As Catalonia moves towards a restoration of her
sovereignty, one of the practical aspects to be discussed with Spain is
the apportioning of her assets and liabilities.
Introduction
As Catalonia moves towards a restoration of her
sovereignty, one of the practical aspects to be discussed with Spain is
the apportioning of her assets and liabilities. Madrid cannot repay her
national debt on her own, so it is unthinkable that she will not
recognize Catalonia. The alternative is Madrid's default. However, it is
not just bonds that one has to talk about. A debate is currently taking
place in Catalan national security circles concerning the shape of the
country’s Armed Forces, and one of the issues is to what extent to rely
on Spanish assets inherited as part of the deal on Spain’s national
debt. Some voices would prefer a clean slate, and point out that Spain
has often failed to properly maintain and modernize her equipment, a
result of her fixation with threatening Catalonia and corresponding
dereliction of duties towards NATO. They add that current technological
and doctrinal changes may have rendered some of those assets obsolete.
Some other voices see the assumption of certain assets, in particular
air and naval systems, as serving a number of purposes, speeding up the
building of the Catalan Armed forces, reinforcing NATO expeditionary
capabilities and European support for the Pivot to the Pacific, and
reducing the threat to Gibraltar and the Falklands.
In order to examine this, we have asked Alex
Calvo and Pol Molas to provide a brief overview of some of the main
arguments in favor and against of taking over some key naval and air
assets from the Spanish Armed Forces, as part of a wider deal involving
the apportioning of the Spanish national debt. This deal is a necessary
condition for the survival of the Euro, since a Spanish default would
mean its end, something the European Union cannot allow to happen.
The case for: removing a threat to fellow NATO members and reinforcing the Pivot to the Pacific
By Alex Calvo
The reconstruction of Catalonia’s Armed Forces
is not taking place in a vacuum. Rather, just like the wider resumption
of sovereignty by our country, it is sure to have a significant impact
on Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, as well as in Spain proper.
Admitting in principle that Catalonia should not simply take over any
military asset from Spain, regardless of its value, our choice on which
systems to include in the agreement on the apportioning of assets and
liabilities may not be completely free, or restricted only by the needs
of Spain proper’s Armed Forces. There are some reasons for this.
First of all, the international community may
be concerned about Spain’s viability. The country is already effectively
intervened by the European Union and the IMF, and has repeatedly
promised to implement deep economic reforms (which, however, are
unlikely to take place until she no longer has access to Catalan taxes,
as MEP Ramon Tremosa has often explained). While Madrid is already
trying to sell a significant number of military assets, or to transfer
existing contracts to third parties, it is not clear whether she will be
able to complete this before Catalan independence is formalized. Media
reports have extensively referred to, among others, the possible sale of
Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia and Peru, and also to the negotiations
with third countries to have them buy the 14 Airbus A400M transport
planes that Madrid is no longer buying but is contractually bound to
take.
Should these plans not be completed, Spain
could end up sitting at the negotiating table with more assets that she
can realistically maintain, while on the other hand national pride (and
pressure from her domestic defense industry) may force Madrid to insist
that she can. In that case, the international community may press
Catalonia to take over some of these assets in order to allow Spain to
start walking with a lesser burden, while giving her leaders a
face-saving formula when confronted by public opinion or their own
military.
Furthermore, the current negotiations between
Madrid and Buenos Aires for the transfer of some 20 Mirage F1 have
prompted concern in the Falklands. While these planes are 38 years old
and would mostly be used to provide spare parts, their name is a painful
reminder of the loss of HMS Sheffield and SS Atlantic Conveyor.
Furthermore, they confirm the view, shared by a growing number of
people, of Spain as a rogue state, a pariah country called by some
“Europe’s North Korea”. Thus not only the United Kingdom, but also other
countries, may press Catalonia to take over some weapons in order to
prevent them ending up in the hands of potentially hostile powers.
Finally, the ongoing Spanish campaign against
Gibraltar, whose population has repeatedly refused to join her, the
recent claims against Portugal concerning the Savage Islands (which
Madrid claims are not true islands under UNCLOS and thus give rise to no
EEZ), and Spain’s traditionally anti-Israel posture, means that not a
few maritime democracies would prefer to see certain weapons systems in
Catalan, rather than Spanish hands. Needless to say, that would also
mean reinforcing overall NATO capabilities.
Therefore, while making it clear that Catalonia
cannot simply take over a certain military asset just because Spain
cannot properly maintain it or because Madrid may transfer it to a
fellow rogue state or employ it against a maritime democracy, it is
necessary to take into account these factors and the resultant pressure
from the international community. Our Armed Forces will not be reborn
in a vacuum.
The case against: starting on a strong, modern, footing and avoiding preparing for yesterday’s wars.
By Pol Molas
Creating a new state is no minor feat, nor is
it providing for its defense. This issue, and specifically the material
required, must be seriously thought out. It seems logical to say that a
proportional share of Spain's military hardware belongs to the Catalans,
however, we must take into account other considerations.
We ought to ask ourselves the following questions :
Which is our strategic framework?
What kind of threats are we facing?
What materiel can be used by the CDF (Catalan Defense Forces) in their initial stage?
The Mediterranean undoubtedly remains the strategic framework for Catalonia, as has been the case for centuries. We depend both on grain and energy imports, and industrial exports. Barcelona, Tarragona and other minor Catalan ports, remain profitable despite the economic crisis. The same could be said about Barcelona's El Prat Airport. This framework, however, is not free of risks or threats.
We can describe the current situation in the Mediterranean as anything but calm. While it is true that a conventional conflict between states is not likely to take place, low intensity conflicts are on the rise, and no less bloody than other sorts. Terrorism, piracy and human trafficking are clear and present dangers today. With this in mind, we must think about how to provide the CDF, including their Navy and Air Force, with the necessary training and equipment.
We must also remember that the CDF will go through an initial phase with very limited capabilities. In particular in terms of specialist personnel able to operate certain weapons systems and sensors. For example, while training crews to operate fast patrol crafts can be achieved easily, instructing a competent corvette crew implies several years. In the case of the Air Force, we could find similar examples.
Due to this, and bearing in mind the nature of the defense hardware acquired by Spain in recent years, some more questions emerge:
Should we become responsible for hardware that hardly fits with the current conflict scenarios?
What kind of threats are we facing?
What materiel can be used by the CDF (Catalan Defense Forces) in their initial stage?
The Mediterranean undoubtedly remains the strategic framework for Catalonia, as has been the case for centuries. We depend both on grain and energy imports, and industrial exports. Barcelona, Tarragona and other minor Catalan ports, remain profitable despite the economic crisis. The same could be said about Barcelona's El Prat Airport. This framework, however, is not free of risks or threats.
We can describe the current situation in the Mediterranean as anything but calm. While it is true that a conventional conflict between states is not likely to take place, low intensity conflicts are on the rise, and no less bloody than other sorts. Terrorism, piracy and human trafficking are clear and present dangers today. With this in mind, we must think about how to provide the CDF, including their Navy and Air Force, with the necessary training and equipment.
We must also remember that the CDF will go through an initial phase with very limited capabilities. In particular in terms of specialist personnel able to operate certain weapons systems and sensors. For example, while training crews to operate fast patrol crafts can be achieved easily, instructing a competent corvette crew implies several years. In the case of the Air Force, we could find similar examples.
Due to this, and bearing in mind the nature of the defense hardware acquired by Spain in recent years, some more questions emerge:
Should we become responsible for hardware that hardly fits with the current conflict scenarios?
Should we be burdened with
maintaining and upgrading equipment which we will not be able to field
for years for lack of skilled personnel?
My answer to the first question is that we just have to assume the materiel needed for our basic strategic goals. Some of these are obvious: the control of territorial waters and airspace, and no less important securing some training platforms. Regarding the second question, the answer is of course no. A negative fostered by the Catalan need to restore her defense industry. Scrapped both by successive Spanish governments and a lack of courage by several past Catalan administrations, few companies in Catalonia remain focused on the defense sector.
The Catalan Navy build-up must be shaped with maritime security in the Mediterranean and strategic mobility in mind. The same can be said about our Air Force, with the addition that it will have an important role as an ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) vector.
We have the opportunity to start on a new path, without heavy baggage. We can create the Catalan Defense Forces, adapted to the real threats of our times, operational and deployable whenever required. An institution to serve and protect our people and our allies.
* Anàlisi publicad al CEEC. Reflexions que Catalunya hauria de començar a plantejar-se seriosament.
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