If Greece exits the euro, what happens to the US base Souda Bay?*

By Steven Beardsley

Stars and Stripes

There has been widespread concern about the consequences for global markets if Greece defaults on its debts and is forced to give up the euro. But how would a tiny American naval base on the island of Crete fare?

The challenges for the base of a Greek exit from the euro would be similar to those of many American companies watching developments in the country, say security and financial consultants.

Greece is in a series of last-minute negotiations with creditors over a deal to avert a looming default on bailout loans from recent years.

Even if a deal is struck by an end-of-the-month deadline, most economists believe this would not solve the country’s underlining financial problems, and a new crisis down the road is likely.

“The potential for chaos and a huge amount of uncertainty and instability is very significant,” Marianna Vintiadis, the managing director for security consultant firm Kroll’s Southern European office, said of a possible Greek default.

Like many overseas American bases, U.S. Naval Activity Souda Bay has hundreds of local employees and contracts with local businesses. American employees live on the local economy and make purchases in euros.

Navy public affairs officials declined to discuss base planning around a possible Greek default, saying they were under strict instructions to refer all matters to the State Department — including unclassified figures such as the number of base employees or the base budget.

A State Department spokeswoman referred to previous White House statements on the issue.

In the event of a default, Greece is expected to drop the euro and replace it with a local currency. Stabilizing that currency, which is expected to immediately fall in value to the euro, would take time, said Naresh Aggarwal, a treasury consultant with PwC.

Because the Greek government will likely close local banks to prevent people from emptying their accounts, businesses typically want more cash at their disposal to make payroll and pay for services.

“What you would want is not to be holding local currency,” Aggarwal said of foreign businesses in Greece. “You would want a foreign currency, whether it’s euros, pound sterling, Swiss francs or U.S. dollars. Or you would want to hold tangible assets.”

For Navy personnel, who have access to U.S. dollars through on-base institutions like Community Bank and Navy Federal Credit Union, access to cash shouldn’t be a problem while a new Greek currency is unavailable.

Whether the base would have an issue paying local employees is less clear. Of Souda Bay’s roughly 900 military and civilian personnel, about 400 are local civilians, according to a military official familiar with the base. Yet its payroll has in the past been made through the Greek government, which then pays the employees, a scheme that could complicate payment in an alternative currency.

Another uncertainty is whether contracts now paid in euros could be switched to the new currency. The base might also worry about the viability of some local service providers, especially smaller businesses that could take a financial hit from the loss of the euro.

“You need to make sure the first group of suppliers you have is resilient,” Aggarwal said of overseas businesses.

That issue, too, could be defused by the fact that the American base is located inside a Hellenic Air Force base, meaning some infrastructure is maintained by the Greek Defense Ministry instead of locals contracted by the U.S.

Social unrest is another concern for foreign businesses operating in Greece, both Aggarwal and Vintiadis agreed. So far, Athens has been the scene of most of the protests and violence surrounding debt negotiations. Aggarwal said that, as symbols of capitalism, larger American companies can become targets in times of financial unrest.

But Vintiadis said the current situation is different because it doesn’t directly involve Americans. Greece’s creditors are European, and Germany in particular has become the target of popular frustration. The U.S. has encouraged any resolution that would keep Greece within the eurozone.

“In this case, would there be anything specifically targeted at Americans? I don’t see it,” she said. “This is not that sort of a crisis; this is not that sort of a problem.”

The likelihood that significant unrest would spread outside Athens depends on how long the Greek government needs to stabilize the currency and return the economy to a sense of normalcy, she added. “What we have at the moment is a situation in flux,” Vintiadis said. “When you’re in a situation in flux, you need to be careful. Things are changing every day.”

* Article publicat a Stars & Stripes. És incerta qualsevol previsió que es faci sobre el futur immediat de Grècia, ara bé, potser a Catalunya algú hauria d'anar pensant alguna contraoferta en cas que la US Navy marxi de Souda Bay.

Sweden is fighting intruders, naked*

The thought of submarine chases off the Swedish coast may sound a tad dramatic, the stuff of cold warrior fantasies. But after two rumored sightings of Russian submarines in the country’s Scandinavian waters this fall, those fantasies have become all too real.

Swedish Armed Forces were tipped off to the presence of the first submarine on October 17, but called off their search a week later after failing to find enough evidence — it had already snuck away. On October 31, they began searching for a second foreign submarine, but only this month has conclusive evidence surfaced: On May 15, five independent witnesses came forward to say that they spotted a submarine very close to Stockholm on October 31 last year. That dramatically raises the stakes in Sweden’s hunt for aquatic intruders.

The witnesses — local residents with marine experience — described their sightings to the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter. Their reports of a submarine sighting on October 31, near the suburb of Lidingö and thus much closer to Stockholm than the October 17 submarine, contradict the armed forces, who maintain that the object was a white plastic boat.

Sverker Göranson, supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces, now finds himself in a predicament. He can maintain the armed forces line that the witnesses are mistaken, or he can choose to believe the witnesses, which would raise the question of why the submarine was able to get so close to Stockholm. The Russian media, meanwhile, is already poking fun at what it labels Swedish military incompetence.

“It’s almost impossible to keep mini-submarines out,” notes Tomas Ries, a lecturer in strategy and security policy at the Swedish Defense College. “That would require rebuilding the whole coastal defense system that the armed forces decimated after the 1990s, especially sensor lines and helicopters.” Russian nuclear submarines are usually tailed by the US Navy, and vice versa, while smaller subs are not.

At the end of the Cold War, Swedish submarine hunters commanded an arsenal featuring depth charges, torpedoes, and anti-submarine-warfare grenades, and surface submarine hunters were aided by a large number of helicopters, which easily spot movements in the water. Now, however, “we’ve got rid of our more modern weapons,” says Göran Frisk, a naval commander and top submarine hunter until his retirement 12 years ago. “The Russians can do whatever they like in Swedish waters as long as they’re not careless, because in that case a Swedish warship can shoot and disable them.”

Following a series of budget cuts starting the late 1990s, the naval commandos defending Sweden’s 2,700-kilometer coastline find themselves rather modestly equipped in the fight against underwater intruders, with just seven torpedo-armed corvettes (small warships), four submarines and one marine battalion. In March, the government announced an ambitious naval investment program that includes the purchase of two new submarines and the upgrade of existing corvettes. But that process will take years.

“Today we’re naked,” says retired Admiral Nils-Ove Jansson, a top submarine hunter in Swedish antisubmarine operations during the 1980s and 1990s. “The little equipment we have is good, but otherwise the situation is dreadful. The risks involved with intruding into Swedish waters are so negligible that the biggest risk facing a sub is that it has an accident.”

That is what happened to the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine U-137, which ran aground close to a Swedish naval base in 1981, an incident known as Whiskey on the Rocks. On October 27 that year, local fishermen discovered the submarine, stuck on a rock, and raised the alarm. The sailors, on an espionage mission off the Swedish coast, had misjudged its tricky waters. Though they all survived the accident, it led to a high-stakes diplomatic drama that ended when the Swedish navy escorted the submarine out of Swedish water 10 days later. After that scare Sweden hastily beefed up its submarine-hunting abilities, increasing both equipment and crew training.

And while Sweden’s navy boasts several modern ships and submarines, its sailors haven’t had much submarine-hunting practice since the 1990s. Finding an intruding submarine is harder than it sounds off the Swedish coast, whose archipelagos offer intruders countless hiding places. Philip Simon, a spokesman for the armed forces, is certain, however, that unwelcome guests will be caught. “We can discover an intruding submarine and get it to stop its activity,” he says. “The armed forces have no intention of disabling an intruder but want him to give up his unlawful activity.”

Not unexpectedly, the armed forces maintain that their navy is well-equipped for submarine hunts. “Regarding systems and their abilities, we’re well-equipped, probably the best in the world when it comes to advanced submarine-hunting in shallow waters,” says Simon. “We have weapons and systems to detect and fight intruding submarines both inside and outside our archipelagos.” But, adds Simon, reductions in the number of systems and vessels have had an effect on the navy’s ability to hunt for submarines in a larger area or over a longer period of time.

“The vast majority of security researchers believe that the intrusions are Russian under-water activities,” notes Ries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of submarine intrusions in Swedish waters dropped, but started growing again in 2000. Independent naval experts report that the Russian navy uses mini-submarines in the Baltic to spy on Swedish, Finnish and NATO activities. It’s no secret that the Russian signals-intelligence ship Fyodor Golovin also gathers information in the Baltic Sea, and doing so in international waters is not illegal. Russia’s military attaché in Stockholm, Colonel Vladimir Ermachkov, did not respond to a request for comment. Following massive military cuts in the 1990s, Russia is now half-way through a $700 billionmodernization plan.

Jansson, who’s also a former deputy director of the Swedish military intelligence agency, MUST, and a leading authority on Russian military espionage, argues that the Soviet Union’s snooping on its largest Scandinavian neighbor has returned in Russian guise, with an undeniable logic to it. “The Russians suspect that Sweden and Finland are not really independent of NATO,” he explains. “With their submarine activities, they’re preparing to put nuclear mines in Swedish locations likely to host NATO naval units. And their TU-22M supersonic bomber airplanes that fly towards Swedish airspace are testing the course of their missiles, which they’d direct against locations that may host NATO air force units.”

As Captain Marko Ramius says in the Cold War-era thriller “The Hunt for Red October”: “Once more, we play our dangerous game, a game of chess against our old adversary.”

The Russian assumption is, of course, right on target: Though officially non-aligned, Sweden cooperates closely with NATO. A Russian air incursion on May 21 is reported to have targeted a state-of-the-art southern Swedish airbase recently used by the Nordic Battle Group, which includes several NATO members. Until reinforcements arrive, the Swedish navy will have no choice but to keep vigilantly patrolling its waters, hoping that unwelcome guests will do themselves in.

Elisabeth Braw is a correspondent for Newsweek, which she joined following a fellowship at the University of Oxford.

* Article publicat a Politico.eu . No és el primer cop que surten notícies assenyalant la debilitat de la defensa de Suècia. Com veiem altra vegada, el buit estratègic acostuma a omplir-se.

Chinese and Russian Navies to Conduct First Ever Mediterranean Surface Exercises in May

Joint Sea 2015-I will be the first time the two navies have trained in the Mediterranean and is a sign of deepening military-to-military cooperation between Russia and China.

“The purpose of the exercise is to strengthen the pragmatic cooperation between China and Russia and to improve the capabilities of the two navies to deal with maritime threats,” said ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng on Thursday.

“What needs to be stressed is that, the joint exercise is not targeting any third party and not related to the regional situation.”

The exercises were announced in November following a meeting between Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan in Beijing.

Following the meeting, Shoigu said U.S. rebalance to the Pacific was a primary concern of both countries.

“We believe that the main goal of pooling our effort is to shape a collective regional security system,” according to the Russian TASS news agency.

“We also expressed concern over U.S. attempts to strengthen its military and political clout in the [Asia-Pacific Region].”

China plans to send the Type 54A Jiangkai II frigates Linyi, Weifang and fleet oiler Weishanhu —currently performing merchant convoy duty off of the Gulf of Aden — to the exercise, Geng said.

It’s unclear what assets Russia will send.

“The drilling items in the exercise include maritime defense, maritime replenishment, escort actions, joint operations to safeguard navigation security as well as real weapon firing drill,” he said.

In addition to the Mediterranean exercise, China and Russia committed to a Pacific exercise later in 2015.

Since the forced annexation of Crimea and a souring relationship with the West, Russia has flexed its surface muscle more in the last year sending more ships further afield than it has in decades — including sending the guided missile cruiser Moscow (or Moskva) to conduct live fire drills in the South China Sea.

Likewise, China continues to venture beyond its regional waters conducting anti-piracy missions near Somalia and drilling with the Iranian Navy.

China and Russia began a regular exercise schedule in 2012 and have since drilled in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.

* Notícia publicada al US Naval Institute. Com us avançavem fa uns mesos, els exercicis conjunts de Rússia i la Xina a la Mediterrància tiren endavant. Una recordatori més que els buits estratègics, sempre acaben omplint-se.

The Rapid Expansion of China’s Navy in Five Charts*

With tensions mounting over China’s island-building in the South China Sea, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence has published its first report on the Chinese navy since 2009. The report, released late Thursday (pdf) predicts: “In the next decade, China will complete its transition from a coastal navy to a navy capable of multiple missions around the world.”

The report says that in 2014, China reclaimed hundreds of acres of land at the seven features it occupies in the disputed Spratly Islands and “appears to be building much larger facilities that could eventually support both maritime law enforcement and naval operations.” It also confirms that China’s newest destroyers have been fitted with a new kind of vertically launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, called the YJ-18, which could significantly enhance their capacity to threaten U.S. ships.

Here are five graphics that illustrate some its other key findings:

1) China’s coast guard and maritime law enforcement fleet is now bigger than those of Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines combined. The coast guard will add 50 ships to its fleet between 2012 and 2015, increasing its overall force by 25 percent.

2) China launched more naval ships than any other country in 2013 and 2014, and is expected to continue this trend through 2015-16.

3) The range of Chinese naval surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles is increasing. China’s newest class of destroyer, the LUYANG III, is fitted with the new YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile which Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College says in a blog post “could pose unprecedented challenges to the air defenses of U.S. and allied ships.”

4) China’s submarine force currently consists of five nuclear attack submarines, four nuclear ballistic missile submarines and 57 diesel attack submarines. By 2020, that force will likely grow to more than 70 submarines.

5) According to the report, China’s navy will soon assume a central role in the country’s nuclear deterrence, launching ballistic missile submarine patrols with intercontinental-range missiles. “As we look ahead to the coming decade, the introduction of aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and potentially a large-deck amphibious ship will fundamentally alter how the PLA(N) operates and is viewed by the world,”it says.

– Jeremy Page. Follow him on Twitter @JNBPage

* Notícia publicada al Wall Street Journal. Clar i concís resum de punts clau en l'expansió navla xinesa, que publiva l'ONI cada any. Per aquells qui vulguin accedir al document complet, cliqueu aquí.

Confirmed: Pakistan Will Buy Eight Chinese Subs*

Details on the type of vessel as well as the new fleet’s price tag remain unknown.

By Franz-Stefan Gady

Yesterday, the Pakistani government confirmed the purchase of eight new submarines from China. “The National Security Committee has approved, in principle, the acquisition of eight Chinese submarines,” Additional Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, Rear Admiral Mukhtar Khan, informed the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Defence in Islamabad.

Details on the type of vessels or their price tag are murky. IHS Jane’s quotes an unnamed Pakistani Foreign Ministry official who said that, “in the recent past, there have been reports of discussions for the Type 041 submarines.”

According to IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships the Type 041 Yuan-class is,“a diesel electric attack submarine (SSK), potentially with Stirling air independent propulsion, that is armed with YJ-2 (YJ-82) anti-ship missiles and a combination of Yu-4 (SAET-50) passive homing and Yu-3 (SET-65E) active/passive homing torpedoes.” The export version of the vessel allegedly displaces about 2,300 tons, according to public sources.

However, as I noted here, the Wuhan-based China State Shipbuilding Industrial Corp (CSIC) supposedly had already signed a contract in April 2011 to deliver six Type 032 Qing-class conventional attack submarines by 2016/2017. Apparently, this deal must be off the table now.

Still other media sources report that Islamabad will build submarines under license based on the Qing-class vessels displacing 3,000 tons: “Pakistan will also build two types of submarines with Chinese assistance: the Project S-26 and Project S-30. The vessels are to be built at the Submarine Rebuild Complex (SRC) facility being developed at Ormara, west of Karachi.”

The procurement of a new fleet of submarines constitutes Islamabad’s most expensive arms deal by far. Estimated total costs range between $4-5 billion. IHS Jane’s quotes a former Pakistani defense official who said that it is “difficult to imagine a price of less than USD 500 million per submarine, if not more.”

He also said that he suspects China to extend a long-term loan, possibly at a low interest rate. Another Pakistani military expert told theFinancial Times that there are still many unknowns: “At this stage, we don’t know the exact financial terms and unless we know the financial terms we can’t be certain about the significance of this order,” he said. “Still, it’s an important contract for Pakistan.”

Ali Sarwar Naqvi, a former senior Pakistani diplomat, said about Beijing’s rationale behind the weapons deal: “China has its own strategic reasons to help Pakistan in this area. As India prepares to head in to the Pacific Ocean, the Chinese are looking to head in to the Indian Ocean.”

* Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. L'ampliació de l'arma submarina pakistanesa sembla consolidar-se. Si l'Índia no millora al mateix ritme les seves capacitats ASW, pot tenir problemes seriosos. Poca gent se'n recorda avui, però l'Índia ja va perdre un vaixell a mans d'un submarí pakistanès.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Return of the Catalan Navy: British and Japanese Soft Power in the Mediterranean*

The same week in which the Royal Navy held the naming ceremony for the first of its new carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and in which Tokyo approved a reinterpretation of Article 9 of her Constitution to provide for a measure of collective self-defence, was witness to a little-reported but still significant fact which, by stressing both nations' naval soft power, serves as a reminder of the potential for a renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance as an engine of peace and stability all over the world, including the Mediterranean: a draft blueprint for the return of the Catalan Navy, (lost, together with all other state institutions, by force of arms in 1714) outlining its potential initial shape and capabilities, refers to the Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) when defining “escort duties”, while recommending Catalonia reach an agreement with the United Kingdom whereby the Royal Navy would help train a first generation of naval officers.

 

The adoption of Japanese doctrinal and operational concepts by a Western Navy is a testament of the growing prowess of the MSDF and its prestige in an increasingly wider range of areas. While Japan has not engaged in combat operations since the end of the Second World War, her naval forces have deployed a significant amount of advanced assets, trained intensively, participated in joint drills and cooperated with fellow navies in counter-piracy and anti-terrorism operations, and been responsible (together with the country's Coast Guard) for checking hostile advances into Japanese territorial waters and EEZ. Furthermore, recent years have seen Tokyo help train and equip coastguards in South-East Asia, as a necessary complement to Japan's drive to promote the rule of law at sea and the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. Faced with revisionist threats, both Hanoi and Manila have turned their gaze towards Tokyo. Thus, it should not be surprising to see Japanese influence in the blueprint for a new or rather re-born navy. Rather, it is a small but significant gesture confirming that, despite the mistrust still pervading relations with Beijing and Seoul, a growing number of countries not only recognize the technical abilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) but also see Tokyo as an international actor having much to contribute to global peace and security. Of course, Japan's main strategic focus is, and due to the difficult circumstances in the area will remain in the foreseeable future, the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region, limiting the degree of attention devoted to the Mediterranean. However, this should be no bar to regular exchanges with the reconstituted Catalan Navy, in addition to multinational cooperation arising from, for example, participation in RIMPAC exercises. The 100 anniversary of the Great War, in which the Imperial Japanese Navy played a vital role in the Mediterranean, provides the ideal historical background. In addition, the recent relaxation by Japan of her long-standing ban on weapons exports means that procurement and joint development and production are also areas where Catalonia and Japan may cooperate in the future, in a development facilitated by the already extensive presence of Japanese enterprises in Catalonia.[1] Last, but not least, mentions of the MSDF in Catalonia's unofficial white paper should serve as a reminder, and evidence, that despite the rumblings of many pundits in Japan and some other countries, a clear majority of maritime democracies see Tokyo's move towards collective self-defence as right, both in moral and in practical national security terms. 

Concerning the Royal Navy, seeing her cooperate with the Catalan Navy would be nothing new, but rather a resumption of a process cut short by the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession. After all, it was a combined Anglo-Dutch-Catalan force which took Gibraltar in 1704. It is precisely the Rock which provides one of the best reasons why it is in the British national interest to help train the Catalan Navy, since the stronger and more proficient Catalan naval forces are, the more secure Gibraltar will be.[2] In an uncertain world, you need allies near any potential hot spot. Actually, Japan's reasons to help train and equip the Filipino and the Vietnamese coastguards are very similar to London's rationale for contributing to the re-emergence of the Catalan Navy. As made clear by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the debates leading to Tokyo's adoption of a limited version of collective self-defence, nowadays no country can ignore others in preparing to safeguard the security and well-being of its citizens. In case there is any doubt, the 1982 Falklands War should serve as a reminder of the absolute necessity of being able to rely on regional Allies in order to effectively project power. Thus, even if we leave history and shared values (including parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, Catalonia's and England's being the two oldest parliaments in Europe) out of the equation, national security considerations in and by themselves should suffice for London to take a keen interest in the re-emergence of the Catalan Navy. 

To conclude, it is no coincidence that in laying down plans to recover her navy, Catalonia refers to Great Britain and Japan, two island democracies that once stood side by side to defence peace and stability and the rule of law at sea and that today are increasingly working together with these same purposes in mind. Both the Royal Navy and the MSDF have much to teach, and their experience and traditions are invaluable, while London, Tokyo, and Barcelona, share a commitment to parliamentary democracy, the rule of law at sea, and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with International Law. Furthermore, it is in the national interest of any country to help fellow (and in particular nearby) maritime democracies develop their naval and coastguard capabilities, above all when revisionist actors threaten to use force to redraw borders, in contravention of international law. As clear from the Falklands War, regional allies are essential, a lesson not lost on Japan, which has come to the aid of Vietnam and the Philippines in their hour of need, in a move contributing to her own national security. Now the time has come for the Royal Navy help train the Catalan Navy out of the same considerations, with Japan's MSDF ideally also lending a hand.

Alex Calvo is an expert on security and defence in Asia 

[1] In the early 1980s, when many European countries were hostile to foreign direct investment (FDI), British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Catalan counterpart Jordi Pujol were the only ones actively seeking Japanese FDI, in a move later imitated by many. 

[2] For an outline of some of the harassment endured by the Rock in recent years, see the report by the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee.

* Article publicat a Help Catalonia. Compartim aquest article del professor Àlex Calvo. Reflexions interessants per no oblidar que recuperar la sobirania implica consciència geopolítica i, no cal dir-ho, responsabilitat.

Colors dels Llúria, que s'adoptaren com els de la Marina Catalana

Cuba shift to buoy maritime sector*

US President Barack Obama's landmark decision to begin normalising relations with Cuba has major implications for the cruise, ferry, cargo vessel and port sectors.

In a special address on 17 December, Obama announced "historic steps to chart a new course" with Cuba, conceding that "decades of US isolation of Cuba have failed".

The ban on most US travel to Cuba remains in place, yet the new policy will grant general licenses to travellers in the 12 allowable categories under current law. This represents the first step in the process of facilitating "an expansion of travel to Cuba".

Import and export restrictions will be eased. US exports to Cuba will be opened up for "certain building materials, goods used by private-sector Cuban entrepreneurs and agricultural equipment for small farmers".

The ban on calls at US ports by vessels that have visited Cuba within the prior six months is also being eased. The new policy will "allow foreign vessels to enter the US after engaging in certain humanitarian trade with Cuba".

As previously reported by IHS Maritime, an end to the embargo would create numerous opportunities for the maritime community. For vessel operators, these include new cruise routes calling in Cuba and cruise ships being used as 'floating hotels'; new ferry services from South Florida; an increased market for US agricultural exports and other US goods; and new demand for building supply cargoes and project cargoes.

UBS analyst Robin Farley addressed the cruise potential in a new research note. "Cuba would represent a new itinerary with significant pent-up demand from American tourists and a lack of developed hotel infrastructure," she explained. "While Havana may not currently handle the largest ships, we believe operators would make the investment to build dockside infrastructure."

Development of new cruise terminals would not be the only potential effect for the port sector. Cuba has long been considered as the potential site of a major transhipment hub for container trades, assuming the embargo is ended. Already, PSA has made inroads in the Cuban port sector via its operation of the new terminal in Mariel.

* Notícia publicada al web d'IHS Maritime. Compartim aquestes primeres reflexions de l'impacte del restabliment de relacions entre els Estats Units i Cuba.

Russia and China to Hold 2015 Naval Exercises in Mediterranean, Pacific*

By: Sam LaGrone

Russia and China have committed to a pair of 2015 naval exercises as a sign of growing military cooperation between the two countries, Russia’s minister of defense said this week.

“We plan to conduct a regular joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean next spring,” said Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, according to the Russian TASS news agency.
“Another joint naval drill is planned in the Pacific.”

The announcement from Shoigu follows a Beijing meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan in which the two countries pledged greater military-to-military cooperation against the backdrop of the so-called U.S. rebalance to the Pacific.

“We believe that the main goal of pooling our effort is to shape a collective regional security system,” Shoigu said.
“We also expressed concern over U.S. attempts to strengthen its military and political clout in the [Asia-Pacific Region].”

Shoigu did not specify the nature of the exercises but Russia and China completed a bilateral exercise in May.

Joint Sea Exercise 2014 was the third between the Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since 2011 and featured 14 surface ships, two submarines, nine fixed wing aircraft as well as helicopters and special operation forces (SOF), state controlled Xinhua news service wrote in May.

The new exercises are part of a trend that, “has visibly expanded and gained a systemic character,” Shoigu said.

Russian president Vladimir Putin indicated the same earlier this year.

“It would be no exaggeration if I said that the cooperation between our two countries is at its highest level in history,” he said in May.

Russia has stepped up its surface presence in Asia in the last few months.

Earlier in October, the Black Sea flagship — guided missile cruiser Moscow (or Moskva) — conducted rare live fire drills in the South China Sea.

Russia also sent a flotilla of four surface ships off of the territorial of Australia ahead of the G-20 summit in Brisbane.

For its part, China has also ventured further abroad.

In late October, Chinese and Iranian military leaders pledged greater cooperation following limited bilateral naval exercises in September.

Shoigu said Russian deepening military ties with China was essential for regional security.

“Amid a highly volatile world situation, it becomes particularly important to strengthen reliable good-neighborly relations between our countries,” Shoigu said.
“This is not only an important factor for security of states but also a contribution to peace and stability on the Eurasian continent and beyond.”

Rear Adm. Du Xiping (front right), deputy commander of China’s Beihai Fleet, shakes hands with Capt. 1st Rank Sergei Yuriyevich Zhuga of Russia’s Pacific Fleet during a welcome ceremony at a naval base in Qingdao, in east China’s Shandong Province, on April 21, 2012. Xinhua Photo

* Notícia publicada al US Naval Institute. Per algú ho havia oblidat, el buit estratègic acostuma a omplir-se

Russia to build military Arctic environmental center*

Russia’s Ministry of Defense wants to enhance ecological monitoring in the Arctic and plans to establish a regional environmental center operated by the Northern Fleet.

Russia’s military presence in the Arctic is not to harm the region’s ecology, Deputy Defence Minister General Dmitry Bulgakov told reporters on Saturday.

“To control the ecology of the Russian Arctic zone, a regional environmental center of the Northern Fleet is to be created in the near future, which will carry out ecological monitoring and control compliance with Russian and international environmental legislation,” Bulgakov said according to Portnews.

Russia’s Defense Ministry has worked out a road-map on ecology security in the Arctic, Bulgakov said. According to the road map, military specialists are analyzing the ecology situation in places the Armed Forces have been located in the Arctic, including territories that were used in the Soviet times. “We plan to remove within the next few years old and destroyed buildings and to re-cultivate the territory - this means we shall remove the debris, fundaments, metal parts and so forth.”

According to Bulgakov, Russian forces have removed ten tons of garbage from Wrangel Island this summer.

 

* Notícia publicada a The Barents Observer. Rússia segueix consolidant posicions, també a l'Àrtic; aquesta peça n'és una nova constatació.

Stavridis: Russian Mistrals Could Work Well As NATO Rapid Reaction Force Asset*

The suspended delivery of two French-built amphibious warships to the Russian Navy could give NATO an opportunity to buy a ready-made platform for its planned rapid reaction force, retired Adm. James G. Stavridis — former NATO Supreme Allied Commander — told USNI News on Thursday.

“France has made a good decision stopping the sale process — it would be absurd for NATO to be providing assistance to Ukraine on the one hand while selling arms to Russia on the other,” said retired James G. Stavridis — U.S. Naval Institute’s Chair of the Board of Directors — said in a statement to USNI News.
“If the [Russian] arms embargo continues, then the idea of NATO purchasing one or even two as part of a rapid reaction force might make sense… “[But] it is too soon to tell, given discussion today about ceasefires and political settlement.”

Stavridis comments follow a Wednesday announcement from the office French President François Hollande suspending the delivery of the ships as part of a $1.53 billion program.

Citing the continued Russian involvement in violence in Eastern Ukraine, the Hollande administration concluded, “the conditions under which France could authorize the delivery of the first helicopter carrier are not in place.”

It is yet unclear if the suspension of delivery will be permanent.

Rapid Reaction

This week — as part of the ongoing NATO conference in Wales — alliance leaders will likely approve the creation of a, “very high-readiness force able to deploy at very short notice,” NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Monday as reported by The Wall Street Journal.
“This force can travel light, but strike hard if needed.”

NATO currently has a response force, but the new unit could assemble in two days instead of five.

The force that could pair well with the Russian Mistrals, said Eric Wertheim — naval analyst and author of U.S. Naval Institute’s Combat Fleets of the World.

“I [think] that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should examine acquiring the two ships as NATO alliance assets operating in support of their newly proposed rapid reaction force,” he said.
“Additionally the two 20,000-ton vessels could support NATO mine-countermeasures (MCM) operations or be on standby for humanitarian assistance duties.”

NATO’s Military Assets

It wouldn’t be the first time NATO purchased and operated its own military assets.

“There would be a precedent for joint ownership of NATO maritime and even air assets. NATO has operated the research ship NRV Alliance as well as the oceanographic tender CRV Leonardo,” Wertheim said.
“NATO also operates a fleet of E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft as well as a force of C-17 cargo aircraft operated by multi-national NATO crewmembers.”

The U.S. Navy also experimented with mixed multi-national NATO crews to some success in the 1960s.

The inclusion of the Mistrals into the NATO arsenal opens up a range of possibilities for the reaction force.

The Russian Mistrals — Vladivostok and Sevastopol — have been modified to carry heavier Russian helicopters and are optimized for Arctic operations, allowing a rare cold weather operating capability for NATO. Most Western ships are optimized to work in tropical climates.

The ships could also serve as a logistics sea base for expeditionary forces from NATO without creating a large terrestrial footprint — much like U.S. Navy and Marine Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Unites. (ARG/MEU).

Economic Affect and Russian Capabilities

A cancellation of the Russian Mistral deal could have a significant affect on the French defense industry.

Russia has paid France most of the price tag for the two ships and a cancellation of the program could result in a total refund plus $325 million in contract penalties, reported the BBC on Thursday.

“Unless an alternative buyer or use is found for these two ships, cancelation could have a negative impact on their economy, employment and shipbuilding industry,” Wertheim said.

A NATO purchase could defray that cost, he said.

The cancellation would also degrade the long-term outlook for the Russian Navy’s amphibious capabilities.

“Without the two French Mistral class vessels, Russia’s navy has only a handful of small landing ships, none of which carry helicopters or have flight decks,” Wertheim said. “Their newest class of tank landing ships has been under construction since 2004 and have yet to enter service. Without these French ships, Russia remains a decade or more away from gaining a similar capability.”

Russia contracted France to build the two ships shortly after its 2008 with Georgia. Russian commanders had trouble deploying large numbers of troops on the coast — prompting the deal with France.

* Notícia publicada a l'US Naval Institute. La cancel.lació de l'entrega dels Mistral a Rússia per part de França és una bona notícia, no només per Ucraïna. Ara caldrà veure com actua l'OTAN, ja que seria desitjable que adquirís les naus.

http://news.usni.org/2014/09/04/stavridis-russian-mistrals-work-well-nato-rapid-reaction-force-asset

The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession*

Scotland will free-ride in the Atlantic without sustained investment, but Catalonian maritime specialization would be welcome in the Mediterranean.
On 18 September, Scotland votes on the question of independence from the United Kingdom, and the polling strongly suggests a vote of no. On 9 November, Catalonia could be voting on the same issue vis-à-vis Spain, but the polling slightly suggests a yes—if the Spanish Constitutional Court allows the vote to take place. NATO members should treat neither case lightly, but the independence of Catalonia would pose fewer military problems for the alliance than that of Scotland.

The secessionist movements in both countries have endorsed joining both the EU and NATO. But both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, and depends on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. The Spanish probably could not manage to block a determined move for Catalonian self-determination. That said, two of my Atlantic Council colleagues have questioned whether the European Union would admit Catalonia, as some member states (e.g. Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity. Would the British accede to Scottish independence, but then plausibly attempt to exclude the country from NATO? A currency union may be off the table, but such dickering over the serious business of defense would be unacceptable.

As Griffe Witte of the Washington Post argued just this week, in the long run, Scottish secession could be challenging for maintaining Britain’s Trident submarine force. The Scottish National Party (SNP) aims to declare independence in 2016, and see the nukes off by 2020. Today, the submarines and their warheads are conveniently somewhat isolated at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, 40 kilometers from Glasgow. The Royal Navy’s other two major facilities, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth, are both in populated areas on the south coast of England. This has caused some to question whether the south coasters would appreciate the sudden arrival of a few hundred nuclear weapons. But Devonport is where the RN overhauls and refuels those nuclear submarines, so the locals are already accustomed to the presence of things nuclear. In the breach, it is likely that they would prefer the several thousand high-paying industrial jobs that would transfer down from Scotland.

That could be all well and good, but assuming that Scotland and Catalonia were admitted to NATO, what would they contribute? At the Strategic Foresight Forum this past spring at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter—late of Princeton and the US State Department, and now running the New America Foundation—opined that an independent Scotland and an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending themselves. At the reception afterwards, a former defense official and defense industrialist argued to me that the consequences for NATO would be adverse, “because the Scots think that defense is a free good”. But even beyond the hyperbole, it’s important to note how significantly plans for forces flying the Saltire cross and the four bars of the Senyera differ.

Scotland is a country of 5.3 million people, with over $200 billion in GDP. The SNP has in mind a tiny version of Britain’s armed forces as a whole: a navy of a few frigates, a fighter squadron, and an armored infantry brigade. With enough investment, a short-ranged maritime patrol squadron might follow as a welcome addition to the recent loss of RAF Coastal Command. The problem, however, is that Scottish resources aren’t likely to match these goals. Spending the NATO average of 1.6% of that GDP on defense would provides just over $3 billion annually. That level of spending is equivalent to the budget of Austria, a neutral country which needn’t maintain a navy. Unless Scotland steps up to a higher rate of spending, its exit from the United Kingdom would produce another free-riding Celtic state on the periphery of the open North Atlantic.

 Catalonia has 7.3 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that on defense provides over $4.5 billion annually, or roughly the budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces. Catalonian military plans are more vague, but so far, they emphasize the navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, ‘with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework’, as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argues. The rough plans call for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as "a main actor in the Mediterranean," with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security.

 Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of each country’s political process, but even the announced policies differ importantly. Scotland’s tiny replication of British capabilities wouldn’t be so clearly efficient. On the other hand, Catalonia’s ambition would be more restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.

 
James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

* Article publicat a The Atlantic Council. Una gran notícia! Que la tasca dels especialistes catalans en Defensa sigui reconeguda als Estats Units posa de relleu dues coses:
- LA SERIOSITAT DEL SEU TREBALL
- LA NEGLIGÈNCIA DE LA CLASSE POLÍTICA (ANC INCLOSA) D'HAVER DEFUGIT AQUEST TEMA

France to deliver Mistral-class vessels to Russia despite protests from key allies*

France will deliver Mistral-class aircraft carriers to Russia as planned, despite objections from key allies, the UK and US, over Moscow's reported involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, President Francois Hollande has said.
Speaking to reporters, Hollande was quoted as saying: "The Russians have paid. Should we repay €1.1bn if the boat was not delivered to the purchaser?
"For the time being, a level of sanctions has not been decided that would prevent this delivery.
"The contract was signed in 2011, the boat is almost finished and should be delivered in October."
The latest move comes in the midst of heavy criticism from the US State Department and UK Prime Minister David Cameron, who urged France to cancel the deal.
Russia has been criticised for allegedly supplying anti-aircraft systems to rebels in eastern Ukraine. Separatists allegedly shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 last week, killing 298 people.
According to US State Department deputy spokesperson Marie Harf, the delivery of Mistral warships to Russia would be 'completely inappropriate'.
"The Russians have paid. Should we repay €1.1bn if the boat was not delivered to the purchaser?"
In June 2011, Russia and France signed a $1.52bn deal for two Mistral-class vessels, which are being built at the DCNS shipyard in Saint-Nazaire, France.
The Russian Navy is set to receive the first ship Vladivostok on 1 November, while Sevastopol, the second vessel, is expected to be floated out in October.
As part of an intergovernmental pact, Russia will also acquire two more Mistral-class ships, which will be constructed in Russia and France.
The 199m-long, 22,000t Mistral-class ships include MRR-3D NG surveillance radar and a high-performance communications suite for humanitarian operations and a range of other missions.
With a potential to cruise at a maximum speed of 19k, they are equipped with two Breda Mauser 30mm naval guns and four 12.7mm machine guns, in addition to two MBDA France Simbad launchers for the Mistral air-defence missile.

* Notícia publicada a Naval Technology.  Continua el serial franco-rus respecte a la venda del portahelicòpters de classe Mistral...

Vietnam faces limited options in South China Sea dispute

Vietnam has curbed the violent anti-China protests that swept the country after a Chinese oil rig began drilling in contested waters. But authorities have not dropped their opposition to the Chinese operation, sending boats to harass the drilling, considering waging a legal case in international courts to resolve the dispute, and courting regional allies like the Philippines.

China tightened the screws on Vietnam this week by sending a “position paper” to the United Nations on the operations of its $1 billion-oil rig in a part of the South China Sea that Vietnam also claims.

It accused Vietnam of ramming its vessels, sending frogmen and “other underwater agents” in waters which it says are indisputably Chinese.

China has always resisted third party intervention in disputes between rival claimants over territory in the South China Sea, but this shift could put Vietnam in a difficult position, says Professor Carl Thayer from the Australian Defense Force Academy.
“Is China trying to provoke a debate in the general assembly, making countries make a decision to put up or shut up? Trying to isolate Vietnam by having those countries which are most concerned about China to shut up because they wouldn’t want to be seen as forced out into the open like Brunei, they just abstain and duck for cover," Thayer suggested.

Vietnam cannot compete with China’s military muscle and remains heavily reliant on Beijing for trade. Vietnam is believed to be considering waging a legal case for the disputed territory, but taking its claims to an international court could take years.

According to Thayer, one option could be to take advantage of the Philippines’ challenge of the legality of China's maritime claims at an international tribunal in The Hague.

“The best approach politically, if relations between China are irreparable, would be to join the Philippines and try to bolster its claim as a friend of the Philippines," Thayer said.

Vietnam’s coalition with the Philippines took a lighter tone on Monday when the country played football, volleyball and tug of war with sailors on an island in the Spratly archipelago.

In the past the two governments would have been wary about organizing such an event, lest they appear to be “ganging up” on China, says Alexander Vuving, a security analyst at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

However, things have now come to a point where both countries can step up and show their solidarity.

Vietnam can look also look outside the region for support, he said.

“India is far away but has also indicated its support for Vietnam so looking at the core interest for both nations I think that the casual allies, if you want to use the term, would be the Philippines, Japan and the U.S. and India," Vuving said.

He added that Vietnam has been moving closer to the U.S. even before the oil rig crisis in a “continuing rapprochement to the rise of China”.

But Vietnam’s politburo are divided on how close they get to Washington. Some do not want political reform and others have vested interests in economic ties with China.

“I think fundamentally modernizers want to get closer to the U.S., not just for defense of the territory but also for economic reform," Vuving explained. " But they are not very well represented in the politburo right now.”

Meanwhile, at home Vietnam is preparing for the long haul. On Monday the National Assembly passed a plan to spend $760 million to support fishermen and coast guards.

The money will be used to buy equipment for patrols and build offshore fishing vessels for the Vietnam Coast Guard, the Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance Force and fishermen.

This includes construction of 3,000 steel-clad fishing boats, Tran Cao Muu, General Secretary of the Vietnam Fisheries Association said. The current fleet of around 100,000 boats are made of wood.

He said policies to exploit resources in Vietnamese waters are not new, but the issue has become “hotter” following China’s aggressive actions in the sea.

Vietnam has accused China of ramming its ships over 1,400 times, once causing a fishing boat to sink.

Despite the increased dangers, Muu said Vietnam's fishing ships were operating as normal in the sea.

* Notícia publicada a The Voice of America. Compartim aquest article, clarificador de com el contenciós al Mar del Sud de la Xina no té, ara per ara, aturador.

El Port d Barcelona mantindria el seu potencial en cas d'indepedència de Catalunya*

Com afectaria al Port de Barcelona, una de les principals infrastructures del país, la independència de Catalunya? 'Des del punt de vista operatiu, el port té plena autonomia financera i de funcionament, té una estructura pròpia i no depèn d'altres institucions', explica en una entrevista a l'ACN el president de l'Autoritat Portuària de Barcelona, Sixte Cambra. Destaca, a més, que l'activitat del port és 'fonamentalment internacional', i que 'un dels objectius que tenim és anar guanyant quota en el mercat francès. Canalitzem comerç internacional, turisme'.

'El ritme inversor privat ha estat molt elevat al Port aquests darrers anys i se segueixen executant projectes amb total normalitat', ha indicat. Cambra ha posat d'exemple la segona fase de la terminal de contenidors BEST de Hutchison al Moll Prat.

El president del Port de Barcelona ha recordat que la logística té cada cop un pes més gran en els costos de la indústria i que la manca d'inversió en el Corredor Mediterrani dificultarà la consolidació de l'àrea metropolitana i de Catalunya com un pol logístic.

El president de l'Autoritat Portuària de Barcelona ha valorat com a 'molt important' l'execució del corredor mediterrani en la seva totalitat. Pel que fa al Port, Cambra ha assenyalat que la connexió amb França -que avui ja està operativa amb ample de via internacional o UIC- afecta especialment l'estratègia de desenvolupament del seu 'hinterland'. En aquest sentit, s'ha mostrat 'preocupat' per l'eficiència d'aquesta connexió, ja que 'els serveis no són tot el competitius que haurien de ser'.

Un altre projecte clau del desenvolupament del 'hinterland' del Port lligat a l'execució d'aquesta infraestructura ferroviària és el corredor Lió-Barcelona-Madrid, l'anomenat projecte CLYMA. 'És important perquè ens connecta amb el quadrant nord-est de la península ibèrica i amb Madrid, l'altre eix de desenvolupament estratègic del Port de Barcelona', ha indicat. En aquest cas, Cambra també ha expressat 'preocupació' perquè no s'impulsin 'més ràpidament' qüestions 'elementals' com l'habilitació per a trens de 750 metres de llarg.

Els accessos ferroviaris definitius al Port de Barcelona també formen part del Corredor Mediterrani. En aquest sentit, Cambra s'ha mostrat 'confiat' que el Ministeri de Foment complirà el seu compromís i licitarà la infraestructura aquest estiu. 'Amb aquest calendari, és complicat que els accessos estiguin operatius el 2015 i esperem que l'execució no vagi més enllà de 2016', ha sentenciat el president del Port de Barcelona.

De totes maneres, Cambra ha celebrat que 'afortunadament' es van executar els accessos ferroviaris provisionals, que donen servei a la zona del Moll Prat i permeten fer les tasques que demanden els operadors portuaris en amples de via ibèric i internacional. Segons Cambra, 'seria molt lamentable que es perdessin oportunitats' per la inacció de Foment en els accessos definitius, sobretot després del gran volum d'inversió que han realitzat operadors privats com Hutchison.

* Notícia publicada a Vilaweb. Celebrem que el Port de Barcelona funcioni tant bé, malgrat els pals a les rodes de l'administració central. Esperem que ben aviat pugui desencadenar tot el seu potencial.

U.S. Should Condemn Spain and France’s Military Support to the Russian Federation*

As Russia continues to occupy Crimea and back political instability in eastern Ukraine, there are some NATO members that continue to provide Russia with military support. Spain allows the Russian navy use of its ports, and France is selling two amphibious assault ships to Russia.

This behavior is unbecoming of 21st-century NATO allies. The U.S. should work with likeminded NATO partners to apply pressure on France and Spain to end their military assistance to Russia.

Europe Is Divided
Although the secretary general of NATO described the crisis in Ukraine and Russian aggression as the biggest threat to Europe since the end of the Cold War, Europe has been divided on its response. Some countries, such as Germany and Italy, have strong economic ties to Russia. Other European nations are dependent for 100 percent of their natural gas and oil requirements on the Russian Federation.

These complex economic relationships do not justify Europe’s unwillingness to enact meaningful sanctions on Russia, but they certainly make it understandably more difficult. However, there is no excuse for the support given by Spain and France to the Russian navy.

Spain Welcomes the Russian Navy
Spain possesses two sovereign enclaves called Ceuta and Melilla that border Morocco. They are both sizable cities, with populations of 73,000 and 79,000, respectively. They are legally part of Spain, and they are the only two European Union (EU) cities located in mainland Africa. They are also part of the Schengen Agreement and the eurozone. The Russian navy has been using their port facilities for years.

On April 28, during the same week that the EU announced a new round of sanctions against Russia, Spain played host to the Russian destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov at Ceuta.[1] During its stay, the destroyer took on nearly 740 tons of fuel and 100 tons of water. In the same week, two Russian navy tankers, the Duban and the Sergey Osipov, visited the Spanish port. Earlier this year, the landing ship Alexander Shabalin and the tug ship Khorov also called into Ceuta. It has been reported that a total of six Russian ships have visited Ceuta in 2014.[2]

Spain’s policy of allowing the Russian navy to use Ceuta in North Africa is also hypocritical in relation to its reluctance to allow visits by NATO ships to or from the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar directly to or from Spanish ports. Therefore, under certain circumstances Spain would rather have a Russian ship visit a Spanish port than a NATO ship. In addition, Spanish authorities routinely deny any request by military aircraft from NATO members that arrives or departs the Gibraltar airfield and overflies or lands in Spain.

France: Arming the Russians
It is not only Spain providing support to the Russian navy. The French are literally equipping it as well. France is proceeding with a €1.2 billion ($1.6 billion) defense deal involving the sale of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to the Russian navy. The first ship, named Vladivostok, is due for delivery at the end of the year. The second ship, coincidently named the Sevastopol (the name of the naval base in Crimea, which Russia has just annexed from Ukraine), will follow soon after.

Although France will not be selling any weapons systems with the ships, the ships themselves provide a platform from which an array of offensive military capability and weapons can be deployed. Mistrals can carry 16 helicopters and have a flight deck with six helicopter landing spots. Russian Mistrals are expected to be armed with eight Ka-52K attack helicopters and eight Ka-29 assault transport helicopters. The ships can carry four mechanized landing craft or two hovercrafts, 70 armored vehicles, and up to 450 troops. Each ship comes equipped with advanced communications capabilities that make it capable of operating as a command-and-control vessel and has a 69-bed hospital. Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, the former head of the Russian navy, said that his country would have won the war against Georgia in 2008 in “40 minutes instead of 26 hours” if it had had these ships back then.[3]

France is also hosting Russian sailors to train them to operate the ships. Russia sent 354 sailors and 60 instructors to France in February to undergo training on manning the ship; this first phase of training will be completed at the end of May. The second phase of training, consisting of around 400 troops, will begin in June and last until October.[4]

Although Russia has publicly stated that the two ships will be based with its Pacific fleet, there is no guarantee this will be the case forever—especially considering that the service life of a Mistral-class ship is several decades. The Mistral variant that Russia will be purchasing will have a reinforced hull and special deck-warming devices in order for it to operate in the Arctic Ocean.

Even with Russia’s recent aggression in the Ukraine, France has no plans to cancel the deal. In fact, French politicians have taken a flippant attitude to the deal. The French defense minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, recently claimed that France was only selling “civilian hulls” to Russia.[5] Bruno Le Maire, a former government minister and current member of the French National Assembly, justified continuing with the sale by stating, “It’s the only way to show Vladimir Putin we’re serious.… Putin is playing on Europe’s divisions and hesitations.”[6] Paris is in denial about the potent maritime capability these two platforms will offer the Russian navy.

Pressure from All Sides
French and Spanish support to the Russian navy weakens NATO’s opposition to Russian aggression against Ukraine and projects an image of a divided alliance. The situation requires:

Leadership from the White House. President Obama should make his disappointment about Spain and France’s behavior public. He should also request that each country cease their support to the Russian navy while the crisis in Ukraine continues.
Pressure from Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel should use every opportunity, including the upcoming NATO ministerial meeting in June and the NATO summit in September, to raise this issue with their French and Spanish counterparts.
A coordinated effort with European allies. The Administration should be coordinating with like-minded allies in NATO to apply pressure to force a change in policy in Paris and Madrid.
Action from Congress. It is incumbent on the U.S. Congress to make it clear that French and Spanish support to the Russian navy is unbecoming of a NATO ally.
Completely Unacceptable
It is unacceptable that two major NATO member states would offer support to the Russian navy at a time when Moscow is actively attempting to dismember Ukraine and undermining the security of the Baltic states. The U.S. government should make it clear at the highest levels that it views any support to the Russian navy in terms of equipment sales and port access as completely unacceptable in light of Russian aggression.

—Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow and Daniel Kochis is a Research Assistant in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

* Notícia publicada a The Heritage Foundation. Si França i Espanya volen representar un paper creïble a nivell internacional (cadascuna al seu nivell), farien bé de no trencar files amb els seus aliats.

First Northern Fleet drones taking off*

The new drone unit, which is based under the Fleet’s motorized rifle brigade, has been officially launched, the Russian Armed Forces informs in a press release. The unit includes a series of flying vehicles, with flight capacity ranging from 10 to 150 km. The unmanned aircrafts used are based on the Granat, Zastava and Orlan models.

“Thanks to advanced video and photo equipment, the drones can give their operators accurate information about the movements of enemy forces both at daytime and nighttime”, the Northern Fleet informs.

* Notícia publicada a The Barents Observer. Com hem dit recentment, l'increment de la presència russa a l'Àrtic no és quelcom temporal.

Russia to build network of modern naval bases in Artic*

MOSCOW, April 22 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will build a unified network of naval facilities on its Arctic territories to host advanced warships and submarines as part of a plan to boost protection of the country’s interests and borders in the region, President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday.
“We need to strengthen our military infrastructure. In particular, to create in our part of the Arctic a unified network of naval facilities for new-generation ships and submarines,” the president said at a meeting of Russia’s Security Council.
He said that Russia should boost security at its Arctic borders.
Putin ordered the military in December to boost its presence in the Arctic and complete the development of military infrastructure in the region in 2014.
The Defense Ministry has already announced plans to reopen airfields and ports on the New Siberian Islands and the Franz Josef Land archipelago, as well as at least seven airstrips on the continental part of the Arctic Circle that were mothballed in 1993.
The military is also planning to form a new strategic military command in the Arctic, dubbed the Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command, by the end of 2014.
Putin reiterated that Russia is actively developing this promising region and should have all means for protection of its security and economic interests there.
“The oil and gas production facilities, loading stations and pipelines must be well protected from terrorists and other potential threats,” Putin said.
The Russian president called on experts to defend Russia’s territorial claims to the Arctic shelf, just like they did during this year’s successful claim to 52,000-square-kilometer area in the Sea of Okhotsk off Japan.
“Our experts must act similarly, for bilateral as well as multilateral consultations with Arctic countries’ governments, and safeguard each parcel of the continental shelf in the Russian part of the Arctic, and marine areas,” Putin said.
Moscow filed its claim to a part of the Artic continental shelf including the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges in 2011, but the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf said that it needed further scientific backing.
Scientists have to prove that the underwater ridges are extensions of the Eurasian continent, thus linked to Russia’s territory. The shelf, which is believed to hold some five million tons of hydrocarbon reserves, is a lucrative resource-rich zone.
In line with these territorial ambitions, Putin believes it is necessary to create a separate public body for the implementation of the Russian policy in the Arctic.
“We do not need a cumbersome bureaucratic body, but a flexible operationally working structure that will help better coordinate ministries and departments’ activities, regions and business,” Putin said.
The president tasked the government with ensuring that Russia’s goals in the Arctic are being solved and receive due financing.
“We are going to continue to invest serious funds in the Arctic, to solve tasks needed for social and economic investment of the Arctic regions, to strengthen security as demanded by our long-term national interests,” he said.

*Notícia publicada a RIA Novosti. Per si a algú se li ha oblidat, el buit estratègic acostuma a omplir-se.

RAF jets scrambled to investigate Russian planes*

Fighter jets were scrambled after two Russian military aircraft were spotted approaching UK airspace, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said.

Royal Air Force Typhoon fighter jets took off from RAF Leuchars in Fife on Wednesday.

The jets were sent to investigate the Russian planes, which are understood to have turned away shortly afterwards.

RAF fighter planes were scrambled to incidents such as this eight times last year, an MOD spokesman said.

The spokesman said the jets were launched to "determine the identity of unknown aircraft" that approached the north of Scotland and "could not be identified by other means".

He said: "The aircraft were subsequently identified as Russian military aircraft. The Russian military aircraft remained in international airspace at all times as they are perfectly entitled to do so."

The spokesman added that Russian military flights have never entered UK sovereign airspace without authorisation.

Meanwhile a Royal Navy warship is shadowing a Russian destroyer as it sails past the UK.

HMS Dragon, one of the Navy's most modern warships, sailed from Portsmouth at the end of last week to waters north of Scotland to track the Russian warship, Vice Admiral Kulakov.

HMS Dragon monitored the movements of the Russian ship as she approached British waters in what has been described by a defence spokesman as a "well established and standard response".

Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, said: "Recent events have increased awareness of Russian military activity, but we have always routinely intercepted, identified and escorted Russian air and naval assets that transit international airspace and waters within the UK's 'area of interest'.

"The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force will remain alert and ready to intercept any non-Nato forces in the area."

*Notícia publicada al web de ls BBC. Compartim aquesta notícia per comolementar les anteriors sobre l'activitat rusa a l'Atlàntic nord.

US House approves Frigate Sale to Taiwan

On Monday, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill authorizing the sale of four U.S. frigates to Taiwan, while also officially reaffirming U.S. support for the Taiwan Relations Act days before the 35th anniversary of that legislation. The bill, HR 3470, began with a section underlining the importance of TRA before moving on the specifics of the latest arms sale to Taiwan. “The Taiwan Relations Act has been instrumental in maintaining peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific since its enactment in 1979,” says the bill’s first clause.

The bill, which was introduced by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, passed with “overwhelming bipartisan support,” according to a Foreign Affairs Committee press release. In a statement, Royce said that “America’s support for Taiwan has allowed this island nation to realize its full potential.” He added, “It is now more important than ever that we reaffirm our strong commitment to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act.” Accordingly, the newly-passed bill contained a clause wherein Congress “reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act.”

HR 3470 also authorized the sale to Taiwan of four decommissioned Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates, the USS Taylor, USS Gary, USS Carr, and USS Elrod. The four vessels, commissioned in 1984 and 1985, can support both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Before the transfer of these vessels becomes official, however, the House bill will also need to pass the Senate and be approved by President Obama.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the passage of HR 3470 in a statement, expressing its gratitude for the move. The statement said the bill displayed Congress’ bipartisan support for “trust and friendship” towards Taiwan. The opposition party DPP also weighed in, with Chariman Su Tseng-chang calling the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and U.S. human rights advocacy “indispensable beacons of hope to Taiwan.”

With Thursday marking the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, this week is a time of reflection on the TRA—and not just for Congress. Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou gave a speech on the subject via videoconference at an event at DC’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. He called the TRA “a landmark piece of legislation that has laid the cornerstone of the robust relationship between the Republic of China and the United States.”

Ma also commented that when he came to office in 2008 it was his “top priority to improve Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S.” Ma attributed the improvement in cross-strait relations to strong ties between Taiwan and the U.S.: “With U.S. support, Taiwan has been able to improve cross-strait relations and confidently engage Beijing from a position of strength.” This has generally been the U.S. position as well: that providing Taiwan with defensive arms can increase the island’s ability to deal with the mainland on an equal footing.

Needless to say, China does not share this view. Chinese scholars believe that, since cross-strait relations are at an all-time high, there is no need for further arms sales. Of course, China also believes such sales are a direct violation of the one-China policy and in violation of previous U.S. promises made in joint communiques with Beijing. A spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense told the press back in March, “We urge the U.S. side to adhere faithfully to the one-China policy … and stop arm sales to Taiwan immediately.”

Accordingly, China responded angrily to the passage of HR 3470. A statement from the Ministry of National Defense complained that “The U.S. side ignored China’s strong opposition, and insisted on passing the bill pushing weapons sales to Taiwan.” The statement further warned that the act “doubtless will seriously interfere in and damage the development of Sino-U.S. military ties and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.”

The timing was especially awkward, with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel just finishing up a trip to China designed to boost military ties between the two countries. In the past, mil-to-mil relations have been the major targets of Chinese anger over arms sales. In response to a 2010 $6.4 billion arms sale, the first of Obama’s presidency, China refused to allow then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit China as part of a larger Asia tour.  Should the bill move forward through the Senate and by signed by Obama, China might chose to cut off mil-to-mil contacts in retaliation.

Interestingly, though, the response from China treats the bill as a done deal, even though the bill has currently only passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. The statement from China’s defense ministry elides the distinction between Congress and the White House by accusing the “U.S. side” of ignoring Chinese opposition. Such complaints would have been directed more to the executive branch’s foreign policy apparatus than to Congress itself. Since the U.S. Congress is historically very supportive of Taiwan (and very critical of China, especially on human rights issues), it’s dangerous for China to equate Congressional action with White House policy, especially since Congress today is notorious for resisting Obama’s wishes.

*Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. Si bé les fragates de la classe Perry mai han estat el "cutting edge" de la US Navy, a Beijing no ha agradat gaire la notícia.