix de forma molt més metòdica que la del 2008 a Geòrgia. Recomanem clicar a l'enllaç per veure el vídeo.

Crimean PM announces creation of regional Navy*

Admiral Denis Berezovsky, appointed as head of Ukraine's Navy forces just two days ago, has sworn allegiance to the people of Crimea. Taking his oath, regional Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov announced creating Crimea's Navy.

Ukraine launches treason case against Navy chief who surrendered

Ukraine launched a treason case on Sunday against the head of the navy, who surrendered his headquarters on Sunday in the Crimean port of Sevastopol on only his second day on the job.

Live Updates: Ukraine: total mobilization, combat alert amid Crimea tensions

Denis Berezovsky was shown on Russian television swearing allegiance to the pro-Russian regional leaders of Crimea. Russian forces have seized the Black Sea peninsula and told Ukrainian forces there to give up their weapons.

"During the blockade by Russian forces of the central headquarters of the navy, he declined to offer resistance and laid down his weapons," said Viktoria Syumar, deputy secretary of Ukraine's Security Council.

"The prosecutor's office has opened a criminal case against Denis Berezovsky under statute 111: state treason," she said. Another admiral, Serhiy Hayduk, was placed in charge of the navy.

Ukrainian Navy Commander says he swore allegiance to people of Crimea

Commander of the Ukrainian Naval Forces Denis Berezovsky said Sunday that swore allegiance to the Crimean people. Earlier it was reported that Crimea-stationed Ukrainian troops have switched sides to join forces with local pro-Russia authorities in the Russian-dominated autonomous republic of Crimea. Allegedly the transition was peaceful and without a single shot being fired.

"I, Denis Berezovsky, swear allegiance to the people of Crimea and undertake to protect them, as required by statute," Berezovsky said at a press conference in Sevastopol.

Ukraine troops in Crimea change sides to back pro-Russia authorities without bloodshed – insider

Crimea-stationed Ukrainian troops have switched sides to join forces with local pro-Russia authorities in the Russian-dominated autonomous republic of Crimea, a source in the region’s administration has said.

The source has stressed the transition was peaceful and without a single shot being fired.

Some of the servicemen reportedly left their posts without prior warning, while others surrendedered letters of resignation but the majority went over to the Crimean government.

According to the source, all troops will soon be sworn in by the authority of the Crimean republic.

Crimea-deployed Ukrainian military massively taking Crimean side

The Ukrainian military serving in Crimea-deployed units are joining local self-defence forces, the ITAR-TASS correspondent reports from Crimea. Many servicemen, disagreeing with Kiev's policy, are leaving their units and tendering their resignation. Some units have said they will take orders only from the command of Crimea's self-defence forces, the eyewitness says.

Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine, is now at the center of the ongoing crisis in the country as pro-Russia groups move to distance themselves from the newly formed formed national parliament that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych a week ago.

The current development comes shortly after Russia's upper house of parliament unanimously approved a request from President Vladimir Putin on Saturday to deploy military forces in Ukraine's mainly ethnic Russian-populated region of Crimea.

Putin issued his request in response to what he said was a threat to the lives of Russian citizens and military forces in naval bases in Crimea.

Putin, who is the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces, has not yet ordered the deployment of a "limited military contingent" in Ukraine, but said in telephone conversations with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and US President Barack Obama early on Sunday that Moscow reserved the right to protect its own interests and those of Russian speakers in the event of violence breaking out in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

There is already a substantial Russian military presence in southern Ukraine, courtesy of the leased Black Sea Fleet naval base on the Crimean Peninsula.

Large movements of Russian troops have been reported around the peninsula, which is in defiance of express instructions from Ukrainian authorities this week for Russian soldiers to remain confined to their quarters.

Meanwhile, thousands of pro-Moscow protesters staged a number of rallies in eastern Ukraine on Saturday backing the anti-Kiev stance of the Crimean population and calling for Russia to defend them as well.

New authorities in Kiev have already responded to Russia's plans by putting the army on high alert and calling up all military reserves.

Kiev also appealed to NATO on Saturday, with a request to, "consider all options to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine".

The North Atlantic Council, NATO's main governing body, is scheduled to hold an extraordinary meeting on Sunday to discuss events in Ukraine, the military bloc's secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said in his Twitter blog.

Russian PM warns Ukrainian counterpart Russia reserves right to defend its citizens, troops in Crimea

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had a telephone conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart Arseniy Yatsenyuk on Saturday during which he expressed his interest in preserving stable and friendly relations with Ukraine, the Russian government press service says.

"However, it was noted that the Russian side reserves the right to protect the lawful interests of citizens and servicemen deployed in the territory the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," the press service said. Russian armed forces "in case of need have the right to act in the framework of the mandate issued by the Federation Council to the president," Medvedev said.

"Also during the conversation Medvedev pointed to the possible responsibility of Ukrainian officials, if they make unlawful decisions on the use of force against Russian citizens," the press service said.

*Notícia publicada a The Voice of Russia. Els fets a Ucraïna s'encadenen vertiginosament; la defecció de les forces navals estacionades a Crimea és tot un símptoma que aquesta crisi no és un episodi menor, per si algú encara no ho tenia clar.

PANAMA, "kriegspiel" autour du canal*

14 février
Par Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky, chercheur à l’IRIS

Il y aura peut-être bientôt un nouveau scandale de Panama. Un scandale révélateur comme le précédent de nouveaux rapports de force. Hier, à la fin du XIXe siècle, il s’agissait de la France et des Etats-Unis. Aujourd’hui c’est l’Espagne qui est au cœur d’un nouveau drame géopolitique, avec toujours les Etats-Unis, mais aussi la Chine, le Brésil et bien d’autres puissances montantes.

Panama, a fait rêver les navigateurs, voyageurs et commerçants, depuis cinq siècles. Le rêve a pris parfois les couleurs du drame. Les grands de ce monde ont bataillé pour contrôler tout ou partie de l’isthme. L’Espagne, en dépit de grignotages britanniques, a occupé l’Amérique centrale pendant quatre siècles. Simon Bolivar, libérateur des Amériques, voulait en faire le centre du monde. L’isthme a été disputé par Anglais et Etasuniens tout au long du XIXe siècle. Les Français ont essayé de les départager en fin de période. Les Nord-Américains ont raflé la mise en 1903 et construit à Panama un canal transocéanique ouvert au trafic maritime en 1914. La Russie soviétique, cinquante ans plus tard, a mis son grain de sel. Avec Cuba, elle a tenté de prendre pied au Nicaragua et au Salvador cinquante ans plus tard.

La fin de la guerre froide avait apaisé les appétits rivaux semblait-il. Elle avait fabriqué une paix régionale en dominos, du Nicaragua au Salvador, en passant par le Guatemala. Les Etats-Unis avaient démantelé leurs bases militaires et rendu le canal aux Panaméens en 1999. Les enjeux de la puissance, et des rivalités internationales, glissaient plus à l’Est vers le Golfe arabo-persique avant de se focaliser sur l’Asie du Sud-est. L’isthme rendu à sa fonction de couloir allait être oublié du monde pendant quelques années. Les aléas de la compétition économique mondiale, exacerbée par la crise occidentale, les ambitions d’Etats latino-américains ayant gagné en assurance, le regard invasif des Asiatiques sont en train d’éveiller de nouvelles concurrences. L’isthme en général et Panama en particulier, sont vus comme une jugulaire articulant divers espaces économiques majeurs. L’intuition de Bolivar a été réactualisée par le dynamisme du commerce maritime, entre Asie et Amériques, Amériques et Europe, Afrique, Proche-Orient et Pacifique américain.

Les pièces d’un kriegspiel centrées sur Panama se sont successivement mises en place de façon accélérée. La réactivation économique latino-américaine, le dynamisme croissant du commerce avec la Chine et ses voisins asiatiques, ont eu comme première conséquence, la décision prise par Panama de moderniser un canal vieux de prés d’un siècle. C’était en 2009. L’appel d’offre visant à créer de nouveaux jeux d’écluses permettant le passage de bateaux gros porteurs, de 15 à 20 mètres de tirant d’eau et 366 mètres de long, a été gagné par un consortium conduit par une entreprise de BTP espagnole, Sacyr. Le secteur sinistré en Espagne depuis 2008 poussait les sociétés de travaux publics à une agressivité commerciale croissante. Le gros œuvre, selon le contrat signé à ce moment là avec l’Autorité du canal de Panama, devait être achevé en 2015.

Cette décision accompagnait une conjoncture restant orientée au vert, marquée par la montée en puissance des échanges maritimes. Panama, a bénéficié de ce climat, tout comme de la récupération des installations cédées par les Etats-Unis en décembre 1999. Sa croissance annuelle a été de l’ordre de 7 à 10% pendant la période. Cet argent a été investi dans l’amélioration d’infrastructures annexes, routes, transports ferroviaires urbains. D’autres acteurs internationaux sont alors entrés dans le jeu. Certains ont offert leurs services pour emporter des marchés locaux. Le Japon a ainsi proposé le plan de financement d’une ligne de métro. D’autres ont anticipé la réorganisation du trafic maritime, et son effet d’entrainement sur la politique d’embargo des Etats-Unis à l’égard de Cuba. Les ports de Houston et Miami ont engagé de grands travaux de modernisation. Et tout en face, à Mariel près de La Havane, le Brésil a financé et construit un énorme port de redistribution de conteneurs, au cœur d’une zone franche. Le Mexique qui avait oublié la région, depuis une dizaine d’années, a annulé 70% des dettes cubaines à son égard. Le Mexique est prés de signer un accord de libre échange avec Panama. Le président, Enrique Peña Nieto, a mis l’accélérateur sur une coalition régionale mise en œuvre par son pays, l’Alliance du Pacifique. Le Costa-Rica a annoncé le 10 février 2014, son intention de rejoindre cette organisation. Panama devrait bientôt suivre.

Les émergents asiatiques sont à l’affût. La Turquie négocie un accord de libre-échange avec le Costa-Rica. Elle envisage l’ouverture d’ambassades au Costa-Rica et à Panama. Le Président chinois, Xi Jinping, a visité la région en juin 2013, une région traditionnellement favorable au frère ennemi taïwanais. Le Costa-Rica, qui préside la CELAC (la Communauté des pays d’Amérique latine et de la Caraïbe)en 2014, a signé avec la RPC une batterie d’accords bilatéraux à portée commerciale. Les entreprises chinoises ont multiplié les offres visant à doubler ou tripler dans un esprit concurrentiel les couloirs transocéaniques. Une entreprise chinoise, CHEC (Chinese Habor Engineering Company), a signé un traité visant à construire un canal sec, une voie ferrée au Honduras, d’Atlantique au Pacifique. Une autre, HKND, a négocié et fait adopter en un temps record par le Nicaragua une sorte de traité inégal, accordant à un financier chinois le droit de construire un canal transocéanique et de devenir le propriétaire des terres adjacentes.

La voiture serait-elle allée trop vite ? Les travaux d’élargissement du canal sont aujourd’hui en effet interrompus. Le consortium conduit par l’espagnol Sacyr s’est déclaré incapable de terminer les travaux. 70% du gros œuvre est pourtant achevé. Mais à cause peut-être de cela, Sacyr et ses associés belges et italiens, demandent à l’Autorité du canal une rallonge correspondant à un tiers de l’appel d’offre pour terminer le chantier. Les Chinois restent mobilisés du Honduras au Nicaragua, comme les Brésiliens à Cuba. Mais ce sont les Etats-Unis qui ont tapé du poing sur la table, début février 2014, et exigé une reprise des travaux dans les plus brefs délais.

Cette réaction nord-américaine est dans l’ordre des textes et des rapports de force. Le traité de rétrocession du canal donne aux Etats-Unis un droit de co-regard. Ils en restent d’autre part les premiers utilisateurs. Ils sont logiquement les premiers intéressés à sa modernisation. Le gouvernement espagnol qui est très dépendant des marchés extérieurs, et plus particulièrement de ceux d’Amérique latine, a envoyé sur place l’un de ses ministres. Ce fiasco entrepreneurial vient après bien d’autres. La crise économique a sensiblement réduit la voilure de l’Espagne. Déjà en novembre 2013 la dernière conférence ibéro-américaine, qui se tenait à Panama, avait été boudée par un très grand nombre de chefs d’Etat latino-américains. Ils étaient en revanche tous à Cuba fin janvier 2014 pour assister au deuxième sommet de la Communauté des Etats de l’Amérique latine et de la Caraïbe.

A l’image de l’Espagne, l’Europe a mal pris la marche panaméenne. La France accuse de façon récurrente Panama d’être un paradis fiscal depuis 2010. Panama a menacé de réviser les grands contrats signés avec des entreprises françaises. L’Union européenne a négocié en 2012 des accords commerciaux avec les pays de la zone qui ne sont pas encore ratifiés. Bruxelles a par ailleurs signalé en janvier 2014 une révision de sa politique à l’égard de Cuba. Certes les jeux sont loin d’être faits. Mais rien ne va plus…

* Notícia publicada a Affaires Strategiques. En vista a anàlisis com aquesta, l'Estat espanyol hauria de pensar-se si pot seguir actuant a l'exterior com actua a casa.