The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession*

Scotland will free-ride in the Atlantic without sustained investment, but Catalonian maritime specialization would be welcome in the Mediterranean.
On 18 September, Scotland votes on the question of independence from the United Kingdom, and the polling strongly suggests a vote of no. On 9 November, Catalonia could be voting on the same issue vis-à-vis Spain, but the polling slightly suggests a yes—if the Spanish Constitutional Court allows the vote to take place. NATO members should treat neither case lightly, but the independence of Catalonia would pose fewer military problems for the alliance than that of Scotland.

The secessionist movements in both countries have endorsed joining both the EU and NATO. But both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, and depends on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. The Spanish probably could not manage to block a determined move for Catalonian self-determination. That said, two of my Atlantic Council colleagues have questioned whether the European Union would admit Catalonia, as some member states (e.g. Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity. Would the British accede to Scottish independence, but then plausibly attempt to exclude the country from NATO? A currency union may be off the table, but such dickering over the serious business of defense would be unacceptable.

As Griffe Witte of the Washington Post argued just this week, in the long run, Scottish secession could be challenging for maintaining Britain’s Trident submarine force. The Scottish National Party (SNP) aims to declare independence in 2016, and see the nukes off by 2020. Today, the submarines and their warheads are conveniently somewhat isolated at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, 40 kilometers from Glasgow. The Royal Navy’s other two major facilities, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth, are both in populated areas on the south coast of England. This has caused some to question whether the south coasters would appreciate the sudden arrival of a few hundred nuclear weapons. But Devonport is where the RN overhauls and refuels those nuclear submarines, so the locals are already accustomed to the presence of things nuclear. In the breach, it is likely that they would prefer the several thousand high-paying industrial jobs that would transfer down from Scotland.

That could be all well and good, but assuming that Scotland and Catalonia were admitted to NATO, what would they contribute? At the Strategic Foresight Forum this past spring at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter—late of Princeton and the US State Department, and now running the New America Foundation—opined that an independent Scotland and an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending themselves. At the reception afterwards, a former defense official and defense industrialist argued to me that the consequences for NATO would be adverse, “because the Scots think that defense is a free good”. But even beyond the hyperbole, it’s important to note how significantly plans for forces flying the Saltire cross and the four bars of the Senyera differ.

Scotland is a country of 5.3 million people, with over $200 billion in GDP. The SNP has in mind a tiny version of Britain’s armed forces as a whole: a navy of a few frigates, a fighter squadron, and an armored infantry brigade. With enough investment, a short-ranged maritime patrol squadron might follow as a welcome addition to the recent loss of RAF Coastal Command. The problem, however, is that Scottish resources aren’t likely to match these goals. Spending the NATO average of 1.6% of that GDP on defense would provides just over $3 billion annually. That level of spending is equivalent to the budget of Austria, a neutral country which needn’t maintain a navy. Unless Scotland steps up to a higher rate of spending, its exit from the United Kingdom would produce another free-riding Celtic state on the periphery of the open North Atlantic.

 Catalonia has 7.3 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that on defense provides over $4.5 billion annually, or roughly the budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces. Catalonian military plans are more vague, but so far, they emphasize the navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, ‘with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework’, as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argues. The rough plans call for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as "a main actor in the Mediterranean," with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security.

 Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of each country’s political process, but even the announced policies differ importantly. Scotland’s tiny replication of British capabilities wouldn’t be so clearly efficient. On the other hand, Catalonia’s ambition would be more restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.

 
James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

* Article publicat a The Atlantic Council. Una gran notícia! Que la tasca dels especialistes catalans en Defensa sigui reconeguda als Estats Units posa de relleu dues coses:
- LA SERIOSITAT DEL SEU TREBALL
- LA NEGLIGÈNCIA DE LA CLASSE POLÍTICA (ANC INCLOSA) D'HAVER DEFUGIT AQUEST TEMA

Portsmouth Ship Yard Jobs: Britain’s Maritime Capabilities Rebalanced*

By Dr. John Louth

British maritime defence industrial manufacturing capabilities saw a historic transition with the Portsmouth naval yard losing out to Glasgow.   This is an important milestone, but it is too simplistic to talk glibly about the resulting strategic shrinkage or the demise of British maritime strength

November 2013 has seen two significant announcements from the UK government that will have major implications for the projection of force and the protection of sovereign capability, both of which would appear to be important to Britain’s fortunes within a contingent and uncertain geopolitical system.

First, it has been confirmed by the Defence Secretary that British maritime defence industrial manufacturing capabilities are to be significantly rationalised and re-ordered by BAE Systems across its sites at Govan, Scotstoun and Portsmouth. This will lead to the complete elimination of a maritime construction presence in Portsmouth, effectively ending English surface-shipbuilding for the Royal Navy and a tradition of excellence that stretches back to Richard the Lion-heart. For once, the description of a decision as being ‘historic’ does not seem overblown.

The decision itself will see British naval manufacturing clustered on the Clyde in Scotland and the loss of over 1,700 jobs: 940 in Portsmouth, 800 in Glasgow and a small number of ship design and specialist engineering posts will also be lost from sites in Bristol and Edinburgh. These roles represent hard-won national defence capabilities and capacity, born from decades of governmental and industrial investment. Once removed, it will not be easy (or even possible) to grow back these core competencies, so this is a major strategic decision for the UK. But it is too simplistic to talk glibly about strategic shrinkage or the demise of British maritime capabilities: politicians and industrialists have to live in the real world of budgets, order books, scarcity and tough choices and play the hand their dealt.   

Once manufacturing has been centred around Glasgow, Portsmouth will be the home and maintenance/refit base for the two ordered Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the first of which is due for delivery in 2017, and a major base of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. So a maritime, as distinct from manufacturing, presence in Portsmouth is assured well into the second part of this century.

Two Aircraft Carriers Operated from Portsmouth

This is where the importance of a second significant announcement from government can be distilled. With his strongest hint to date, the Defence Secretary has told Parliament of the utility that operating both aircraft carriers would bring to UK forces in future operations. This is different from a current common argument across government and in defence circles that one of the two ships should be kept as some kind of forward reserve, to be up-skilled at moments of crises only. Both carriers being operated at the centre of future British defence capabilities would offer real force utility and points to the significance of Portsmouth as a major operating base for many years to come.

Of course, both the carrier programme and the rationalisation of maritime surface-ship manufacturing are not without real risks and concerns. In relation to the former, the Public Accounts Committee will inevitably conduct another inquiry into the programme after it was announced this week that costs had grown by another £800 million to £6.2 billion, significantly above the original 2007 estimate of £3.7 billion. 

This will be the fourth such exercise in six years. Whilst narratives of cost overruns and inefficiency will invariably dominate the debate, and understandably so, the substantive issue is one of effective requirements setting, cost forecasting and budgeting by government rather than runaway costs. A taste for champagne but a budget for rough cider usually means that something has to give; in the case of the carrier programme it has been the budget.

Scottish Referendum

Moreover, the decision to anchor surface-ship manufacturing to Glasgow prior to a referendum on Scottish independence, due in 2014, could prove problematic if the Scottish people vote to leave the Union. It seems less than certain that a UK (less Scotland) with an historical commitment to sovereignty over its warship design and production would import warships from a foreign power residing just north of the border at Hadrian’s Wall. Of course, it is equally fanciful that a youthful and reforming independent Scotland would have a demand for any warships it was manufacturing on the Clyde.

Scottish independence would probably see a return of shipbuilding to Portsmouth as contracts with BAE Systems and others were revisited as part of the constitutional de-coupling. Indeed, across defence, Scottish independence is a major issue within boardrooms with mitigation plans, investment decisions and migration options all part of the mix: it would be naive to assume that the maritime sector would be immune to such a major political, economic and structural event no matter what decisions are taken now.

To conclude, November 2013 is a significant moment in Britain’s naval history and tradition. A centre of excellence on the Clyde for shipbuilding centred on concluding the carrier programme and the Royal Navy’s demand for a new frigate, the Type 26, is a major rationalisation of skills and competencies, unfortunately at Portsmouth’s expense. The latter will continue as a major operational centre for the surface fleet and the home of the new carriers. Both, perhaps, could be fully operational and the centre-point of future British military capabilities across a wide spectrum of operational scenarios.  

 This seems a sensible, rational solution for the UK as a whole, re-balancing core-competencies and capacity within the industrial sector to a shrinking order book from the UK government. But as a solution it only stays intact, I suspect, if the UK polity itself stays intact. Those risks registers, in London, Edinburgh and elsewhere, both in government and in commerce, will see some action between now and the end of next year.

* Article publicat al RUSI. Interessant lectura, no només per les implicacions en la indústria de defensa britànica, sinó especialment per veure com Londres està jugant molt hàbilment les seves cartes.

http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C527D1BAD21378/#.Uo-GLJ6PVzT