Coast Guards in the Arctic – Troubles Ahead?*

Coast guards are the maritime workhorses of coastal states, intent on protecting their sovereign rights to fisheries and petroleum resources, while also safeguarding lives and the environment. In an Arctic Klondike, this institution – which often operates in the shadow of national navies – does the heavy lifting. Yet, striking the right balance on fleet structure, investments, and Arctic presence in times of budget austerity is no easy task for Arctic coastal states.

Waking up to a New Reality

Maritime activity levels in the Arctic are increasing, compared to low levels throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. It is not the number of trans-arctic voyages, but the number of ships with a destination in the Arctic itself that has predominately increased. This comes as a result of an increase in the transport of goods to and from the Arctic, and from an increase in cruise ship tourism offering “Arctic Cruises” [1]. Similarly, exploratory drilling in Greenlandic, Alaskan or North Norwegian waters, and record yielding fish stocks in the Barents Sea and North Sea, contribute to this trend [2].

Coast Guard Prerogatives

As activity increases, the need for an active management of the maritime domain increases as well. When fisheries grow in volume, so does the need for fisheries inspections and research to determine the sustainable yield of the stocks. When more vessels operate further north, search and rescue incidents grow in numbers, and as the number of exploratory drillings rises, the potential for accidents related to oil exploration similarly increases. The pressure on coast guards to provide aid to navigation is also increasing, sometimes demanding an ice breaking capacity that requires relatively costly investments in icebreakers [3]. Consequently, this large relative growth in activity spurs demand for a number of coast guard tasks in the Arctic, as depicted below.

The coast guard institutional structure in one Arctic state is very different from the next, ranging from a civilian model without a law enforcing mandate (Canada), to military structures separated from (USA, Russia), or part of (Norway, Denmark), national navies [4]. Yet, as the amount of tasks in northern waters increases, all of the various Arctic coast guards find themselves in a similar position, weighing priorities and resources [5]. In particular, they encounter challenges concerning budget restraints, aging equipment and large areas of operation.

Solving problems together?

Investments in coast guards, on the other hand, in particular in the North American side of the Arctic, are pending. This is mainly a consequence of limited public investments in an area where the return rate of such investments – at least in according to strict economic calculations – can be questioned. In the context of low temperatures and remote operating areas, however, the consequences of a cruise ship accident or an oil spill is likely to become more fatal in the Arctic, than in more densely populated areas further south.

In 2011, Arctic states responded to this challenge by creating a legally binding search and rescue agreement under the auspices of the Arctic Council, dividing the Arctic into areas of responsibility (see map) [6]. In 2013, another agreement was signed on oil pollution, preparedness and response, implementing the same mechanisms for oil spill response [7]. Forming alliances and initiating collaboration across borders with partners in similar situations provides a practical solution to a fiscal challenge. It is also an easier and less expensive remedy than building up domestic assets in isolation.

However, agreeing on zones of responsibility does not inherently enhance maritime capabilities in the Arctic, which ultimately fall under the prerogatives of the various national coast guards. Operational collaboration across borders is also not necessarily an adequate response to new maritime challenges in the Arctic. The share distance between the Arctic maritime zones and the differences in coast guard structures provide barriers to effective collaboration. Additionally, coast guard tasks are often closely linked to the protection of sovereign rights and enforcing national law. Such tasks are not easily transferred or outsourced.

Planning for the future

Working across Arctic maritime borders with your neighbor is undoubtedly beneficial, if not crucial, to jointly manage natural resources and protect the environment. The establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum – building off the already well-functioning North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum – is one such measure.  

Such collaboration will not, however, disband the need for national and local investments in future Arctic capabilities. The processes of coast guard procurement and capacity building are additionally costly and lengthy. Showcasing this challenge, the US Coast Guard has been calling out for more investment in District 17 (Alaska) for almost a decade, while in Canada the acquisition of a much-needed new Coast Guard icebreaker is delayed [8].

Littoral states in the Arctic have to carefully contemplate future investments and needs to avoid finding themselves in a situation where the former and the latter do not match. Arriving in 2030 in a direr state than today will be detrimental to any Arctic development. Preventing disaster is of interest to all littoral states as they determine the future potential of their Arctic maritime areas.

Sources:

[1] Steinicke, S., & Albrecht, S. (2012). Search and Rescue in the Arctic Working Paper (Vol. 2012/05). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. & Brigham, L. W. (2013). The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic. In B. S. e. Zellen (Ed.), The fast-changing Arctic: rethinking Arctic security for a warmer world (pp. 1-17). Calgary: Calgary Unversity Press.

[2] Fred Olsen Cruise Lines. (2014). Greenland & Arctic Cruises. Retrieved June 5, 2014, from http://www.fredolsencruises.com/places-we-visit/region/arctic-greenland-cruises & Østhagen, A. (2013a). Arctic oil and gas. The role of regions. In IFS (Ed.), (Vol. September 2). Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS).

[3] Brigham, L. W. (2013). The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic. In B. S. e. Zellen (Ed.), The fast-changing Arctic: rethinking Arctic security for a warmer world (pp. 1-17). Calgary: Calgary Unversity Press. & Mitchell, J. R. (2013). The Canadian Coast Guard in Perspective: A paper prepared for Action Canada (Vol. August). Ottawa: Action Canada.

[4] Andreas Østhagen (2014). "Coast Guard Collaboration in the Arctic: Canada and Greenland (Denmark)", Toronto: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program.

[5] Terjesen, B., Kristiansen, T., & Gjelsten, R. (2010). Sjøforsvaret i krig og fred: Langs kysten og på havet gjennom 200 år. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

[6] Arctic Council. Search and Rescue: SAR-Agreement. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/oceans/search-and-rescue/157-sar-agreement

[7] Arctic Council. Agreement on cooperation on marine oil pollution, preparedness and response in the Arctic Final - Formatted version. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting

[8] http://www.adn.com/article/20140916/us-icebreaker-fleet-will-need-makeover-about-2020-coast-guard-says & Byers, M. (2012, March 27). You can’t replace real icebreakers, The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2012/03/you-cant-replace-real-icebreakers.html

* Article publicat per The Artic Institute. No és el primer cop que parlem de guardacostes i l'Àrtic. Recomanem una lectura reflexiva d'aquest article així com les seves fonts documentals.

Russia to build military Arctic environmental center*

Russia’s Ministry of Defense wants to enhance ecological monitoring in the Arctic and plans to establish a regional environmental center operated by the Northern Fleet.

Russia’s military presence in the Arctic is not to harm the region’s ecology, Deputy Defence Minister General Dmitry Bulgakov told reporters on Saturday.

“To control the ecology of the Russian Arctic zone, a regional environmental center of the Northern Fleet is to be created in the near future, which will carry out ecological monitoring and control compliance with Russian and international environmental legislation,” Bulgakov said according to Portnews.

Russia’s Defense Ministry has worked out a road-map on ecology security in the Arctic, Bulgakov said. According to the road map, military specialists are analyzing the ecology situation in places the Armed Forces have been located in the Arctic, including territories that were used in the Soviet times. “We plan to remove within the next few years old and destroyed buildings and to re-cultivate the territory - this means we shall remove the debris, fundaments, metal parts and so forth.”

According to Bulgakov, Russian forces have removed ten tons of garbage from Wrangel Island this summer.

 

* Notícia publicada a The Barents Observer. Rússia segueix consolidant posicions, també a l'Àrtic; aquesta peça n'és una nova constatació.

PLA looks to add more Type 052D destroyers

The People's Liberation Army will soon be adding more of the highly-touted Type 052D destroyer to its naval fleet, reports the Canada-based Kanwa Defense Review.

After completing six Type 052C destroyers, the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai is said to have shifted its focus to the Type 052D destroyer, which comes with several key improvements including its radar and engine systems.

The Type 052D has reportedly ditched the old Ukraine-made DA80 gas turbines used in the first two of the Type 052C vessels and has domestically upgraded the QC-280 gas turbine engines used in latter four Type 052C vessels to reduce weight and increase power. The DA80s were not ideal for the Type 052C given their considerable weight and fuel consumption, which is why they have not been considered for use in the Russian and Indian navies, the report said.

The Type 052D also features the PLA Navy's first ever vertical launching system for anti-ship missiles, which can travel at both subsonic and supersonic speeds and with a range of about 220 kilometers.

Altogether six vessels of this class are now fitting out or under construction, with a further four on order or planned. The Kunming is currently the only active Type 052D destroyer in the PLA Navy, while the Changsha is still undergoing sea trials.

Each of the Type 052D vessels has a displacement nearing 10,000 tonnes. As of now, China only has one type of vessel at that level, namely the Type 071 amphibious transport dock, which has a displacement of 20,000 tonnes. China currently has three of the Yuzhao-class amphibious warfare ships and reportedly has plans to acquire three more for the PLA's East Sea Fleet.

* Notícia publicada per Want China Times. Ja hem dit diverses vegades que la transformació de la Marina de l'Exèrcit Popular d'Alliberament (PLAN) en una flota oceànica ha de ser mesurada en el seu conjunt i no només en si té portaavions. Vet aquí un pas més. A la inversa, la US Navy hauria de començar a "alliberar" Arleigh Burkes de tasques d'escorta de portaavions i començar a ampliar ens seus DESRONs (Destroyer Squadrons), si realment vol mantenir l'hegemonia al Pacífic.

Australia receives first Canberra-class LHD

The Australian government has accepted the first of its two Canberra-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) from BAE Systems, the vessel's prime contractor said in a statement on 8 October.

The ship will remain at BAE Systems' Williamstown shipyard in Melbourne before its commissioning at Sydney later in 2014, the statement added. It is due for delivery to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) on 28 November.

Canberra , which is based on Navantia's Juan Carlos I aircraft carrier design, completed its final contractor sea trials in late August.

Work is progressing on second ship Adelaide , which arrived in Australia for outfitting in Bé bé ja tu after being transported from Navantia's Ferrol yard in Spain. Adelaide is scheduled to begin sea trials in the second quarter of 2015, with delivery expected in 2016.

Meanwhile, Australia has begun the process of exercising an option on two more Boeing C-17A Globemaster III strategic airlifters in addition to the six operated by 36 Squadron out of RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland.

Defence Minister David Johnston said in a statement that, if exercised, the two extra Globemasters would "significantly enhance the Royal Australian Air Force's [RAAF's] capacity for operational tasks, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance in our region and around the world".

"The ability to rapidly react and move large elements of Australia's support systems over long distances during these times has highlighted the need for us to have a good sized fleet," he added.

Australia initially purchased four C-17s under Project AIR 8000 Phase 3 using the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, with the first aircraft delivered in December 2006. The last of the six in service was delivered to the RAAF in 2012.

* Notícia publicada per Jane's Information Group. Austràlia continua ampliant la seva capacitat de projecció de força, consolidant-se com a element estabilitzador al Pacífic i l'Índic