In early January this
year, Vietnam formally joined the Southeast Asian “submarine club” with
its first Russian-built Kilo-class submarine christened the Hanoi.
Not too long ago, Jakarta expressed interest in acquiring the same
model of submarines from Russia or more boats from South Korea,
ostensibly to augment the incoming new fleet of three SS-209 boats
purchased from South Korea back in August 2012. Just recently in
November 2013, Singapore contracted German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp to develop the Type-218SG, the first of two boats slated to enter service in 2020.
Other Southeast Asian countries have evinced interest in acquiring an
undersea warfighting capability, but were prevented from doing so
largely because of budgetary constraints. In the case of Thailand, even
though no submarines were bought after the German offer of second-hand
Type-206A boats lapsed in March 2012, the Royal Thai Navy has reportedly
constructed submarine basing support and training facilities in
anticipation of future acquisitions. The Philippine Navy has been eyeing
submarines but for now, decided to prioritize the use of limited funds
to beef up surface and naval aviation forces, with anti-submarine
warfare capabilities tipped as the next major focus to substitute for a
submarine capability.
A “Submarine Race” in Southeast Asia?
This recent spate of submarine acquisitions being implemented or
planned has characterized Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts to
date, which could lead to observers highlighting the revival of a
“submarine race” in the region after the bout of submarine purchases
made in the 1990s to early-2000s. A superficial survey of open remarks
by the region’s defense and naval planners seemed to allude to this. For
example, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro reportedly
remarked that the submarine purchase, among other defense equipment, is
designed to signal Jakarta’s commitment towards Indonesian defense
modernization so that “we can keep up with ASEAN members.” Bangkok referred to the submarine programs of neighboring Southeast Asian navies when it emphasized the need for submarines as part of the country’s naval capabilities.
However, technical and geopolitical indications point to neither the
existence of a “submarine race” nor the prospective emergence of such a
phenomenon in the foreseeable future. Any negative effects of submarine
proliferation in Southeast Asia appear to be at least counterbalanced by
rising trends of regional cooperation in the submarine field.
Key Patterns in Submarine Capabilities
While there are evident efforts among regional submarine operators to
look beyond a mere “fleet-in-being” force to create a more effective
and sustainable force to guard their national waters, there are no
indications of a rapid expansion of submarine forces. The Vietnamese
submarine force will number six boats by 2016 while the Indonesians will
muster three new submarines around the same time, whereas the existing
pair of West German-built Type-209s will most likely be decommissioned.
With the progressive phasing out of the ageing Challenger-class boats by
then, Singapore will most likely have just two Archer-class submarines
in service before the first Type-218SG is inducted. In short, the number
of submarines in service throughout Southeast Asia will remain more or
less stable within the next decade, with new boats supplanting old ones
for existing submarine users while any expansion will take place over a
significant span of time, primarily dependent on the countries’ economic
health.
There is also no indication of a qualitative submarine race. When
Singapore became the first Southeast Asian navy to introduce submarines
with the air-independent propulsion (AIP), designed to prolong the
underwater endurance of conventional submarines with reduced need for
snorkeling, the consequent submarine buys of the other regional navies
did not include that capability in response. The only area where there
is some “catching up with the Joneses” has been submerged-launch
anti-ship missiles. The Royal Malaysian Navy’s Scorpene-class submarines
touted the region’s first such capability in the form of SM-39 Exocet,
followed by Vietnam with the Klub-S, while Indonesia’s intent to
purchase Kilo boats from Russia is intricately linked to a similar
capability. In fact, new conventional submarines on the global market
are typically offered with submerged-launch anti-ship missiles as an
optional part of the entire sales package. This is an international
trend in contemporary proliferation of submarine technologies, by no
means unique to Southeast Asia. Navies in the Northeast and South Asian
sub-regions have in fact long possessed such a capability.
Submarine-launched cruisemissiles (SLCM) for land attack purposes,
however, represent a wholly different ballgame. Such weapons are
potentially destabilizing, especially when launched from a platform as
stealthy as a submarine, since they can project offensive firepower at
standoff ranges deep into another country’s territory. It is noteworthy
that whereas other major navies in the region have either acquired or
explored the SLCM option, at present no Southeast Asian navy is
seriously considering this capability. Another point is that none of the
ASEAN member states is partner to the Missile Technology Control
Regime, which restricts proliferation of missiles (and associated
technologies) with a 500-kilogram payload out to a minimum range of 300
kilometers.
It is not yet ascertained whether the Kilo boats, which Indonesia is
reportedly keen to purchase, will be armed with SLCM, such as the Klub-S
land-attack variant. Scant information has emerged thus far regarding
the capabilities of the Type-218SG. Nevertheless, SLCM is unlikely to
appear on the future wish-lists of Southeast Asian navies unless serious
evolution of geopolitical circumstances compels the introduction of
such a weapon into the region. For now and the foreseeable future, AIP
and submerged-launch anti-ship missiles constitute key submarine
capability patterns in Southeast Asia.
The Geopolitical Underpinnings
Perhaps more crucial is that a “submarine race” – embodying the
classical, arms-tension spiral consequences – emerging within a
political void looks unlikely. The geopolitical environment in Southeast
Asia has never been as benign as it has over the past decade or so. The
region was once fraught with maritime territorial and sovereignty
disputes, but since the early 2000s, Southeast Asian countries have
amicably resolved most of the pressing maritime disputes through
international law proceedings. The Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the
Pedra Branca islet disputes are examples. Maritime boundary issues are
also addressed bilaterally, for instance the agreement reached in 2011
between Indonesia and Vietnam to jointly determine common fishing corridors
in their overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Bilateral
technical working groups continue to discuss outstanding maritime
boundary issues, as seen in the case of Indonesia and Singapore in the
Singapore Strait, and between Malaysia and Singapore concerning the
post-2008 International Court of Justice verdict on the Pedra Branca.
The various General Border Committees established back in the early
years of ASEAN continue to be active in addressing common bilateral
border issues, including areas of territorial contention and EEZ
jurisdictional problems.
Since the last reported naval incident in the disputed Ambalat offshore oil block
in the Sulawesi Sea between the Indonesian and Malaysian naval patrols
in 2009, there had been no other reported instances of close encounters
among Southeast Asian navies in disputed maritime zones. This tranquil
situation looks set to persist, especially given that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has reiterated in recent years its
commitment towards a community, a geopolitical construct that envisions
refrain from the threat or use of force against fellow ASEAN member
states. Moreover, in the context of regional uncertainties arising from
ongoing geopolitical problems, for instance disputes in the East and
South China Seas, ASEAN strives to retain its relevance as the driver of
the regional security architecture. The threat or use of force among
ASEAN member states would be regarded as antithetical to this objective.
Rising Trends of Concord Over Discord
While submarines feature prominently within the overall scheme of
Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts, often overlooked is the
recent intensification of cooperation among regional navies. Indonesia
and Singapore established a submarine rescue and cooperation agreement
back in 2012, followed by an equivalent pact between Singapore and
Vietnam in 2013. These bilateral efforts augment existing multilateral
arrangements in the region, such as Exercise Pacific Reach – a
multinational submarine rescue exercise since 2000 – and the
Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) which first began in 2001 as a
platform designed to promote cooperation and mutual trust among
submarine operators and aspiring ones in the Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions. Considering the operationally sensitive nature of submarine
operations, these gradual, incremental steps are noteworthy. They can
facilitate the creation of wider multilateral participation and
institutionalized cooperative arrangements in the future, modelling on
foreign examples such as the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working
Group (SMERWG).
With more submarine operators entering the scene, which means more
submarines roaming the waters of Southeast Asia, the risk of underwater
accidents is also multiplied. This calls for a further conceptualization
of regional submarine rescue cooperation.
Prospects for Further Submarine Cooperation
Because submarine operations are much more hazardous for naval
servicemen, a rescue capability is necessary. The recent mishap
revolving around the Indian Navy submarine INS Sindhurakshak
highlighted the necessity of a submarine rescue capability which is,
however, expensive to obtain, operate and maintain. Rudimentary
submarine rescue capabilities, such as a basic diving bell lowered by
the rescue vessel onto the submarine escape hatch, are limited by sea
conditions and depth. Modern submarine rescue techniques encompass the
use of more robust equipment such as a mobile diving bell, or more
commonly deep-submergence rescue vehicles (DSRVs) – essentially
mini-submarines designed to mate with the submarine in distress and
transport submariners to the rescue ship. DSRVs and their operations are
more complex to handle than diving bells. The entire package – the
“mother ship” and its DSRV payload, trained personnel and supporting
infrastructure altogether – may entail costs beyond the reach of many
regional navies’ budgets.
To date, in Southeast Asia only Singapore operates a DSRV-type
submarine rescue capability. Malaysia has in recent years expressed the
intent to acquire a similar capability but is apparently prevented from
proceeding with procurement due to a lack of funds. Nonetheless, the
bilateral agreements reached with Indonesia and Vietnam indicated
intra-regional attempts to share naval expertise and resources, at least
until more submarine-operating regional navies acquire their own
submarine rescue capabilities. The role of extra-regional navies cannot
be discounted, given that the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, South
Korean and U.S. naval forces all possess full-fledged submarine rescue
capabilities. An Asia-Pacific submarine rescue framework, perhaps
emulating NATO’s SMERWG,
can be established on the basis of existing arrangements such as
Pacific Reach and APSC. This is an interim arrangement after all, since
activating and deploying a submarine rescue capability from overseas
foreign bases requires time and colossal logistical efforts. The ideal
would be multiple submarine-operating navies in the region mustering
their own rescue capabilities and pooling them together under an
institutionalized framework. However, taking into account the budgetary
constraints faced by navies in Southeast Asia, sharing of submarine
rescue capacity will remain the way to go.
Final Thoughts
Because of the persistent interest in submarines, in no small part
influenced by the outstanding requirements to fill envisaged capacity
shortfalls, submarines look set to remain on the wish-lists of various
Southeast Asian navies. This proliferation pattern will continue in the
foreseeable future. But to label this as a “submarine race,” in view of
the technical and geopolitical trends observed so far in Southeast Asia
as well as evident growth in inter-navy submarine rescue cooperation,
may be a mischaracterization of what is more likely a concerted drive by
Southeast Asian navies to achieve balanced naval force capabilities.
Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore. His primary research interests cover naval
modernization in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.
* Article publicat a The Diplomat. Sens dubte un bon article de reflexió que invita a seguir estudiant els canvis el les diverses marines asiàtiques en matèria de submarins i, especialment, les seves implicacions futures.
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