Japan’s Biggest Warship Since World War II Enters Service*

(Bloomberg) -- Japan’s armed forces took control of their biggest warship since World War II, underscoring Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s drive to strengthen the nation’s military.

The Izumo, a 19,500-ton helicopter carrier, will improve the Self-Defense Forces’ capacity to deal with submarines, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters after inspecting the ship at the Japan Marine United Corp. shipyard in the port city of Yokohama, near Tokyo. The 248-meter (814-foot) vessel can carry 470 personnel and as many as nine helicopters.

Since taking office in 2012, Abe has reversed a decade-long decline in defense spending, lifted a ban on arms exports and reinterpreted the pacifist constitution to allow Japan to defend other countries. The defense push is adding to tensions with China over a territorial dispute that threatens the trade relationship between Asia’s two largest economies.

“As well as having the capacity to search for submarines itself, it will be able to deal with submarines over a larger area as it’s equipped with a lot of helicopters,” Nakatani said, adding that he wasn’t referring to any specific country.

In May 2013, Japan said it detected submarines navigating under water close to territorial waters near Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures. The government is seeking to toughen the measures Japan can legally take under its pacifist constitution in the event of a “gray zone” situation that doesn’t amount to an armed attack on the nation.

A second ship of the same size and specifications is set to be introduced in early 2018.

The vessels are also capable of carrying Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. Ospreys can take off and land like a helicopter and fly long distances like a fixed-wing plane, giving the ships some of the capabilities of a small aircraft carrier.

Nakatani stressed the Izumo’s capacity to help out in disaster relief and peace-keeping operations.

“China has aircraft carriers,” Nakatani said. “The Izumo isn’t designed to carry fixed-wing aircraft,” he said, adding that Japan wasn’t thinking of operating it like an aircraft carrier.

* Notícia publicada a Bloomberg. Ja havíem fet esment de l'Izumo anteriorment i, si bé els comentaris sobre les seves capacitats ASW són certes, també ho és que no només serveixen per això. Són un portaavions VTOL en potència o, com ja apunta l'article, una plataforma per assalts verticals.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Return of the Catalan Navy: British and Japanese Soft Power in the Mediterranean*

The same week in which the Royal Navy held the naming ceremony for the first of its new carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and in which Tokyo approved a reinterpretation of Article 9 of her Constitution to provide for a measure of collective self-defence, was witness to a little-reported but still significant fact which, by stressing both nations' naval soft power, serves as a reminder of the potential for a renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance as an engine of peace and stability all over the world, including the Mediterranean: a draft blueprint for the return of the Catalan Navy, (lost, together with all other state institutions, by force of arms in 1714) outlining its potential initial shape and capabilities, refers to the Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) when defining “escort duties”, while recommending Catalonia reach an agreement with the United Kingdom whereby the Royal Navy would help train a first generation of naval officers.

 

The adoption of Japanese doctrinal and operational concepts by a Western Navy is a testament of the growing prowess of the MSDF and its prestige in an increasingly wider range of areas. While Japan has not engaged in combat operations since the end of the Second World War, her naval forces have deployed a significant amount of advanced assets, trained intensively, participated in joint drills and cooperated with fellow navies in counter-piracy and anti-terrorism operations, and been responsible (together with the country's Coast Guard) for checking hostile advances into Japanese territorial waters and EEZ. Furthermore, recent years have seen Tokyo help train and equip coastguards in South-East Asia, as a necessary complement to Japan's drive to promote the rule of law at sea and the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. Faced with revisionist threats, both Hanoi and Manila have turned their gaze towards Tokyo. Thus, it should not be surprising to see Japanese influence in the blueprint for a new or rather re-born navy. Rather, it is a small but significant gesture confirming that, despite the mistrust still pervading relations with Beijing and Seoul, a growing number of countries not only recognize the technical abilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) but also see Tokyo as an international actor having much to contribute to global peace and security. Of course, Japan's main strategic focus is, and due to the difficult circumstances in the area will remain in the foreseeable future, the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region, limiting the degree of attention devoted to the Mediterranean. However, this should be no bar to regular exchanges with the reconstituted Catalan Navy, in addition to multinational cooperation arising from, for example, participation in RIMPAC exercises. The 100 anniversary of the Great War, in which the Imperial Japanese Navy played a vital role in the Mediterranean, provides the ideal historical background. In addition, the recent relaxation by Japan of her long-standing ban on weapons exports means that procurement and joint development and production are also areas where Catalonia and Japan may cooperate in the future, in a development facilitated by the already extensive presence of Japanese enterprises in Catalonia.[1] Last, but not least, mentions of the MSDF in Catalonia's unofficial white paper should serve as a reminder, and evidence, that despite the rumblings of many pundits in Japan and some other countries, a clear majority of maritime democracies see Tokyo's move towards collective self-defence as right, both in moral and in practical national security terms. 

Concerning the Royal Navy, seeing her cooperate with the Catalan Navy would be nothing new, but rather a resumption of a process cut short by the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession. After all, it was a combined Anglo-Dutch-Catalan force which took Gibraltar in 1704. It is precisely the Rock which provides one of the best reasons why it is in the British national interest to help train the Catalan Navy, since the stronger and more proficient Catalan naval forces are, the more secure Gibraltar will be.[2] In an uncertain world, you need allies near any potential hot spot. Actually, Japan's reasons to help train and equip the Filipino and the Vietnamese coastguards are very similar to London's rationale for contributing to the re-emergence of the Catalan Navy. As made clear by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the debates leading to Tokyo's adoption of a limited version of collective self-defence, nowadays no country can ignore others in preparing to safeguard the security and well-being of its citizens. In case there is any doubt, the 1982 Falklands War should serve as a reminder of the absolute necessity of being able to rely on regional Allies in order to effectively project power. Thus, even if we leave history and shared values (including parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, Catalonia's and England's being the two oldest parliaments in Europe) out of the equation, national security considerations in and by themselves should suffice for London to take a keen interest in the re-emergence of the Catalan Navy. 

To conclude, it is no coincidence that in laying down plans to recover her navy, Catalonia refers to Great Britain and Japan, two island democracies that once stood side by side to defence peace and stability and the rule of law at sea and that today are increasingly working together with these same purposes in mind. Both the Royal Navy and the MSDF have much to teach, and their experience and traditions are invaluable, while London, Tokyo, and Barcelona, share a commitment to parliamentary democracy, the rule of law at sea, and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with International Law. Furthermore, it is in the national interest of any country to help fellow (and in particular nearby) maritime democracies develop their naval and coastguard capabilities, above all when revisionist actors threaten to use force to redraw borders, in contravention of international law. As clear from the Falklands War, regional allies are essential, a lesson not lost on Japan, which has come to the aid of Vietnam and the Philippines in their hour of need, in a move contributing to her own national security. Now the time has come for the Royal Navy help train the Catalan Navy out of the same considerations, with Japan's MSDF ideally also lending a hand.

Alex Calvo is an expert on security and defence in Asia 

[1] In the early 1980s, when many European countries were hostile to foreign direct investment (FDI), British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Catalan counterpart Jordi Pujol were the only ones actively seeking Japanese FDI, in a move later imitated by many. 

[2] For an outline of some of the harassment endured by the Rock in recent years, see the report by the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee.

* Article publicat a Help Catalonia. Compartim aquest article del professor Àlex Calvo. Reflexions interessants per no oblidar que recuperar la sobirania implica consciència geopolítica i, no cal dir-ho, responsabilitat.

Colors dels Llúria, que s'adoptaren com els de la Marina Catalana

Australia and Japan to Ink Submarine Deal*

Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Tony Abbott will sign an agreement to open up cooperation on producing submarines.

As Clint noted earlier today, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is making the rounds throughout Oceania this week.

Abe’s stopover in Australia is expected to be particularly significant for many reasons that Clint discussed. However, the security aspects of the Abe’s Australia visit deserve special attention.

In particular, on Tuesday Abe and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott are expected to sign an agreement that will allow the two countries to cooperate on the production of submarines. According to Australian news sources, under the agreement “Japanese-designed submarines could be built under license in Adelaide or even straight off the shelf from Japan.”

As The Diplomat has covered for some time, Australia has long been exploring the best options for its next generation submarines. After ruling out a nuclear-powered submarine, in May 2012 the then-Labor Party government announced four possible options:

• An existing off-the-shelf foreign design.
• A modified off-the-shelf foreign design
• An evolved Collins-class design
• Development of a completely new submarine design in Australia

Last year, however, in a move that saw widespread criticism, the Australian government ruled out the first two options.

The fact that the Abbott government is now exploring cooperation with Japan therefore represents a change in policy.

There were signs that this was coming. Most notably, during a trip to Japan last month, Australian Defense Minister David Johnston became the first non-Japanese minister to tour one of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) stealthy, diesel powered Soryu-class submarines.

“Australia is looking to strengthen our defense cooperation with Japan by examining ways to enhance our cooperation in the field of defense science and technology,” a spokesperson for Defense Minister Johnston said at the time. Johnston himself reportedly called the Soryu-class submarines the best conventional submarines in the world.

At the same time, noting Australia’s engagement with the U.S. and European countries on submarine technology, Johnston noted, “We are casting a wide net to get the best chance of acquiring a really decent submarine for Australia that will last for decades.”

Still, the Soryu-class subs offer many advantages to Australia. At 84 meters and 4,200 tons (submerged), they are the largest non-nuclear conventional submarines in the world. They are also equipped with a unique Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system that allows them to stay submerged indefinitely, according to Australian news reports. This would be advantageous to a country like Australia that has a wide area of sea to cover.

The agreement to be signed this week will focus on marine hydrodynamics with the possibility of that joint venture leading to a more substantial agreement. Australia has pledged to spend A$40 billion ($37 billion) to replace its current fleet of Collins-class submarines. A final decision on what type of submarine to pursue is expected to be made early next year.

* Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. La cooperació entre el Japó i Austràlia, no cal dir-ho, té implicacions importants de cara a l'equilibri de forces al Pacífic. En el cas dels submarins, amdúes nacions tenen molt bona reputació.

Drop the double standard on Japanese defense*

Japan is currently in the midst of a domestic political debate about whether or not it can participate in collective defense with the United States. This raises the question whether the time might be right for the international community to drop the double standard that it applies to the military roles and capabilities of the Japanese defense forces (SDF).

This double standard derives from Japan’s war history and holds that Japan presents a perennial risk of revived militaristic nationalism. It therefore judges Japan’s military activities much more critically than those of other neighboring states. It mistakenly assumes that a militarily more powerful Japan must necessarily become a threat to the rest of Asia rather than a stabilizing influence, and that Japan, even in the midst of provocative actions by other states, particularly China, must refrain from any new military commitments.

Japan has followed a slow, incremental and politically fraught path to defense normalization spanning decades. Both the Japanese people and the international community have demanded a high standard of justification for even the most modest addition to the functions of the Japanese military, even when these additional roles have not involved the use of force, such as providing logistical support for UN peacekeeping operations and rear area support for U.S. forces under the defense cooperation guidelines.

The constitutional and legal strictures under which the Japanese defense forces operate continue to impose some of the tightest rules and regulations on any military in the world. First and foremost, what the SDF are permitted to do and where must conform to the long-standing interpretation of Article 9 (Peace Clause) of the Japanese Constitution. Second, and by no means less importantly, what the SDF can do is strictly controlled by legislation. If laws, including the SDF Law, do not authorize a particular function, then it is proscribed. The legal basis for SDF action means that the domestic political requirements for major changes in Japanese defense policy are that new proposals be incorporated into legislation and formally approved by a majority in the Diet. These democratic processes of lawmaking have, in the past, helped to ensure that despite the desires of some Japanese leaders to push the boundaries of SDF action, changes have been limited to piecemeal advances.

The question now is whether, how and to what extent due political process will circumscribe the ambitions of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to expand the roles of the Japanese military forces, including authorization of a collective defense role. The convoluted and extended discussion currently being conducted in Japan on this question illustrates once again the tortuous political process that each step towards Japan’s defense normalization must take.

The formal-legal requirements of defense policy change sit alongside an additional, compelling political constraint – the need for support from the so-called “national defense consensus.” Inevitably, proposals for change elicit strong opposition from sections of the general public and media, and from political groups, including political parties, stemming from an entrenched “culture of antimilitarism.”

Not surprisingly, politically entrenched pacifist elements in Japanese society and politics have surfaced to hold the Abe administration to account. Objections to the Japanese military forces participating in collective defense are even being raised openly by senior members of Abe’s own government. The path forward will not be smooth.

In this context, it is important to maintain the distinction between militarism and expanded military roles and capabilities. They are not the same thing. Prewar Japanese militarism was built into the very ethos of the state. The 1934 “Basic Principles of Japanese Defense and Proposal for Defense Buildup” declared that “war is the father of creation and the mother of culture.”

Postwar, militarism has been excised from state ethos and replaced with the peace ethos of Article 9. Perhaps this explains why Japanese pacifists hold the spirit of the Constitution so close to their hearts. They bear in mind the maxim of former Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka who said in 1970, “Militarism is a ghost that we must always watch closely.” The Japanese people watch this ghost closely and so continue to distrust military and political leaders who are historical revisionists such as Shinzo Abe. They accuse the prime minister of wanting to attack the Constitution in order to “shake free of the postwar regime.” In their view, because Abe sees the Constitution as a symbol of the postwar order that was imposed by the occupation forces, he regards it as in need of amendment in order for the Japanese people to regain pride. In this way, Abe has put himself on the “watch” list.

The argument about Abe’s unhidden agenda to change the constitution may have a point. What is qualitatively different about the current plan for Japan to assume a collective defense role is that it proposes to dump a long-standing (since 1981) interpretation of Article 9, which permits the Japanese military to act only to defend Japan in the event that it is attacked directly and to use the minimum necessary level of military force to do so – the absolutely fundamental principle of “exclusively defensive defense” that is deemed compatible with Article 9 and which permits Japan to maintain military forces. This makes the debate about Japan’s assuming a collective defense role significantly more consequential compared with previous additions to SDF roles, which did not challenge this fundamental principle to anything like the same degree.

What is more, the major change in interpretation would be made by the cabinet rather than through any processes involving the Diet or the voters, which places the Constitution itself under possible future threat of revision by reinterpretation rather than by undergoing the formal (and politically difficult) amendment procedure. Abe and his clique of historical revisionists, including Minister of Education Hakubun Shimomura, National Public Safety Commission Chairman Keiji Furuya, and Minister of State for Regulatory Reform Tomomi Inada, could use the change in constitutional interpretation not only as a precedent but also as a stepping-stone to achieving formal amendment of the Constitution itself. Abe has justified his advocacy of collective defense by saying that “under the current Constitution, we can’t participate in combat outside the country, and so it [the Constitution] cannot protect the people’s lives.” In other words, exclusively defensive defense is no longer sufficient to protect Japan. Superficially this is a powerful argument, but it does not stand up to close scrutiny. Participating in combat “outside the country” does not necessarily enhance Japan’s ability to defend itself. In fact, it may endanger Japan’s security further by drawing it into a conflict that it might otherwise have avoided.

On the other hand, while Abe and others who support his goals have certainly been assertive in their ambitions to shake off Japan’s historical legacy, there is a world of difference between what they are proposing and Japan’s prewar military expansionism. The government must observe due political process and remains politically accountable to a population that is steadfastly cautious and anti-militarist, and would never countenance military action that was anything more than legitimate self-defense in the face of an increasingly dangerous regional environment.

It is also important to separate Abe’s personal motives from a dispassionate and objective assessment of what Japan needs to do in order to deal with new kinds of security threat. The collective defense proposals include others that affect areas where Japan’s own ability to defend itself is debatable. The question remains whether Japan has the capability to deal with “grey zone” threats to remote islands in the Southwest, which fall between the cracks of permissible SDF and Japan Coast Guard functions.

As a gesture to solidify the alliance with the United States, Japanese participation in collective defense is also important. Indeed, the political value of collective defense to Japan may outweigh its security value in an alliance context. It is designed to elicit a stronger U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, particularly to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. It is ironic that a potentially significant development in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is occurring at a time when the current American and Japanese administration basically don’t like each other. In particular, figures close to the prime minister view the Obama administration coldly and, to some extent, the feeling is mutual. The White House is wary of the Abe administration because of America’s vested interest in regional stability and the record of extreme Chinese reactions to Abe’s symbolic gestures of historical revisionism (by, for example, visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo) as well as Japanese unwillingness to acknowledge a sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu.

Aurelia George Mulgan is professor of Japanese Politics, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. Author of six books on Japanese politics (the latest “Ozawa Ichiro and Japanese Politics: Old Versus New,” Nissan/Routledge 2014).

* Notícia publicada a The Diplomat. Interessant reflexió que, malgrat les enormes diferències entre la història del Japó i la del nostre país ens porten a la conclusió que el pacifisme(tot i poder ser una idea lloable) ens condueix a situacions de greu risc.

Navy’s standard flies again on wreck of sunken battle-cruiser Repulse*

The White Ensign flies again on one of the most hallowed sites in Royal Navy history. Fifty-seven metres beneath the South China Sea Lt Adam Bolton admires the Royal Navy’s standard fixed to the wreck of battle-cruiser HMS Repulse, sunk by the Japanese 73 years ago

The reservist from HMS Vivid in Plymouth and fellow diver/photographer Mike Robinson fulfilled the wishes of the survivors’ association to return to the battered remains of the Repulse, one of two capital ships around which Force Z was formed in 1941 to deter Japanese aggression in the Far East.

Not only did the two vessels fail to curb Tokyo’s ambitions, but they were also pounced upon by Japanese bombers when they sailed from Singapore to attack enemy ships supporting landings on the Malay Peninsula.

After evading nearly 20 torpedoes, Repulse – which was built in WW1 and served extensively in the Mediterranean between the wars – was struck four or five times in quick succession, despite her gunners damaging or downing 15 Japanese aircraft.

After just 70 minutes of battle, the 25-year-old ship succumbed to her wounds, capsized and sank, taking more than 500 souls with her - ​just under half the ship’s company.

The Prince of Wales survived for another hour before she too tank about eight miles to the east.

In all, around 840 officers and men – including the task force commander Tom Phillips and flagship captain John Leach – lost their lives. Repulse’s captain, Bill Tennant, survived and became one of the architects of the Normandy invasion.

The wrecks of both vessels have been visited fairly regularly since being discovered by Royal Navy divers in the mid-1960s – although the Prince of Wales has generally received the bulk of the attention.

Adam and Mike made five dives on the Repulse and despite fairly poor visibility – around four metres – the duo were able to make a fairly comprehensive survey of the lost leviathan.

“Repulse is still a very imposing sight and it was a great honour to replace the Ensign on behalf of the survivors’ association,” said Adam.

“The wreck is still in good condition overall, lying on her port side in 57 metres of water. One of the 15in turrets is still facing out pointing the massive barrels up to the sky.

“The rest of the secondary armament on the port side is all visible. The seabed is littered with live ammunition – mainly pom-pom rounds and some 4in shells are clearly visible.”

Sadly, despite the sanctity of the site – both ships are protected war graves – the Repulse has suffered at the hands of ruthless salvage hunters; pre-nuclear-era steel is particularly valuable.

These scrap dealers have removed two propellers and caused substantial damage to aft, using explosives around the shafts.

All images are courtesy of Mike Robinson, Wreckferret Photography. You can see more of Mike’s haunting photography of the wreck of the Repulse at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/93805587@N03/with/14038097668/

* Notícia publicada al web de la Royal Navy. Al Regne Unit hi ha un gran respecte per als caiguts en combat, tant per part de les institucions públiques com per associacions ciutadanes. Una noble tradició que els catalans hem d'anar recuperant. També un sentit record per les tripulacions del HMS Repulse i l'HMS Prince of Wales.

We shall fight them on the beaches: Japan looks at UK for inspiration as she readies for amphibious drills*

Japan is taking a major step forward in her deterrence strategy, conducting a large-scale amphibious drill designed to put on display her ability to reconquer an island.

This follows Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's repeated references to the Falklands in his speeches, a polite and indirect, yet unequivocal way, of warning China that an invasion of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu for Beijing) would be met with an amphibious counterstrike. This was crowned by his recent meeting with Falklands veteran His Royal Highness the Duke of York. On the political and diplomatic side the drills are designed to show that Tokyo is not standing alone should that scenario materialize. Japan has already succeeded in getting the United States to acknowledge that the bilateral security treaty covers indeed the Senkaku Islands, following a certain ambiguity and conflicting public statements in the past. Next step is to show that Japanese and US forces are interoperable and could work together in such a campaign. All of this while developing a Japanese amphibious capability. However, there is still the nagging question whether a successful and relatively bloodless landing by Beijing may prompt some voices in the US to claim the islands are no longer under Tokyo's effective control and therefore outside the scope of an automatic response in support of Japan. Should Japan fear that scenario Tokyo's next logical step may be to deploy land troops. While it is not clear yet whether that step will ever be taken, Japan is deploying, as part of the drills, anti-ship missiles with which to close the First Island Chain to Chinese shipping.

Japan's growing amphibious capabilities. The creation of specialized units and facilities in this field is one of the aspects of Japan's defense reorientation following the end of the Cold War and the growing might of the Chinese Navy. The idea is to develop a capability to deploy in contested islands in the event of a major crisis, and to retake them if necessary.

With that need in view, Tokyo decided to develop a specialized force, mentored by the US Navy and Marine Corps. The force will comprise contingents from the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and include different units covering a range of capabilities, from infantry to maritime transportation, and including the necessary air support. This specialized force is seen as necessary, among others, because the disputed territories are far not only from existing military facilities, but from civilian infrastructure able to support operations.

Until 2012, Japan considered marines to be offensive in nature and thus falling outside the scope of Article 9 of her constitution. The current government interpretation of the text is that it allows defensive, but not offensive, weapons, a distinction not always easy to make in practice. Finally, last year the cabinet came to the conclusion that Japanese law allowed marines units to be created and deployed. The unit selected to serve as the core, the seed, of this amphibious capability was the Western Army Infantry Regiment (WAIR), based in Nagasaki. This location facilitates its quick embarkation on MDSF (Maritime Self-Defence Forces) ships at Nagasaki/Sasebo or on V-22 Ospreys from nearby air bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki. From this core, Japanese amphibious capabilities are expected to expand.

Despite its name, the WAIR is, broadly speaking, of battalion size. It is made up of at least three infantry companies. Its table of equipment is that of a light infantry unit, with weapons no heavier than 84mm Carl Gustav recoil-less rifles (employed by the Royal Marines against ARA Guerrico in the defense of South Georgia) and French MO-120-RT 120mm towed mortars. Tokyo announced recently that it would be buying up to six AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles. Traditionally the WAIR's only vehicles were light trucks.

Concerning air support, up to now the WAIR has not had at its disposal any dedicated, specialized, collocated, air unit. Traditionally, it has relied on helicopters from the 1st Aviation Brigade, with headquarters near Tokyo. For example, during the June 2013 Dawn Blitz drills, which took place in Southern California, this brigade provided AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook helicopters. Now Tokyo is pondering the possibility of purchasing organic air transport for her marines, in the shape of up to 20 V-22 Ospreys. This may allow the WAIR to quickly move to the Senkaku Islands in the event of a crisis. The Ospreys are however somewhat controversial in Japan, with certain opposition due to past accidents.

With regard to naval means, here we can observe how, in spite the very recent decision to develope specialized marine units, Japan has long enjoyed a sizable capability when it comes to amphibious ships. The MSDF's three Oosumi class vessels are considered to be Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs) and feature full-length flight decks and a well deck. Each can transport almost a battalion of infantry, plus tanks and other vehicles. Each of these ships can carry two American-built Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), Japan having six of them. Tokyo also has a dozen medium-sized landing crafts, each able to transport around 30 tons of equipment or up to 80 marines from the ship to shore. To the Oosumi class we must add the Hyuga class, officially described as “helicopter destroyers” but similar in look and capabilities to light carriers. Each can carry up to 14 or 16 helicopters, and it probably would not be too difficult to convert them to operate VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) planes like the F-35-B which the UK is buying for her Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, currently under construction. Although media reports do not usually refer to this, the question remains in the air whether the budding defense cooperation between London and Tokyo may include at some point future assistance in developing such a capability. It may be a door left open. Similar to the French Mistral class and American Iwo Jima class in their versatility, the Hyuga Class, of which a third vessel is under construction, provides a very strong addition to Japan's amphibious capabilities. This, while able to serve in a variety of different roles. Writing for the Asahi Shimbun on the occasion of the launch in August 2013 of the second ship in the class, the Izumo, Alessio Patalano (King's College London), one of the top experts on Japanese Naval Affairs, made this clear. Patalano stressed her design had multiplied “the Izumo’s operational flexibility and versatility so that it can be used in the defense of offshore islands, to rescue nationals overseas and as a command ship in expeditionary or relief missions” and adding that “In relief operations after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, for example, the helicopter destroyer Hyuga was deployed precisely in that type of function”.

We can thus see how, out of the three pillars of Tokyo's amphibious forces, the maritime one is probably the strongest. The marine component is currently under development, and in the air there is still a lack of specialized units and equipment, with Tokyo pondering the purchase of V-22 Ospreys.

Concerning US assistance in the process, Washington may be interested not only in helping Tokyo reinforce her military capabilities as a complement to her own “Pivot to the Pacific”, which rests in no small measure on a strengthening of the naval capabilities of key allies and partners such as the Philippines and Japan, but also in opening the door to a Japanese contribution to US-led amphibious operations. This was stressed by Kyle Mizokami in his recent piece on “Japan’s Amphibious Buildup” for the United States Naval Institute News. Mizokami wrote “Under the tutelage of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, Japan is slowly but surely building up a credible, flexible amphibious force capable of responding to national emergencies. Highly trained with a high level of mobility, it could eventually become the equal of both. The force will not only be highly useful in Japan’s territorial disputes, it will likely be a excellent partner for their American counterparts in joint operations”.

Recently writing in the Asahi Shimbun, Koji Sonoda explained that according to Japanese Defense Ministry sources “The creation of a Japanese version of U.S. Marines will be included in the National Defense Program Guidelines to be compiled in December”, adding that “The amphibious force will be set up as early as fiscal 2015”. Sonoda said that these sources had revealed the target size of the force to be 3,000. Four of the specialized craft mentioned earlier would be purchased in the current fiscal year, and the remaining two in Fiscal 2014.

The coming drills: ships, jets, and 34,000 troops. Japan's Defense Ministry has announced a large-scale military exercise designed to bolster the country's ability to protect her remote islands, claimed by other nations. AFP quoted a ministry official who explained that the war games would feature “destroyers, fighter jets and 34,000 troops”, adding that they would involve “live-firing”. The “air-sea-land drill” will be held from 1 to 18 November. It will comprise “amphibious landings on the uninhabited atoll of Okidaitojima, 400 kilometres southeast of the main Okinawan island”.

In a statement, the SDF joint staff said that the drill was aimed at “maintaining and improving the joint operational abilities of the Self-Defense Forces in armed-attack situations”, adding that it would feature “a series of actions in defending islands” including combined operations in landings.

According to the Asahi and Fuji TV networks, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are pondering the deployment of short-range anti-ship missiles on Ishigaki, an island 150 kilometers away from the Senkaku-Diayu. Both sources added that there were no plans to conduct live-fire exercises in Ishigaki. The deployment was later confirmed by US private intelligence firm Stratfor.

Closing the First Island Chain: the Long Shadow of HMS Glamorgan. The decision to deploy anti-ship missiles in the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako-jima was the aspect of the drills most clearly stressed by Straftor. Although the “Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles” will not be tested, Stratfor believes that “their deployment is important because stationing batteries of Type 88 missiles in such a way would effectively put the entire passage between Okinawa-jima and Miyako-jima under the coverage of Japanese land-based surface-to-ship missiles”. The commentary notes that while Tokyo denies aiming this deployment at anyone in particular, “the Chinese navy is increasingly using the same passage through the first island chain and into the Pacific” and as a result “the deployment is sure to send a strong message to Beijing”.

Stratfor concludes that Japan's drills and anti-ship missile deployments “show that, despite some Chinese military claims of having 'dismembered' the first island chain as an obstacle”, transiting it “in peacetime is entirely different from attempting the same feat during a conflict with Japan”.

The potential of shore-based anti-ship missiles became clear in the closing stages of the 1982 Falklands War, when Argentinian forces launched an improvised Exocet missile (taken from the above mentioned ARA Guerrico) against the Royal Navy's HMS Glamorgan, damaging her extensively and taking her out of action. While not as well known as the other two successful instances of Buenos Aires' use of this weapons system during that war, from the air against HMS Sheffield and SS Atlantic Conveyor, it was duly noted by both Chinese and Japanese naval planners. Recent Filipino commentary on how to protect waters claimed by China has also featured discussions on mobile shore-based missiles, possible camouflaged in some of that country's extensive jungle areas. Taiwan is also another country considering the potential of this kind of weapons system, one of the “asymmetrical” technologies that many voices are urging Taipei to adapt, given the growing gap in conventional naval capabilities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Japan's accompanying public relations (PR) offensive. The announcement of the drills went hand in hand with that of a renewed exercise in public diplomacy, with Japan releasing some videos, and announcing the coming publication of others, defending Tokyo's position in the island disputes with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. AFP informed that “In its latest volley, the foreign ministry has produced two 90-second videos stating its case for ownership of the two disputed island groups and posted them on its YouTube site”. It added that both clips were in Japanese and that they would be followed by versions in other languages, “including Chinese and Korean”. AFP quoted a Foreign Affairs Ministry (FOMA) official as saying that “We are also preparing three other short movies on the Senkaku islands and one on the issue of Takeshima,” the later refers to islets under South Korean control, which Seoul calls Dokdo. The official explained that the FOMA had earmarked 120 million yen in the current fiscal year to produce such films, adding that “It is important that the international community obtain correct understanding over situations surrounding Japan including territories”.

Both Beijing and Seoul reacted strongly to this move. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying insisted once more that the Senkaku Islands belonged to Beijing, adding that “Whatever propaganda tools Japan employs to support its illegal claim, it will not change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China”. Chunying said “We strongly urge the Japanese side to correct its attitude, stop all provocative words and actions and make concrete efforts for the proper management and resolution of the question of the Diaoyu Islands”. On the other hand, Seoul lodged a formal diplomatic protest over the Youtube video, summoning a senior Japanese embassy official on 26 October.

At the time of writing, the Japanese MOFA's Youtube channel still contained the two Japanese-language video clips only. The one on the Senkaku Islands had been viewed by 258,577 people, and the one on Takeshima/Dokdo by 406,895.

From “Three Blocks” to “Three Islands”, or the thin line between police and the military. Since an invasion of the Senkaku Islands could take place at the hands not only of a conventional military force, but also of unarmed activists supported by naval and air units, a question which we may ask ourselves is: Does Tokyo have the capability to use non-lethal force to recover control of a contested islands? One of the most difficult challenges of contemporary war fighting is the need to be prepared for very different scenarios, and to prevail in all of them at the same time. It is what the US Marine Corps calls the “Three-Block” doctrine. It does not suffice to be able to employ brute force, like a doctor, sometimes resorting to surgery, sometimes just prescribing a pill or some exercise, modern Armed Forces are called upon to be ready to resort to a wide range of tools. Confronting an entrenched unit of the PLA, ready to open fire, is not the same as confronting a group of Chinese activists, with the usual addition of a few Hong Kong and Taiwan “compatriots”, with their placards and slogans. Are Japan's Self-Defense Forces ready to react to both scenarios, and even to both in different islands at the same time? Do they have the necessary training, equipment, and doctrine for this? Is the recovery of an island in the hands of unarmed activists backed up by naval and air forces included in the coming drills? These are questions that need to be asked. The US Marine Corps itself has recognized the need to acquire a police capability, one of the lessons learned in Iraq, setting up a battalion of reservists who are police officers in their daily life.

The British factor: A renewed Anglo-Japanese Alliance? While it is the United States that constitute the main target for Japan's diplomacy when it comes to securing support for its stance on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, we cannot but fail to note the growing significance of the United Kingdom in Tokyo's discourse. We have already noted Shinzo Abe's frequent references to the Falklands, but this may just be the tip of the iceberg. A recent two-day security conference at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security (RUSI)'s Tokyo Branch, featured none other than the Duke of York, a veteran of the 1982 war, with Shinzo Abe as the keynote speaker. It is interesting to note how, within the division of duties in the British Royal Family, the Duke of York is in charge of export and investment promotion. So again we find what is fast becoming Shinzo Abe's trademark combination of economic and security issues. The message was dual: working to increase trade and investment links with another advanced economy, and sending the signal that just like the UK in 1982 force would be met with force. All in the most deniable way of course, but the message was there.
The conference was titled “Rejuvenating UK-Japan relations for the 21st century” and was jointly organized by RUSI and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. It took place in Tokyo from 30 September to 1 October 2013. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe attended the event, delivering a keynote address and meeting the Duke of York. The 400th anniversary of UK-Japan relations seems to be providing cover for Japan's deterrence diplomacy. Next year, the 100 anniversary of the First World War, where Japan and the UK fought together, may provide further opportunities for the Japanese prime minister to send subtle messages to China and to Tokyo's allies. In his speech, Abe already noted how the Japanese Imperial Navy came to be known as “the guardian of the Mediterranean”. Can Japan combine a no-nonsense approach to national security without incurring excessive military spending and/or prompting accusations of militarism at home and abroad? That is a key question, and one on which the Japanese Government seems to be looking to the UK as a possible role model, to some extent going back to the old days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the old days when Japan was respected as a regional power without being seen as an outcast and a bully as in the 1930s.

Conclusions. The drills announced by Tokyo are significant, and not just due to the large number of personnel involved, but above all because they signal a clear determination to show the world, both to allies and to potential foes, that Japan is back as a major naval power and that she is developing a serious amphibious capability, together with the ability to close off key naval passages at a time of conflict. There is little doubt that the Japanese military are professional and skilled and that they can easily acquire new capabilities. However, what is equally important for Tokyo, perhaps even more so, is to integrate the securing of national objectives such as the defense of the Senkaku Islands with the defense of wider interests and values such as freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and the peaceful solution to territorial disputes. Since becoming prime minister for a second time Shinzo Abe has devoted much time and effort to this, and it has become a constant in his speeches. Growing links to the UK are part of this strategy, since that country displays many of the characteristics that Japan is seeking, being an ally of the US with significant military capabilities and sizable soft power. Furthermore, referring to the UK and her past defense of the rule of law in the South Atlantic is an attractive way of stressing that Japan's rearmament and normalization are meant to benefit, not hinder, the national interest of other countries. Thus, beyond the development of technical capabilities and doctrines, this is and remains Shinzo Abe's main challenge, together with economic recovery: portraying Japan's reemergence in the security arena as that of a force for good, going back to the old days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when Japan was known as the “Britain of the Far East” and leaving behind the negative legacy of the 1930s and the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Second World War. If Abe succeeds in this and in getting the Japanese economy to grow sustainably again, his legacy will be assured.




Alex Calvo, an expert on security and defence in the Asia-Pacific Region, is currently guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan)

* Article publicat al CEEC. Interessantíssim anàlisi del professor Àlex Calvo sobre els canvis en les JSDF.

Three Japanese warships in Da Nang *

 

Three Japanese warships arrived at Tien Sa port based in the central Da Nang city on Saturday for a two-day visit to help forge closer links with Vietnam’s naval force.
The squadron comprises training vessel Japanese Defense Ship (JDS) Kashima, two destroyers JDS Shirayuki and JDS Isoyuki, and 750 officers and crew members.
The ships belong to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Training Squadron. Rear Admiral Fumiyuki Kitagawa, who leads the squadron, said that this visit is part of activities marking the 40^th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Japan.
During their stay in Da Nang, the squadron’s members will meet the city’s leaders, jointly participate in sea rescue training with local naval forces, and visit some tourist attractions.

* Notícia publicada a tuoitree news. Compartim aquesta notícia per com a seguiment de la ruta de l'Esquadra d'Instucció Japonesa, ara al Vietnam.

La Escuadra de Instrucción japonesa en Barcelona

 

La flotilla de instrucción de la Fuerza Marítima de Autodefensa de Japón recaló en la ciudad condal durante su viaje de circunnavegación
  
28/08/2013.- Entre los días 26 y 29 de agosto permanece atracada en el puerto de Barcelona la Escuadra de Instrucción de la Fuerza Marítima de Autodefensa de Japón (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force o JMSDF). La flotilla está al mando del contralmirante Fumiyuki Kitagawa, y se compone del buque escuela «Kashima» y los destructores «Isoyuki» y «Shirayuki», ambos de la clase «Hatsuyuki», éste último fue convertido en buque escuela en 2011.

El Japan Training Squadron zarpó de Tokio el 22 de mayo y tiene prevista la arribada al mismo puerto el 30 de octubre, dando la vuelta al mundo y recorriendo alrededor de 30.000 millas. Visitarán 18 paises atracando en los puertos de Pearl Harbor (EEUU); Manzanillo (México); Panamá (Panamá); Halifax (Canadá); Portsmouth (Gran Bretaña); Helsinki (Finlandia); San Peterburgo (Rusia); Gdynia (Polonia); Kiel (Alemania); Brest (Francia); Barcelona (España); Tarento (Italia); Split (Croacia); Yibuti; Colombo (Sri Lanka); Yangon (Myanmar); Sihanoukville (Camboya) y Da Nang (Vietnam), desde la cual regresarán a Tokio finalizando su viaje de instrucción.

Como dato anecdótico, durante la jornada del lunes 26 la flotilla de la JMSDF compartió muelles en la dársena barcelonesa con otra iniciativa de origen japonés, el denominado Peace Boat o Buque de la Paz, se trata de un buque de crucero auspiciado por una ONG nipona que también se encuentra realizando su vuelta al mundo.

El buque escuela 3508 «Kashima», es una nave especialmente diseñada para su empleo como unidad docente en la flota de la JMSDF. Su construcción fue autorizada en 1991, aunque la situación bélica vivida en aquellas fechas (Guerra del Golfo), retrasó en dos años el inicio de su construcción. Se trata de un buque de 4.050 toneladas de desplazamiento a plena carga; con eslora total de 143 metros, manga de 18 metros y calado de 4,6 metros. La propulsión es CODOG, es decir combinada diesel o turbinas de gas, compuesta por 2 motores diesel Mitsubishi S16U-MTK de 8.000 hp y 2 turbinas de gas Rolls-Royce Spey tipo SM1C de 26.150 shp cada una. Alcanza una velocidad máxima de 25 nudos y cuenta con una autonomía de 7.000 millas náuticas navegando a una velocidad de crucero de 18 nudos.

Tiene una dotación de 220 personas y puede transportar 140 alumnos en camarotes dobles, incluyendo personal femenido. A pesar de su condición de buque docente, dispone de un sistema defensivo compuesto por un cañón bivalente OTO-Melara de 76/62 mm, 2 ametralladoras de 12,7mm y 2 montajes triples de tubos lanzatorpedos antisubmarinos Mk-68 de 324 mm.

En popa cuenta con una amplia cubierta de vuelo para helicópteros aunque en su diseño se pensó también como plataforma multifunción para la realización de instrucción, ejercicio físico, uso ceremonial y actividades similares.

A pesar de su conversión a buque escuela el destructor 3517 «Shirayuki» mantiene el mismo equipamiento que su hermano gemelo 127 «Isoyuki» (Foto: Javier Sánchez García / Revista Naval)
La clase completa se compuso de 12 destructores, una de las numerosas y homogéneas series de la actual flota de autodefensa japonesa, construidos a lo largo de la década de 1980. En la actualidad sólo persisten siete unidades en su función original, habiendo sido convertidos en buques escuela los destructores «Shimayuki» 3513 (ex 133), desde el 18/03/1999; «Shirayuki» 3517 (ex 123), desde el 15/03/2011; y «Setoyuki» 3518 (ex 131), desde el 14/03/2012. Causando baja los «Hatsuyuki» 122 (25/06/2010) y «Hamayuki» 126 (14/03/2012).

Estos buques fueron diseñados originalmente con la superestructura de aluminio, siguiendo los pasos de otras unidades construidas en aquellas fechas, pero al comprobarse los daños sufridos por buques de la Royal Navy durante la guerra de las Malvinas (1982) por el uso de este metal y sus graves consecuencias al inflamarse, se tomó la decisión de sustituirlo en la construcción por el acero clásico, con lo que partir del «Yamayuki» 129 los buques desplazan 100 toneladas más.

Por lo demás,  estos buques tienen un desplazamiento a plena carga de 4.000 toneladas, siendo sus dimensiones de: 130 metros de eslora, 13,60 metros de manga y 4,10 metros de calado. Tienen un grupo propulsor del tipo COGOG (combinación Gas/Gas) compuesto por dos turbinas de gas Kawasaki-Rolls Royce Olympus TM3B y otras dos RR-Kawasaki RM-1C que desarrollan una potencia total de 45.000 hp (TM3B) y 9.900 hp (RM1C), siendo utilizadas para alcanzar una velocidad máxima de 30 nudos o de crucero 16 nudos, respectivamente.

Estos destructores pueden enfrentarse a cualquier tipo de amenaza, para ello cuentan con un sistema defensivo artillero compuesto por un cañón OTO-Melara 76/62 mm y dos cañones de defensa de punto CIWS Phalanx de 20 mm. Un componente misilístico formado por dos lanzadores cuádruples de misiles antibuque Harpoon, un lanzador RIM-7 Mk 29 Sea Sparrow y un lanzador óctuple para cohetes antisubmarinos ASROC. Además cuentan con dos montajes triples HOS-301 de 324 mm ASW y las instalaciones necesarias para operar con un helicóptero ASW SH-60J.

Disponen de un sofisticado equipamiento electrónico dotado con radares de fabricación japonesa OPS-14 exploración/búsqueda aérea y OPS-18 exploración/búsqueda superficie, entre otros. Un sónar antisubmarino OQS-4 (de casco) un sistema OQR-1 TACTASS y los equipos de guerra electrónica NOLR-6C ESM y OLT-3 ECM. También cuentan con un sistema lanzaseñuelos de origen estadounidense SRBOC Mk 36. El sistema de combate OYQ-5 TDPS (LINK-14) es una versión japonesa del estadounidense NTDS utilizado por los buques de la US Navy. La dotación de estos buques de 200 personas.

* Notícia publicada a Revista Naval. Encara que l'article ja tingui un parell de setmanes, l'hem volgut compartir per l'acurada descripció de les naus japoneses i llur comesa d'instrucció. Creiem que la seva visita és un gran honor per Catalunya.

http://www.revistanaval.com/noticia/20130828-040839-jmsdf-japan-escuadra-instruccion-barcelona

Wide-mouthed frog*

IF IT’S as big as an aircraft-carrier and looks like an aircraft-carrier, chances are that it is an aircraft-carrier—or can readily be turned into one. In Yokohama on August 6th Japan unveiled its biggest warship since the second world war. Officially, the Izumo is a destroyer; when it enters service in 2015 it will come with a complement of up to 14 helicopters that will be used for anti-submarine warfare and border-surveillance missions. The ship, with a displacement of 27,000 tonnes fully loaded, is half as big again as anything else in the Japanese fleet. It will also be able to ferry lots of people and equipment to disaster-relief sites.

For the moment, at least, the Izumo does nothing to challenge Japan’s pacifist constitution, drawn up after the war, which forbids the country to project force abroad—with strike carriers, for instance. However, speculation is rife that the Izumo, with a flight deck of 248 metres (814 feet), could be used to launch fixed-wing aircraft, should the constitution or circumstances change. The vessel is similar in size to the French and Italian carriers, the Charles de Gaulle and the Cavour. It is nearly 40 metres longer than the Invincible-class carriers from which Britain operated Harrier jump-jets. Although the Izumo lacks “cats and traps” (catapults for take-off, arrester cables for landing) or a “ski-jump” bow, it would not take much modification to fly the short take-off version of America’s stealthy new Joint Strike Fighter. The Chinese, who already have a (converted Soviet) carrier and are building at least two more of a similar design, have angrily called the Izumo an “aircraft-carrier in disguise”. They have a point.

* Notícia publicada a The economist. La botadura del Izumo és molt significativa, tant per la data escollida ( 6 d'Agost, Hiroshima...) com per la fita que representa en el canvi de la doctrina de defensa japonesa.

Japan's vessels instructed to avoid Chinese Navy ships near disputed islands*

JAPAN - Former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's administration had instructed the Maritime Self-Defence Force to observe Chinese Navy ships in the East China Sea from afar to avoid provoking Beijing, sources close to the government have said.
After the Noda administration nationalised the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture, in September, it told the MSDF to monitor the Chinese vessels from a distance at which the Japanese destroyers could not be seen by the Chinese, the sources said.
Liberal Democratic Party member Koichi Hagiuda asked Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during Thursday's House of Representatives Budget Committee meeting whether he thought the Noda administration had given too much consideration to China with this decision.
Abe replied that he had been told the former government ordered the MSDF to impose restrictions on monitoring of Chinese ships.
"For fear of additional friction, [the Noda administration] excessively restricted the MSDF's activities when patrolling the sea. Right after the inauguration of the current administration, we fundamentally reviewed the policy of the former government," Abe said.
According to the government sources, in the early days of the DPJ's administrations, MSDF ships carried out their duty of patrolling the sea in a conventional way by coming as close as three kilometers to Chinese ships in the East China Sea when necessary.
However, after the escalation of confrontations between Japan and China following the nationalisation of the Senkaku Islands, the Noda administration changed the policy over MSDF patrols, according to the sources.
Some observers said the leaders of the previous government paid special consideration to China, for fear that military tensions could heighten if the MSDF approached the Chinese Navy ships.
It is generally said the distance at which people on a ship can see other vessels is 28 kilometers or less.
The MSDF is believed to have tracked the Chinese ships by radar while positioned more than 28 kilometers away.
The MSDF destroyers backed away when Chinese ships came close to them, the sources said.
After the Abe administration came into power in December, the new government restored the monitoring activities to their previous level.
Some government officials said when Chinese Navy vessels locked fire-control radar onto an MSDF destroyer north of the Senkaku Islands on Jan. 30, they might have done so because China interpreted Japan's sudden visible presence in the waters as a provocation.
"When Japan restored its monitoring system to the conventional level, China reacted in a menacing way, as it thought Japan took a provocative action," a senior official of the Defence Ministry said.

*Noticia publicada a Asia One. Evitar caure en provocacions és quelcom assenyat, ara bé, les polítiques d'apaivagament acostumen a produïr l'efecte contrari quan es tracta amb dictadures.

Beijing's Senkaku goal: Sub 'safe haven' in South China Sea +

Quest for isles a strategic aim: former MSDF rear admiral

By REIJI YOSHIDA

Staff writer

What's at stake in the smoldering diplomatic crisis with China over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, which only seem to attract fishing boats and ultranationalists?

Sub-chaser: Sumihiko Kawamura, ex-commander of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's antisubmarine air wing, is interviewed recently in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo. REIJI YOSHIDA

Many Japanese observers say Beijing, which claims the Japan-controlled islets in the East China Sea and calls them Diaoyu, is trying to secure natural resources in the surrounding area, whereas China says the islets were captured by Japan in the 1890s at the start of its aggression toward China.

But according to Sumihiko Kawamura, a former rear admiral and commander of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's antisubmarine air wing, Beijing has a more critical but less-articulated goal that, if achieved, could tip strategic military superiority from the United States to China in the Pacific.

Kawamura believes Beijing is trying to turn the South China Sea into "a safe haven" for its nuclear-powered submarines, which are armed with ballistic missiles that can reach the United States. For that purpose, seizing the Senkakus — just 190 km east of Taiwan and close to the northern gateway to the South China Sea — is indispensable, Kawamura says.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are considered China's only viable option to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent against the U.S., because America has identified all of China's ICBM silos and could easily destroy them in a pre-emptive nuclear strike, he says.

If Beijing maintains a second-strike capability with SLBMs that can reach the U.S. mainland, Kawamura says, this risk would possibly dissuade America from intervening in a major conflict involving China.

"This is directly related to the nuclear strategy of China. China will never give up the Senkakus," the former vice principal of the Joint Staff College of the Self-Defense Forces said during a recent interview with The Japan Times.

"This is just the beginning. Even if it takes 100 years, Beijing will try to seize the islands" to turn the South China Sea into a safe haven for its missile subs, he said.

Kawamura indicated the MSDF has the capability, with the U.S. Navy, to contain China's submarines within the South China Sea, which is partially enclosed by Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.

The MSDF's nonnuclear "ultraquiet" submarines, working together with the U.S. Navy, can find, track and even sink any Chinese submarine that tries to enter the Pacific Ocean by crossing anywhere along a sea line that runs from the Japanese main islands to the Philippines via Okinawa and Taiwan, Kawamura said. The Chinese navy calls the line the First Island Chain, given its strategic importance.

"(We can) sink Chinese submarines anytime we want if it comes to a showdown" in the Pacific Ocean, said Kawamura, who in August published a book detailing a possible Japanese-Chinese military clash over the Senkaku Islands.

"No option is left (for China) except for trying to make the South China Sea a safe haven and defending submarines carrying nuclear missiles there," Kawamura said.

According to The New York Times, Xiong Guangkai, then deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, threatened the U.S. in 1995, saying China would consider launching a nuclear attack on Los Angeles if the U.S. were to intervene in a Taiwan conflict.

In 2005, Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu sparked a sensation by telling reporters that Beijing would have no choice but to conduct a pre-emptive nuclear strike against American cities if China faced the prospect of defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan.

"Japan has been protected by the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. If the U.S. cannot fully trust its deterrence power (against China), the U.S. won't interfere in" military conflicts between Japan and China, nor those involving Taiwan, he said.

Recently, China started calling the South China Sea one of its "core interests," signaling that no compromise would be acceptable and the use of force wouldn't be ruled out to protect its interests in the area.

China has also opened a large naval base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea that reportedly can accommodate as many as 20 submarines. This is part of the strategy to provide its nuclear-armed subs with a safe haven, Kawamura said.

Experts believe China's SLBMs have a maximum range of about 8,000 km. This means the lower 48 states in the U.S. would be out of reach from submarines in the South China Sea.

But China is working to extend the range of its SLBMs so they can hit the U.S. without its subs having to venture too far into the Pacific, according to Kawamura.

He said he believes China is being forced to follow the same tactic the Soviet Navy adopted during the Cold War.

The MSDF and U.S. Navy were able to track "almost all of the Soviet submarines" and thereby minimized the SLBM threat in the Pacific, Kawamura said.

As part of its nuclear deterrence against the U.S., the Soviet Union tried to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into "a bastion" for its nuclear sub fleet by crowding many surface warships and subs there.

China still lacks the technology to make its submarines stealthy. They are far noisier and easier to track than the Soviet subs, Kawamura said.

"When navigating, Chinese submarines sound like they are pounding a drum or bell," he said.

He believes that for now, the MSDF has supremacy over the Chinese navy, particularly because of its advanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities.

Submarine warfare could be the decisive element in a modern naval engagement. At present, China has only four antisubmarine aircraft, whereas 77 MSDF P-3C sub hunters regularly patrol the seas around Japan.

"As far as submarine warfare is concerned, China still doesn't have the ability to do what we were doing 30 years ago (to counter Soviet submarines). They are 30 years behind us," Kawamura said.

China recently launched its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, sparking a media sensation. But the carrier's operational theater would be restricted to just the South China Sea if a real war broke out, given its various technological limitations, Kawamura said.

Echoing many other military analysts, Kawamura noted China lacks the catapult technology to launch heavy carrier-based jets.

China's subs also aren't quiet enough to protect a carrier. The Liaoning would only "fall prey to" MSDF submarines even if it is dispatched, for example, to the East China Sea in the case of a war with Japan, Kawamura said.

"I don't think China will able to have an aircraft carrier that really performs within 10 years or so," he added.

If China were to attack and try to seize the Senkaku Islands now, it might be able to temporarily occupy them. But the occupation would not last long and the Chinese would eventually lose because the MSDF can easily cut off the maritime logistical lines for any occupiers, Kawamura said.

"If China has analyzed (the MSDF's capability) in a calm manner, I don't think it will resort to force. But there can be an accidental escalation" leading to a military clash, he said.

Chinese leaders may also try to use military force to attack the Senkakus to divert the frustration of the Chinese people, Kawamura warned.

He thus urged the government to enact legislation to ease regulations on the MSDF and Japan Coast Guard to allow them to fire warning shots against foreign ships approaching the islets. Otherwise, Chinese ships will keep coming back to the Senkakus for years to show they effectively control the territory, he said.

* Entrevista publicada al Japan Times. Creiem  que les opinions d'un alt oficial amb l'experiència de l'almirall Kawamura són per tenir en molta consideració.

China provokes Japan as activists land on disputed island chain *

Outrage was provoked by a visit by two cabinet ministers to the Yakusuni shrine in Tokyo, which commemorates 2.5 million Japanese war dead, including 1,054 war criminals and 14 “Class A” war criminals.

A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign ministry said he hoped Japan would take “concrete actions” to “correctly see” its history of invasion and that it would “respect the feelings” of people in Asian countries.

The practice of visiting the shrine on the anniversary of Japan’s surrender, which was revived by Junichiro Koizumi, the then prime minister, in 2006.

Japan’s neighbours expressed hopes that visits to the shrine would cease after Mr Koizumi left office.

Meanwhile, a group of Chinese activists managed to evade Japan’s coastguard, which fired on them with water cannons, and plant a Chinese flag on the Diaoyu islands, which are also claimed by Japan as the Senkaku’s.

Japanese police initially arrested five activists who swam ashore in the East China Sea chain, known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

Japan Coast Guard officers later arrested nine others who stayed on the fishing boat, the Kai Fung 2, including two who had earlier landed on one of the islands called Uotsuri and went back aboard, officials said.

The island chain moved into the spotlight again in April when Shintaro Ishihara, the 79-year-old governor of Tokyo, announced that he wanted to buy the Senkaku’s for Japan.

He has so far raised more than $17 million in donations, while announcing that Japan is heading for an “inevitable” confrontation with China, to the delight of nationalists.

Xu Dunxin, a Chinese former Foreign vice-minister, said that some Japanese politicians were stirring up nationalism for political capital. “The farcical episodes are exploiting the domestic nationalist mood to take advantage while damaging China-Japan ties,” he told the China Daily newspaper.

The Chinese activists who made it ashore sang patriotic songs and shouted in jubilation. The Japanese Foreign ministry warned it would “take appropriate action”, while China, through the state-run Global Times newspaper, warned that it would “send warships” to the islands if the activists were touched.

A second attempt to reach the islands by a group of Taiwanese activists was thwarted by a typhoon.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong residents tore up paper replicas of the Japanese military flag, and there were small protests at Japanese government offices in Taipei and Beijing.

There were memorial services to mark the anniversary in Nanjing, Changchun and in Guangzhou, where a new exhibit opened to celebrate General Chen Kefei, a key figure in the anti-Japanese war.

Relations between Japan and South Korea have also deteriorated, and a South Korean pop star yesterday led a group of 40 students in a swim to another disputed island chain, the Liancourt Rocks, known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan.

Last week Japan recalled its ambassador to Seoul and cancelled a meeting with South Korea’s Finance minister after Lee Myung Bak, the South Korean president, made a sudden and unexpected visit to the islands, possibly to stir up support for his party ahead of elections in December. “It is extremely regrettable,” said Japan's Foreign minister, Koichiro Gemba.

During the Olympics, a South Korean footballer, Park Jong Woo, held up a sign saying “Dokdo is our land”, and was promptly banned from receiving his bronze medal.

* Notícia publicada al Telegraph. Tot i que aquesta mena d'accions no són cap novetat en la disputa per les Senkaku/Diaoyu, cal seguir-les atentament, ja que el pas d'una escalada verbal a una de militar és massa fàcil.

US to deploy drones over Diaoyutais*

An RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle conducts tests over Naval Air Station Patuxent River in the US state of Maryland in an undated photo supplied by the US Navy.

Photo: Reuters

The US will use its most advanced unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to monitor Chinese activity in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), the object of an acrimonious dispute between Beijing and Tokyo, Japanese media are reporting.

The decision was made during a meeting between Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta at the Pentagon on Sunday, NHK and the Yomiuri Shimbun said, adding that the drones would also conduct surveillance around Okinawa.

At least three unarmed Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk drones have been deployed at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam since September 2010, bolstering the operational intelligence capabilities of US forces in the Asia-Pacific.

Operating at an altitude of about 18,000m, the RQ-4 provides near-real-time, long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance imagery by means of a high-resolution synthetic aperture radar. It played a role in damage assessment following the disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in March last year.

Amid rising tensions between Japan and China over the disputed islets, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has mostly relied on P-3C “Orion” surveillance aircraft to monitor Chinese naval activity in the area.

Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the islands.

Tetsuo Kotani, a fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, said the deployment sends an important message.

“One of the urgent issues for the US-Japan alliance is to enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] cooperation,” he told the Taipei Times yesterday. “The Global Hawk can serve as a symbol of allied ISR cooperation.”

“This is an important step for the alliance and sends a strong message to Beijing thatWashington stands firmly with Tokyo,” he said.

Although the US does not officially take a position on the sovereignty dispute, some believe the Diaoyutais fall within the scope of Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security.

However, Kotani said Beijing should not misunderstand the real message.

“This is US reassurance to Japan. As long as Japan is reassured by the US, Japan does not have to take provocative actions vis-a-vis Beijing over the Senkakus,” he said. “No country wants to increase the tensions.”

The Diaoyutais are known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan.

During Sunday’s meeting, Panetta and Morimoto also agreed to explore eventual revisions of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which govern cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the US military during crises.

Passed in 1978, the guidelines were substantially revised in 1997 in response to the North Korean nuclear program.

“We shared the view that it’s important to jointly study and discuss [security matters], taking into consideration changes in the security environment and what Japan-US cooperation should be,” Morimoto told a press conference.

According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, the review will focus on defense cooperation on the Nansei Islands in response to Chinese military expansion and increasing activity in waters surrounding Japan, as well as North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and post-disaster cooperation.

No specific procedures or timeline for the review were discussed.

* Notícia publicada al Taipei Times. Que la situació a les Senkaku / Diaoyutai és tensa, no és cap novetat. Ara bé, el possible destí d'aparells com el Global Hawk nord-americans és tot un missatge.