The Obama administration recently announced plans to forward-deploy
some of the U.S. Navy’s new, lightly armed Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)
to the South China Sea. The news conjures up images from a century ago,
when the itinerant U.S. Asiatic Fleet lumbered from port to port,
patrolled Chinese rivers and strove to defend the PhilippineIslands.
This was no battle fleet, nor was it meant to be. It was an implement of diplomacy, plain and simple.
Properly
configured,an LCS flotilla would be a worthy successor to the Asiatic
Fleet. The 2007 Maritime Strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower,” designates non-combat missions like
coalition-building and maritime security as “core capabilities” of the
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. A latter-day Asiatic Fleet
could perform such functions admirably despite — indeed, because of —
its lack of combat punch.
That is, U.S. sailors could do their work without fanning paranoia — well, much paranoia — in nearby China.
Upheaval
in fin-de-siècle Asia warranted stationing a fleet in Far Eastern
waters. China’s Qing Dynasty tottered during the 19th century before
collapsing into civil strife in 1911. Predatory European and Japanese
empires seemed poised to divide the country among themselves, barring
competitors such as the U.S.
Historian Alfred Thayer Mahan likened China’s predicament to carrion birds’ descent onto a tasty “carcass.”
The
Asiatic Fleet’s first purpose was to keep order in China, chastening
warlords and other ne’er-do-wells menacing American citizens or trade.
It was adequate to this task. Few in China could resist the firepower of
even obsolescent men-of-war.
Its second purpose was to telegraph
resolve, upholding Washington’s “Open Door” policy in that beleaguered
land. Standing policy implored the imperial powers to keep all of China
open to commerce. The fleet was woefully unequal to guaranteeing U.S.
access against encroachment from the likes of Japan or Germany.
The faraway fleet would have been forced to dispatch reinforcements if the great powers slammed the “Open Door” shut.
A
motley assortment of warships constituted the Asiatic Fleet. Its
flagship was a heavy cruiser such as USS Augusta, once skippered by
Capt. Chester Nimitz, or USS Houston, immortalized by historian James
Hornfischer in “Ship of Ghosts.” The flagship’s entourage included
low-end combatants such as light cruisers, destroyers and gunboats.
Think USS San Pablo from the Steve McQueen film, “The Sand Pebbles.”
The
Imperial Japanese Navy made quick work of the Asiatic Fleet following
its December 1941 onslaughts on Hawaii and the Philippines. Crews fought
their ships valiantly, but in a foredoomed cause. That’s the usual
result when a fleet meant for non-combat missions encounters a fleet
meant for battle.
What do the life and death of the Asiatic Fleet
tell us? Historical similes are never exact. As Navy officials
contemplate maritime strategy in the South China Sea, they must
recognize important differences between Asia then and Asia now.
Then,
the U.S. Navy could use castoff ships to overawe a fractured Chinese
populace while brandishing the combined might of the Asiatic and Pacific
fleets to face down — for a time — external competitors. Today, the
dynamics have reversed. No longer does a power vacuum draw outsiders in.
Instead, a strong China is pressing outward, oftentimes at the expense
of U.S. allies like the Philippines.
Rather than fend off
rapacious outsiders, Washington intends to help friendly outsiders right
the regional balance vis-a-vis a strong central power. Geographically
speaking, U.S. strategy is more peripheral than it was during the
Asiatic Fleet’s heyday.
Then, Pacific Fleet reinforcements were
based too far away to backstop Far Eastern forces effectively in
wartime. Today, heavy Pacific Fleet forces reside in relatively nearby
Japan and Guam. They could move even closer if Washington negotiates
access to Australian seaports for U.S. Navy carrier or surface action
groups.
Then, outdated ships could accomplish U.S. goals. Today,
ships designated for overseas service remain modest in combat power, but
they’re brand-spanking new rather than retirement age. It will be
harder to consider an LCS contingent expendable in wartime than it was
to think of the Asiatic Fleet that way. Navy officials must fight the
temptation to pile defensive armaments onto the LCS or forward-deploy
frontline combatants to Southeast Asia for protection.
Lavish
improvements would discredit the LCS squadron in Chinese eyes. Such a
force will be valuable precisely because it can perform diplomatic and
constabulary missions alongside regional sea services — and because it
can do so without appearing to encircle and contain China. Stationing a
battle-worthy fleet in Southeast Asia could set in motion a mercurial,
escalatory cycle of American action and Chinese reaction.
The
chief lessons from Asiatic Fleet history: Keep diplomacy at the
forefront of the LCS squadron’s endeavors while arranging new basing
options should conflict threaten.
This phantom from the Navy’s past still renders good service.
James
Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College
and co-author of “Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the
Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy.” These views represent only those
of the author’s.
* Notícia publicada a DefenceNews. Sens dubte, les aportacions del professor James Holmes han de ser preses en consideració.
* Notícia publicada a DefenceNews. Sens dubte, les aportacions del professor James Holmes han de ser preses en consideració.
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