The Navy is sick of one-person subs for deep diving

Moving around underwater in a diving suit is a lot less fun than it sounds. To survive at the deepest depths, divers need enormous, cumbersome, pressure-resistant suits that limit their mobility. But the Navy is sick of trading survivability for flexibility, no matter how far into the briny deep its divers wade.
In the Navy’s most recent round of technology solicitations to small businesses, the seafaring service is looking for someone to develop a lightweight atmospheric diving suit that weighs under 400 pounds and can withstand pressure at 1,000 feet below sea level. If the weight requirement still sounds pretty heavy, consider that the current generation of deep-sea suits can weigh thousands of pounds, limiting what divers can do in them.
According to the solicitation, the new diving suit is for “expeditionary diving and salvage forces
” (.pdf) and retrieving “high value material” in “austere environments.” Unlike the bulky suits divers currently wear — really more like one-person submarines — these might be light enough so divers can propel themselves with their own feet. (Current models use thrusters, not divers’ legs.) Still, a wetsuit this ain’t: It’s still a self-contained pressure suit.

It’s also extremely dangerous to dive below a few hundred feet
 without one of these single-serving subs. Below 500 feet, a neurological disorder called high-pressure nervous syndrome can kick in, which can lead to drowsiness and tremors. Breathing nitrogen and oxygen at depths below 300 feet can also cause blackouts and even death. Saturation diving, which relies on gradually acclimating to underwater pressure over time, isn’t perfect either. Surfacing too quickly can result in the bends, a form of decompression sickness caused by nitrogen bubblesexpanding and becoming stuck in vital organs
.
To prevent death from happening at these extreme depths, bulky atmospheric suits maintain a steady internal pressure of one standard atmosphere, or one atm
 — the same as the mean pressure at sea level. That also means deep-sea divers don’t have to depressurize when surfacing. But the Navy notes: “This size and cumbersome configuration severely constrains its use.”
Some experimental suits have some of the functionality the Navy wants. Canadian firm Nuytco Research recently developed an atmospheric diving suit called the Exosuit ADS
, which can descend to 1,000 feet — its crush depth is double that — and weighs between 500 to 600 pounds, just over the Navy’s requirement. Divers can wear flipper boots in addition to the suit’s thrusters. And the Nuytco model uses a foam coating ofteeny, tiny microbubbles
 to keep divers’ limbs buoyant. The suit also has artificial hands controlled by handles contained inside.
Nor is the Navy is the only part of the military giving divers a boost. The Pentagon’s blue-sky research agency Darpa wants to develop a sensor system that can detect signs of decompression sickness in divers
, and adjust for it by squirting small amounts of nitric oxide into divers’ lungs when there’s danger. But those divers won’t be operating at extreme depths. For that, you’ll still need a clunky suit — though a lighter one. With flipper boots.

Robert Beckhusen

* Article publicat a Wired. El descens a grans profunditats no és una qüestió menor. El rescat de tripulacions atrapades o bé l'extracció de tecnologies secretes o materials perillosos de dins de naufragis és quelcom vital per qualsevol país.

Supporting Pivot in the Pacific*

After a decade centered on asymmetric warfare in the Middle East and Central Asia, the US has announced a “Pivot to the Pacific,” designed among others to prevent China from subverting the international law of the sea, turning the bodies of water off her shores into mere extensions of her territory. The move has been welcomed by US allies like the Philippines and Vietnam, involved in territorial maritime disputes with Beijing, which are in turn also supported by India and Japan, and increasingly by Russia.

This prompts the question of how current and future NATO members could help the US secure this essential objective, keeping freedom of navigation and the framework of the law of the sea, one of the foundations of the post-war political and economic order on which the prosperity of the Free World rests, and one of the pillars of the Atlantic Charter, issued by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill.

Admiral David G Farragut, hero of the Union Navy during the American Civil War.

His father was a Catalan from Minorca

According to an article by James R. Holmes1, an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College, "European capitals can order ships to cruise through the China seas and other expanses where freedom of the seas is under duress, flying Western flags from as many mastheads as possible." The idea is to undertake "freedom of navigation operations", carrying out certain activities within the Chinese EEZ that Beijing claims are forbidden in those waters which she considers to be territorial, and therefore prevent the emergence of precedents which may support such claims.In addition, the author believes that European Navies may aid the US by undertaking the main responsibility for securing the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, thus allowing the US Navy to concentrate en force in the Indo-Pacific area. He cites an historical precedent for this, namely the arrangements among London, Paris, Washington, and Tokyo, in the run up to the First World War. European NATO members would be responsible for securing the Western approaches to the Pacific, thus multiplying available US options if war broke out.Unfortunately, over the past year we have seen a NATO member state use her navy to:• Harass the territory of another NATO member state in pursuit of a territorial claim repeatedly rejected in successive referenda by the population involved, illegally entering her territorial waters, and causing a string of incidents.• Force trawlers from a territory incorporated by force in the past, which is gradually moving towards a restoration of sovereignty within NATO and the EU by democratic and peaceful means, to fly her flag.

Needless to say, these actions are incompatible with supporting the United States' "Pivot to the Pacific", since they tie up her scarce naval resources.

Monument to Catalan Admiral Roger de Lluria, in Barcelona

Therefore, in order for Europe to effectively support peace in the Indo-Pacific region, freedom of navigation, the wider Law of the Sea, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and the US "Pivot to the Pacific", it is essential to see the following commitments:

• By existing NATO member states not to deploy their navies either in pursuit of territorial conflicts with fellow Atlantic Alliance partners or against territories peacefully and democratically exercising their right to self-determination.

• By new NATO member states to regularly deploy naval assets to the Chinese EEZ in order to prevent Beijing from claiming they are territorial waters, and to contribute such assets to the joint allied securing of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, thus freeing up the US Navy to more effectively redeploy to the Indo-Pacific theatre of operations.

"*Alex Calvo* is a Professor of International Relations and International Law, Head of the IR Department, and Postgraduate Research Director, European University (Barcelona Campus). An expert on Asian security and defence issues, he got his LLB from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS, University of London) and is currently doing an MA in Second World War Studies at the University of Birmingham. He is a former teaching and research fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)."

1 HOLMES James R., "How Europe Can Support the ‘Pivot’", "The Diplomat", 9 July 2012, available at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/07/09/how-europe-can-support-the-pivot/

* Article publicat a Help Catalonia. Com sempre les reflexions del professor Alexandre Calvo són dignes d'estadista. Ens ofereix, amb el seu estil elegant i anglo-saxo, les pistes de com pot actuar Europa i l'OTAN, en el "pivot cap al Pacific, així com fa palés que hi ha catalans amb molt sentit d'Estat, quelcom imprescindible per assolir la Llibertat...

Construction starts on the Finnish Border Guard's new OPV*

Construction on the Finnish Border Guard's new offshore patrol vessel (OPV) has started with the keel laying at STX Finland Oy's Rauma Shipyard, as part of an agreement signed on 21 December 2011.
Built by STX Finland, the new OPV is expected to boost Finland's maritime search-and-rescue capabilities, especially during events that lead to multiple consequences.

The 96m-long and 17m-wide vessel, which has yet to be named, will feature advanced, environmentally friendly technologies to meet government requirements for decision-in-principle on sustainable public procurement.
STX Finland Oy's Rauma Shipyard director Toivo Ilvonen said: "Now it is time to begin the assembly of the ship's hull, and thus the ship will gradually find its final form by the end of July."
Scheduled for delivery in November 2013, the OPV will be powered by liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diesel, for energy efficiency and safe operations to suit individual accident situations."The new colour scheme of the vessel has been designed to provide support for our operations on the open sea, in an international operating environment."
Capable of supporting a variety of underwater assignments both independently and in collaboration with other authorities, the vessel will be used by the Finnish Border Guard to conduct border safety and frontier supervision missions, such as maritime search-and-rescue and military national defence.
In addition to damage control capacity to ensure reliability of operation at sea, the ship will feature emergency towing capabilities for enhanced protection of sea transport from damage.
Finnish Frontier Guard headquarters technical department navy chief captain Jukka Jaakkola said: "The new colour scheme of the vessel has also been designed to provide support for our operations on the open sea, in an international operating environment."
Cassidian has been awarded a contract to deliver and integrate its TRS-3D naval radar on board the new OPV by mid-2013. *

* Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Finlàndia, un dels referents de Catalunya, continua mantenint i millorant una potent Guàrdia de Fronteres i unes Forces Armades realment dissuasòries. Prenguem-ne nota.

Shipbuilding is a priority*

An Interview with Sean J. Stackley
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (RDA) has been the chief U.S. Navy and Marine Corps weapon buyer since 2008. He is a former Navy surface-warfare officer and oversaw the San Antonio–class amphibious program while in the service. Secretary Stackley spoke recently in the Pentagon with Naval Institute Online Editor Sam LaGrone.

Proceedings: In the current fiscal and legislative climate, how do you feel about the future health of the shipbuilding program?

Stackley: First, shipbuilding is a priority not only in the Navy budget but also with the Department of Defense and Congress. Though there’s great uncertainty on the outcome of sequestration, we will ensure that shipbuilding remains a top consideration in our budget and budget decisions. When you foresee what might happen in 2013, start with what has happened already in the authorization and appropriations. In both cases, not only did Congress support our 2013 request but strengthened our shipbuilding program through respective actions of the Defense committees. Congress has come back with marks that are pending on the appropriations side to potentially include an additional destroyer and significant funding toward a submarine within those respective multiyear ship buys.

Proceedings: What concerns you the most in the short term about the shipbuilding budget?

Stackley: Clearly in shipbuilding, more so than in other areas of defense procurement, we really have to take a long view. We strive to maintain consistency with the 30-year shipbuilding plan that we submit each year with the budget. In 2013 the plan laid out our force construct in terms of what we need not just to build, but the Fleet we need to support for the near-term, mid-term, and long-term requirements. It’s really stability in the total program that’s equally critical to ensure support for the right force structure and the right balance of forces to meet the Navy’s missions.

Proceedings: What are some particular areas of concern that you can be a little more specific about?

Stackley: Let me start with balanced force. The Navy’s force structure calls for a balance of carriers, surface combatants and amphibious ships, submarines, and auxiliaries. The build rate that we lay out first in the 30-year plan, then inside the Future Years Defense Plan, and then in the annual budget is all-critical to support the balanced force. We have to balance the force requirements with the budget. And we have to consider the industrial base in the shipbuilding plan.
We didn’t simply ask for two DDG-51s [Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers] in 2013; we asked for the authority for a multi-year deal. One of the challenges was that, while we would like to sustain a build rate of two destroyers per year, balancing that program requirement with the budget resulted in a nine-ship request over a five-year period. Therefore, we’ve been working with Congress to leverage the program’s savings and stability to meet the ten-ship requirement.
In submarines, we have a similar scenario where our requirements would drive us to a two-submarine-per-year rate, but budget constraints in 2014 limit us to one submarine in that year but inside the construct of a multiyear. Once again, while our request was for a nine-boat multiyear, we have been working closely with Congress and have support from all four Defense committees to procure a ten-boat multiyear. These two programs, alongside the Littoral Combat Ship program, are good examples of leveraging stability to achieve affordability and best meet our requirements while sustaining our industrial base in a tough budget environment. We are more challenged, however, in our amphibious and auxiliary-ship programs due to low rates of production and associated impacts to the industrial base.

Proceedings: You’ve said in the past the Navy needs to seek “80 percent solutions,” for programs moving forward to cope with fiscal realities. Is that still the case?

Stackley: I would describe it as the standard way of doing business today. You’re trying to manage a very complex matter between what was the original requirement and ultimately what you’re dealing with regarding cost and execution on the shipbuilding side.
Today we’ve moved to a process where affordability has been brought to the table as a requirement on the front end. We’re effectively, in the requirements-definition process, making the trades up front to ensure the program that follows is affordable and executable. Program by program we’re being very careful to bring the best information we have in terms in of cost vs. capability to the front end of the process to ensure affordability of the end item we’re procuring.

Proceedings: Can you define some examples of that thinking?

Stackley: The Mobile Landing Platform [MLP], which is being followed on with the Afloat Forward Staging Base [AFSB], is a great example. But other major shipbuilding programs are following suit. The Ohio Replacement Program [OR] is one that is of great interest. We spent a lot of time in drafting a capabilities document, understanding what the costs of the respective capabilities of that boat would be and making trades to ensure the affordability of the boat was within our reach.
The OR Analysis of Alternatives [AOA] looked at a number of variants to support the mission and priced those out. The results of the AOA were used in making initial requirements decisions. But subsequent trades in capabilities and requirements were necessary to bring the estimates for procurement of the OR within what we consider to be affordable.

Proceedings: How does affordability factor into the design of the OR?

Stackley: Let’s start by defining requirements for a strategic deterrent that will be in the Fleet potentially to a 2080 time frame. That right there is a challenge. You have to project what the threat will be and what the technology in the near- to mid-term will support to ensure the submarines built in the 2020s to the 2030s will remain effective until 2080. Concerns have been raised that the pursuit of affordability on OR comes at the expense of needed capability. To be clear, the capability of the OR will be far superior to the capability of the Ohio. That should never be misunderstood. We are reducing the number of missile tubes. That reduction was determined after significant analysis across Strategic Command, the Department of the Navy, and the DOD to determine what capacity that leg of the triad needs to deliver to meet the strategic requirement. Using the existing Trident D5, the number of missile tubes can be reduced. Consideration for increasing the size of the missile tubes for some potential future ballistic missile brought cost into the discussion. It was determined that it’s not necessary to increase the size of the missile tube to remain effective as a strategic-deterrent platform. Similarly, each characteristic of this major program has been scrutinized to ensure this critical asset is capable of its mission at the most affordable price.

Proceedings: Another important program is the DDG-51 Flight III. How is the design proceeding?

Stackley: Let me start with radar. We’re in a competitive down-select for the radar. One thing we have learned in the decision to go toward Air and Missile Defense Radar [AMDR] was that it is the exact right decision with regard to capability and the maturity of the technology. We have extremely high confidence regarding the performance of the radar and the schedule that it’s on to support Flight III introduction with the 2016 ships. The risk associated with that integration is limited to the AMDR aspects of the ship’s design and we have over the past several years been looking at different approaches in supporting the AMDR on the Flight III. We have arrived at what I believe to be the right balanced design to address the space, weight, and cooling requirements of the AMDR while delivering the significant capability that radar promises and doing this at a level of risk and cost that fits our means.
An upgrade to the power-distribution system will be needed to support the AMDR, but that fits within the footprint of the current system of the DDG-51 Flight IIA. A weight penalty comes with that much added radar topside. It’s offset some by the nature of the radar’s design, but that becomes a limiting a factor in how much radar we can add to the Flight III ship. So when we look at the capability we can deliver in Flight III, it will meet the established requirements. We are effectively going to be top-end, limited in terms of future growth to the radar.
When you look at the long-range shipbuilding plan, you start to see reference to a Flight IV destroyer out in the 2020s. While AMDR will be critical to meeting the near- to mid-term requirements, we look forward in the longer term to a Flight IV destroyer to pace the threat.

Proceedings: The shipbuilding industry struggled through the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. Now four years after you’ve taken over your role as the assistant secretary for RDA, how to you perceive the health of industry?

Stackley: We have to be careful that we don’t break or harm the industrial base that we rely on for the long term. In our shipbuilding plan, the Navy has made a very concerted effort to stabilize requirements, drive affordability, and also balance consideration of our industrial base.Whether you’re looking at the 30-year plan or the FYDP, a couple of things become clear.
The nation has one shipbuilder for aircraft carriers, Newport News Shipbuilding. Our plan is to build carriers at a five-year center. In terms of Newport News and carrier construction, today the CVN-78 dominates production at that shipyard. That’s the first of the Gerald R. Ford class and it brings with it all the challenges associated with a first-in-class ship. While we complete that lead ship and basically march it toward its delivery to replace the Enterprise, which we recently decommissioned, we are also building the construction plan for CVN-79, and a focus of that plan is on affordability. It’s capturing the lessons learned not only from the first in class but also from the best practices in shipbuilding to drive the cost of the follow-on ships down to a more affordable level. That means commitment by the shipbuilder toward every step of the process. Planning, design, material procurement: We’ve been working very collaboratively with what forms a major piece of the Newport News business base for the immediate future.
Between Newport News and Electric Boat, our submarine program has effectively ramped up to two boats per year. Both of those builders are at an efficient production level for submarine construction. In the long-term plan there are a couple of years where we drop down to one boat a year and we have a period of one boat per year in the mid-term when the OR is being built. In total, submarine construction is at a very healthy level for the near and long term.
When you shift to surface combatants, we have two builders, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding. Our challenge is to sustain a minimum of a two-destroyer-per-year build rate to ensure efficient production levels out of our surface-combatant builders.
Amphibious and auxiliary construction is probably our greatest challenge in terms of industrial base. Today, in terms of amphibs, we have 30 across the big decks, LSDs and LPDs currently in the Fleet. Amphibious-ship construction is at a low level, and that’s a fairly critical concern for Ingalls shipbuilding. NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company] is our lone shipbuilder of auxiliary ships and is building the MLP and the AFSB. The next auxiliary shipbuilding program, the T-AO(X) [next-generation oiler] is in the 2016 timeframe. We’re working closely with Congress to get the AFSB authorized and appropriated, which will provide stability for NASSCO until competition for the T-AO(X) opens. NASSCO is also a shipbuilder competitive in the commercial shipbuilding environment and has recently secured commercial shipbuilding construction that intermixes with its naval shipbuilding, helping the company shore up its business base.

Proceedings: How is shipbuilding quality in your view?

Stackley: In certain shipbuilding programs, quality has not been a problem whatsoever. I would tell you across the board the shipbuilders are meeting the requirements as they relate to quality. Yes, there were challenges in the recent past, but the measures that have been taken by the shipbuilding industry have raised the bar in terms of quality and completion of the delivered ships. We’re satisfied in that regard. In certain shipbuilding programs quality has not been a problem whatsoever. When we saw lapses in quality, the shipbuilders have addressed issues, and now the focus is on driving down the cost of delivering that quality. Across the board in shipbuilding, our priority is the affordable solution, and the key to affordability is stability—in requirements, build rates, quality, and wholeness for our Fleet at sea through modernization and maintenance.

* Entrevista publicada a la revista Proceedings (USNI). Interessantíssim document per comprendre la planificació i els requeriments en construcció naval dels Estats Units. No són on són només pels diners sinó per la capacitat de planificar, re-avaluar i innovar constantment.